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Federal Court Enjoins Implementation of Mississippi
H.B. 1523

U

.S. District Judge Carlton W.
Reeves announced on June 27
that he would order Mississippi
officials not to enforce part of H.B. 1523,
a recently-enacted state law scheduled
to go into effect on July 1, because it
would circumvent the Supreme Court’s
2015 ruling requiring states to afford
equal marriage rights to same-sex
couples. The challenged provision,
Section 3(8)(a), allowed Circuit Court
Clerks to “recuse” themselves from
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples if they have a sincere religious
belief opposed to same-sex marriage.
The provision says that same-sex
couples will be entitled to get marriage
licenses, but provides no mechanism to

also a named defendant, hinted he might
not be joining that appeal, suggesting
that religious folks in Mississippi had
been “duped” by the legislature enacting
a useless and probably unconstitutional
measure. Subsequently, Hood signaled
that he definitely would not join the
appeal, stating that the law had hurt
the state’s reputation and that it should
expend resources on defending it when
there were so many other underfunded
initiatives.
On July 7, Governor Bryant filed a
motion informing Judge Reeves that he
intended to appeal to the 5th Circuit,
and asking that the injunction be stayed
and the law be allowed to go into effect
pending the appeal, according to news

protection for clerks who do not want to
issue same-sex marriage licenses was
no more violative of the Establishment
Clause than laws in more than 40 states
exempting those with objections to
abortions from having to participate in
them. Indeed, they argued, there is a
well-established practice in American
law recognizing exemptions from
general legal obligations for those whose
religious or moral scruples compel
them to refrain from actions. They
cited as other examples conscientious
objection from military service or from
dispensing contraceptives. They also
argued that H.B. 1523 avoids inflicting
any harm on same-sex couples by
requiring that steps be taken to assure

Judge Reeves granted a preliminary injunction against the entire statute
based on his finding that it probably violated both the 1st and 14th
Amendments.
make sure that they can get them in case
there is nobody in a particular clerk’s
office who has not recused himself
or herself. The Order is published as
Campaign for Southern Equality v.
Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83036,
2016 WL 3574410 (S.D. Miss., June
27, 2016). Then, just days later, as H.B.
1523 was scheduled to go into effect on
July 1, Judge Reeves issued a lengthy
decision in two other pending cases,
granting a preliminary injunction
against the entire statute based on his
finding that it probably violated both
the 1st and 14th Amendments. Barber
v. Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120,
2016 WL 3562647 (S.D. Miss., June 30,
2016). Although Governor Phil Bryant,
a Republican who is the lead defendant
in all three cases, announced a swift
appeal to the 5th Circuit, Attorney
General Jim Hood, a Democrat who is

reports on July 8 (Memphis Commercial
Appeal). Of course, his motion could
only succeed if Judge Reeves agreed
that the governor likely to prevail
on the merits in his appeal. (One
constitutional law professor was quoted
in a local newspaper as stating that the
Establishment Clause conclusion was
so clear that he would not use it as an
exam question.) When Reeves did not
immediately issue a ruling staying his
preliminary injunction, Bryant had a
motion filed in the 5th Circuit on July 11,
urging the court to issue a stay without
waiting for Reeves to rule. At the heart
of Bryant’s motion was the contention
that H.B. 1523 did not present any sort
of serious Establishment Clause issue.
His counsel (Drew L. Snyder, James
A. Campbell [of Alliance Defending
Freedom], and the James Otis Law
Group LLC) argued that the conscience

that they are not delayed in obtaining
marriage licenses as a result of a clerk’s
recusal (although the statute does not
specify how that assurance will be
implemented). They also argued that
the Mississippi law does not require
anybody to discriminate against gay
people.
In his June 27 Order, recalling a 1962
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 5th Circuit, Meredith v. Fair, 305
F.2d 343, which “chastised our State
for ‘a carefully calculated campaign
of delay and masterly inactivity” in
response to federal desegregation
orders, Judge Reeves announced that
he would “reopen” the Mississippi
marriage equality case “for the parties
to confer about how to provide clerks
with actual notice of the Permanent
injunction” and for the parties “to confer
on appropriate language to include in
Summer 2016
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an Amended Permanent Injunction.” As
noted below, he came back to this theme
in his June 30 order, comparing the
language with which Governor Bryant
had criticized the Obergefell decision
and the language used by segregationist
Mississippi governors in the 1950s and
1960s to criticize the Supreme Court’s
ruling on racial segregation.
Robbie Kaplan, a New York attorney
who represents the Campaign for
Southern Equality, the plaintiff in the
Mississippi case, had filed a motion
seeking to reopen the marriage case
in order to ensure that same-sex
couples in the state are not subjected to
unconstitutional discrimination because
of H.B. 1523. A large team of pro-bono
attorneys from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison, a New York firm
where Kaplan is a partner, is working on
the case, together with attorneys from
several southern states, including local
counsel from Mississippi.
Reeves is also presiding in two
other lawsuits involving challenges
and defenses to the constitutionality of
other provisions of H.B. 1523, which
was explicitly enacted in response to the
Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges
decision and which shelters public
employees and private businesses from
any liability or adverse consequences
if they refuse to deal with same-sex
couples based on their religious beliefs.
The law also allows government offices
and businesses to deny transgender
people appropriate access to restrooms
and other gender-designated facilities,
once again based on a “sincere religious
belief” that a person’s gender is
immutably determined at birth.
Judge Reeves, an African-American
man who was appointed to the district
court by President Barack Obama,
presided over the Mississippi marriage
equality case, Campaign for Southern
Equality v. Bryant, issuing a ruling
in November 2014 that the state’s
constitutional and statutory bans on
same-sex marriage violate the 14th
Amendment. He issued a preliminary
injunction to that effect on November
25, which was stayed while the state
appealed to the 5th Circuit, which,
after hearing oral argument in this and
266 LGBT Law Notes Summer 2016

cases from other states in the circuit in
January 2015, put a hold on the appeal
until the Supreme Court decided the
Obergefell case.
The Obergefell decision, announced
on June 26, 2015, said that same-sex
couples were entitled to enter into civil
marriages “on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples.”
“This resolved the issue nationwide,”
wrote Reeves, who subsequently issued
a Permanent Injunction in response to an
order from the 5th Circuit (see 791 F.3d
625) directing him to “act expeditiously
on remand and enter final judgment.”
Reeves’ July 2015 Permanent Injunction
ordered that the state “and all its agents,
officers, employees, and subsidiaries,
and the Circuit Clerk of Hinds County
and all her agents, officers, and
employees, are permanently enjoined
from enforcing Section 263A of the
Mississippi Constitution and Mississippi
Code Section 93-1-1(2).”
Shortly after Reeves issued his
injunction, the Mississippi Attorney
General’s office advised all 82 Circuit
Court clerks to grant marriage licenses
“to same-sex couples on the same terms
and conditions accorded to couples of
the opposite sex.” But in response to this
motion, the State argued that the only
Circuit Court Clerk bound by the court’s
injunction was the Hinds County Clerk,
who was named in that Order, because
the clerks are county employees rather
than state employees.
When the Mississippi legislature
convened for its 2016 session, it promptly
passed H.B. 1523, which was clearly
intended to send a message that the
state would happily tolerate and protect
discrimination against same-sex couples
and LGBT individuals by privileging
those with anti-gay religious beliefs.
This was largely symbolic when it came
to discrimination by private businesses
and landlords, since Mississippi law did
not then forbid discrimination because
of sexual orientation or gender identity
in employment, housing and public
accommodations. It was only after H.B.
1523 was enacted that the city of Jackson
became the first jurisdiction in the state
to legislate against such discrimination.
Thus, at the time H.B. 1523 was passed,

this “privilege” was not necessary
to “protect” free exercise of anti-gay
religious views by Mississippians,
especially as the state already had a
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in
place that would at least arguably protect
individuals against undue burden of
their religion if the state didn’t have a
compelling interest to require them to
comply with a generally applicable law.
The provisions in H.B. 1523 about
bathroom use and marriage licenses
threatened to have more significant
practical effect, setting up a clash with
federal constitutional and statutory
requirements. Over the past few months,
issue has been joined in several lawsuits
in other federal districts contesting
whether federal sex discrimination laws
override state laws and require employers
not to discriminate against LGBT
people or to deny bathroom access to
transgender employees and students. As
Judge Reeves pointed out in his June 27
Order, states “lack authority to nullify
a federal right or cause of action they
believe is inconsistent with their local
policies.” In this case, the marriage
license provision clearly violates federal
constitutional requirements established
in the Obergefell decision.
“In H.B. 1523,” wrote Reeves, “the
State is permitting the differential
treatment to be carried out by individual
clerks. A statewide policy has been
‘pushed down’ to an individual-level
policy. But the alleged constitutional
infirmity is the same. The question
remains whether the Fourteenth
Amendment requires marriage licenses
to be granted (and out-of-state marriage
licenses to be recognized) to samesex couples on identical terms as they
are to opposite-sex couples.” And the
precise question before Reeves was
whether it was necessary to modify his
2015 injunction to make it clear that all
government employees involved in the
marriage process, including the State
Registrar and the Circuit Court Clerks,
are bound by his injunction.
Reeves concluded that the Registrar
was clearly bound, but that it would be
preferable to make it more explicit that
the Circuit Court Clerks are bound as
well, since a violation of the injunction

would subject them to potential liability,
including the costs of defending lawsuits
against them and possible contempt
penalties if they refused to obey the
court’s Order.
Much of Judge Reeves’ June 27 Order
was devoted to technical procedural and
jurisdictional issues, which he resolved
in every instance against the state
defendants, from Governor Phil Bryant
on down.
He also agreed with the plaintiffs
that they should be able to conduct
discovery against the State Registrar
in order to learn which Clerks had filed
forms seeking to recuse themselves
from issuing marriage licenses. The
Registrar, who is supposed to receive
those forms under H.B. 1523, had been
claiming that since she was not a party
to the marriage lawsuit, she was not
bound by the court’s injunction and
thus not subject to a discovery demand
in this case. Reeves asserted that “there
are good reasons to permit discovery
from the Registrar strictly for purposes
of enforcing the Permanent Injunction.
In 2016, Mississippi responded to
Obergefell by creating a new way to
treat same-sex couples differently
than opposite-sex couples. That the
differential treatment is now pushed
down to county employees should be
irrelevant for discovery purposes. The
State will have the documents that
show exactly where and by whom the
differential treatment it authorized in
HB 1523 will now occur. The Plaintiffs
should be able to receive that postjudgment discovery from an appropriate
State employee, like the Registrar.”
Reeves rejected the technical
argument that the State, as such, was
not a party to the lawsuit. For technical
reasons of constitutional law, the State
as an entity can’t be sued in federal
court by its citizens without its consent,
so state officials rather than the State
itself are designated as defendants
in cases like the marriage equality
lawsuit. But this is really a technicality.
The Attorney General defended the
marriage ban using state funds and
employees and, Reeves pointed out,
it is well established that a federal
court “may enjoin the implementation

of an official state policy” because
the state is “the real party in interest”
even though the lawsuit was brought
against named state officials. Reeves
signaled that the amended form of the
Injunction would add language from
the Obergefell decision to make clear
that same-sex couples are entitled to the
same treatment as different-sex couples
because, as the 5th Circuit said last July,
Obergefell “is the law of the land and,
consequently, the law of this circuit.”
“Mississippi’s elected officials may
disagree with Obergefell, of course,
and may express that disagreement
as they see fit – by advocating for a
constitutional amendment to overturn
the decision, for example,” wrote
Reeves. “But the marriage license issue
will not be adjudicated anew after every
legislative session. And the judiciary
will remain vigilant whenever a named

the entire bill, not just the clerk recusal
position at issue in the June 27 Order.
Unlike the earlier ruling, the June
30 Order treated H.B. 1523 as broadly
unconstitutional on its face. At the heart
of H.B. 1523 is its Section 2, which
spells out three “sincerely held religious
beliefs or moral convictions” that are
entitled, as found by Judge Reeves, to
“special legal protection.” These are “(a)
Marriage is or should be recognized as
the union of one man and one woman;
(b) Sexual relations are properly
reserved to such a marriage; and (c)
Male (man) or female (woman) refer to
an individual’s immutable biological sex
as objectively determined by anatomy
and genetics at birth.” According to the
statute, any person or entity that holds
one or more of these beliefs is entitled
to be free from any sanction by the
government for acting upon them by,

Reeves, who ruled in 2014 that Mississippi’s ban
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional,
agreed with the plaintiffs as to all of their
arguments.
party to an injunction is accused of
circumventing that injunction, directly
or indirectly.”
Just minutes before H.B. 1523 was
scheduled to go into effect on July 1,
Judge Reeves filed a 60-page opinion
explaining why he was granting a
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs
in two other cases challenging the
measure, which he consolidated for this
purpose under the name of Barber v.
Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120,
2016 WL 3562647 (S.D. Miss., June 30,
2016). According to this June 30 Order,
H.B. 1523 likely violates both the 1st
Amendment’s Establishment of Religion
Clause and the 14th Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. Reeves’ lengthy,
scholarly opinion expanded upon some
of the points he made just days earlier,
but this opinion was necessarily more
expansive because it was addressed to

for example, denying restroom access
to a transgender person or refusing to
provide goods or services to a same-sex
couple for their wedding.
The state may not override federal
rights and protections, and the plaintiffs
argued in these cases that by privileging
people whose religious beliefs contradict
the federal constitutional and statutory
rights of LGBT people, the state of
Mississippi had violated its obligation
under the 1st Amendment to preserve
strict neutrality concerning religion and
its obligation under the 14th amendment
to afford “equal protection of the law”
to LGBT people. Reeves, who ruled in
2014 that Mississippi’s ban on same-sex
marriage was unconstitutional, agreed
with the plaintiffs as to all of their
arguments. For purposes of granting a
preliminary injunction, he did not have
to reach an ultimate decision on the
Summer 2016
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merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. It would
suffice to show that they were “likely”
to prevail on the merits. But anybody
reading Reeves’ strongly-worded opinion
would have little doubt about his view
of the merits.
In an introductory portion of this
opinion, he spelled out his conclusions
succinctly: “The Establishment Clause
is violated because persons who
hold contrary religious beliefs are
unprotected – the State has put its
thumb on the scale to favor some
religious beliefs over others. Showing
such favor tells ‘nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and adherents
that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community,’” quoting
from a Supreme Court decision from
2000, Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290. “And the
Equal Protection Clause is violated by
H.B. 1523’s authorization of arbitrary
discrimination against lesbian, gay,
transgender, and unmarried persons.”
Much of the opinion was devoted to
rejecting the state’s arguments that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring
the lawsuits, that the defendants were
not liable to suit on these claims, and
that injunctive relief was unnecessary
because nobody had been injured
by the law. Reeves cut through these
arguments with ease. A major Supreme
Court precedent backing up his decision
on these points is Romer v. Evans, the
1996 case in which LGBT rights groups
won a preliminary injunction against
Colorado government officials to prevent
Amendment 2 from going into effect.
Amendment 2 was a ballot initiative
passed by Colorado voters in 1992 that
prevented the state from providing any
protection against discrimination for
gay people. The state courts found that
the LGBT rights groups could challenge
its constitutionality, and it never did go
into effect, because the Supreme Court
ultimately found that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Judge Reeves
ended his introductory section with a
quote from Romer: “It is not within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort.”
268 LGBT Law Notes Summer 2016

On June 27, Judge Reeves had
alluded to Mississippi’s resistance to
the Supreme Court’s racial integration
rulings from the 1950s and 1960s,
and he did so at greater length in the
June 30 opinion, focusing on how H.B.
1523 was specifically intended by the
legislature as a response to the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.
Mississippi legislators made clear
during the consideration of this bill that
its intention was to allow government
officials and private businesses to
discriminate against LGBT people
without
suffering
any
adverse
consequences, just as the state had earlier
sought to empower white citizens of
Mississippi to preserve their segregated
way of life despite the Supreme Court’s
rejection of race discrimination under
the 14th Amendment.
Reeves quoted comments by
Governor Bryant criticizing Obergefell
as having “usurped” the state’s “right
to self-governance” and mandating the
state to comply with “federal marriage
standards – standards that are out of step
with the wishes of many in the United
States and that are certainly out of step
with the majority of Mississippians.”
In a footnote, Reeves observed, “The
Governor’s remarks sounded familiar.
In the mid-1950s, Governor J.P.
Coleman said that Brown v. Board of
Education ‘represents an unwarranted
invasion of the rights and powers of
the states.’” Furthermore, “In 1962,
before a joint session of the Mississippi
Legislature – and to a ‘hero’s reception’
– Governor Ross Barnett was lauded
for invoking states’ rights during the
battle to integrate the University of
Mississippi.” Reeves also noted how
the racial segregationists in the earlier
period had invoked religious beliefs as
a basis for refusing to comply with the
Supreme Court’s decisions.
Turning to the merits, Reeves
addressed the state’s argument that the
purpose of the statute was to “address
the denigration and disfavor religious
persons felt in the wake of Obergefell,”
and the legislative sponsors presented
it as such, as reflected in the bill’s title:
“Protecting Freedom of Conscience

from Government Discrimination Act.”
Reeves pointed out what was really
going on. “The title, text, and history
of H.B. 1523 indicate that the bill was
the State’s attempt to put LGBT citizens
back in their place after Obergefell,” he
wrote. “The majority of Mississippians
were granted special rights to not serve
LGBT citizens, and were immunized
from the consequences of their actions.
LGBT Mississippians, in turn, were
‘put in a solitary class with respect to
transactions and relations in both the
private and governmental spheres’ to
symbolize their second-class status.”
(The quotation is from Romer v. Evans.)
“As in Romer, Windsor, and Obergefell,”
Reeves continued, “this ‘status-based
enactment’ deprived LGBT citizens of
equal treatment and equal dignity under
the law.”
Because state law in Mississippi
does not expressly forbid discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender
identity, the state tried to claim that
in fact the bill did not have the effect
of imposing any new harm. However,
subsequently the city of Jackson
passed an ordinance forbidding such
discrimination, and the University of
Southern Mississippi also has a nondiscrimination policy in place. “H.B.
1523 would have a chilling effect on
Jacksonians and members of the USM
community who seek the protection
of their anti-discrimination policies,”
wrote Reeves. “If H.B. 1523 goes into
effect, neither the City of Jackson nor
USM could discipline or take adverse
action against anyone who violated their
policies on the basis of a ‘Section 2’
belief.”
The court held that because of the
Establishment Clause part of the case,
H.B. 1523 was subject to strict scrutiny
judicial review, and also pointed
out that under Romer v. Evans, antiLGBT discrimination by the state is
unconstitutional unless there is some
rational justification for it. He rejected
the state’s argument that it had a
compelling interest to confer special
rights upon religious objectors. “Under
the guise of providing additional
protection for religious exercise,” he

wrote, H.B. 1523 “creates a vehicle for
state-sanctioned discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity. It is not rationally related to a
legitimate end.” Indeed, he asserted,
“The deprivation of equal protection of
the laws is H.B. 1523’s very essence.”
Reeves found that the standard for
ordering preliminary relief had been
met. Not only was it likely that H.B.
1523 would be found unconstitutional
in an ultimate merits ruling, but it was
clear that it imposed irreparable harm
on LGBT citizens, that a balancing of
harms favored the plaintiffs over the
defendants, and that the public interest
would be served by enjoining operation
of H.B. 1523 while the lawsuits
continue. “The State argues that the
public interest is served by enforcing
its democratically adopted laws,” he
wrote. “The government certainly has a
powerful interest in enforcing its laws.
That interest, though, yields when a
particular law violates the Constitution.
In such situations the public interest is
not disserved by an injunction preventing
its implementation.” Reeves concluded,
“Religious freedom was one of the
building blocks of this great nation,
and after the nation was torn apart, the
guarantee of equal protection under law
was used to stitch it back together. But
H.B. 1523 does not honor that tradition
of religious freedom, nor does it respect
the equal dignity of all of Mississippi’s
citizens. It must be enjoined.”
In his motion to the 5th Circuit to
stay the June 23 and June 30 injunctions,
Governor Bryant argued, as detailed
above, that Reeves erred on every one
of his findings, and contended that
Reeves’ Establishment Clause rulings
would place in question numerous
federal and statute statutes authorizing
religious exemptions from compliance
with general laws. He also argued that
the correct standard of review for the
constitutionality of H.B. 1523 was
rationality review, not heightened or
strict scrutiny, and that the measure
easily passed the rationality test because
so many religious exemption statutes
have been upheld against challenge by
the courts. ■

Federal Trial Courts Divided Over Title
VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Claims

L

ast July, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
reversing its position dating back
fifty years, issued a ruling that a gay man
could charge a federal agency employer
with sex discrimination, in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
for denying him a promotion because
of his sexual orientation. Baldwin
v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC
2015), is an administrative ruling, not
binding on federal courts, and federal
trial judges are sharply divided on the
issue. During May and June, federal
district judges in Virginia, New York,
Illinois, Mississippi, Connecticut,
Indiana, and Florida issued rulings
in response to employers’ motions

historical accounts suggest that Smith’s
strategy was to make the bill more
controversial, thus ensuring its defeat.
More recent accounts have suggested
that Smith, although a racist, was
actually a supporter of equal rights for
women and genuinely believed that sex
discrimination in the workplace should
be banned. (His amendment did not add
“sex” to the titles of the bill addressing
other kinds of discrimination.) The
amendment passed, and ultimately the
bill was enacted, going into effect in
July 1965.
Because “sex” was added through a
House floor amendment, the Committee
Report on the bill says nothing about it,
and the subsequent debate in the Senate

Federal trial judges in seven states issued
rultings on the matter in May and June.
to dismiss Title VII claims of sexual
orientation discrimination. In each case,
the employer argued that the plaintiff’s
Title VII claim had to be dismissed
as a matter of law because the federal
employment discrimination statute
does not forbid sexual orientation
discrimination.
Title VII was enacted as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although the
House committee considering the bill
took evidence about sex discrimination,
it decided to send the bill to the House
floor without including “sex” as a
prohibited basis for discrimination,
because this was deemed too
controversial and might sink the bill.
During the floor debate, however,
a southern representative, Howard
Smith of Virginia, a conservative
Democrat who was opposed to the
proposed ban on race discrimination,
proposed an amendment to add “sex”
to the list of prohibited grounds. Most

(where the bill went directly to the floor,
bypassing committee consideration)
devoted little attention to it, apart from
an amendment providing that pay
practices “authorized” by the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 (which bans paying men
and women at different rates for the
performance of “equal work”) would
not be outlawed by Title VII. As a
result, the “legislative history” of Title
VII provides no explanation about what
Congress intended by including “sex” as
a prohibited ground of discrimination.
During the first quarter century of
Title VII, the EEOC and the federal
courts consistently rejected claims that
the law outlawed sexual orientation
discrimination. In the absence of
explanatory legislative history, they
ruled that Congress must have intended
simply to prohibit discrimination
against women because they are women
or against men because they are men,
and nothing more complicated or
Summer 2016
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nuanced than that. This interpretation
was challenged in 1989, when the
Supreme Court ruled in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
that a woman who failed to conform
to her employer’s sex stereotypes
could bring a sex discrimination case
under Title VII, adopting a broader
and more sophisticated view of sex
discrimination. Since 1989, some
lower federal courts have used the
Price Waterhouse ruling to allow gay
or transgender plaintiffs to assert sex
discrimination claims in reliance on the
sex stereotype theory, while others have
rejected attempt to “bootstrap” sexual
orientation or gender identity into
Title VII in this way. More recently,
several federal appeals courts have
endorsed the idea that gender identity
discrimination claims are really sex
discrimination claims, and a consensus
to that effect has begun to emerge, but
progress has been slower on the sexual
orientation front.
Last summer the EEOC’s decision
in Baldwin v. Foxx presented a
startling turnabout of the agency’s
view. The EEOC does not adjudicate
discrimination claims against nongovernmental and state employers,
but it is assigned an appellate role
concerning discrimination claims by
federal employees. In Baldwin v. Foxx,
the EEOC reversed a ruling by the
Transportation Department that a gay
air traffic controller could not bring
a sexual orientation discrimination
claim under Title VII. Looking at the
developing federal case law since Price
Waterhouse and seizing upon a handful
of federal district court decisions that
had allowed gay plaintiffs to bring
sex discrimination claims under a
sex stereotype theory, the agency
concluded that a sexual orientation
discrimination claim is “necessarily” a
sex discrimination claim and should be
allowed under Title VII.
Since that July 15 ruling, many
federal district judges have had to rule
on motions by employers to dismiss Title
VII sexual orientation discrimination
claims. The precedential hierarchy of
the federal court system has required
some of them to dismiss those claims
because the circuit court of appeals to
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which their rulings could be appealed
had previously ruled adversely on the
issue. In other circuits, however, the
question is open and some judges have
taken the EEOC’s lead.
On May 5, U.S. District Judge Robert
E. Payne in Virginia found that he was
bound by 4th Circuit precedent to reject
a sexual orientation discrimination
claim under Title VII in Hinton v.
Virginia Union University, 2016 WL
2621967, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60487
(E.D. Va.), even though the plaintiff,
an openly-gay administrative assistant
at the university, had alleged clear
evidence of anti-gay discrimination by
the university president. Judge Payne
found that a 1996 decision by the 4th
Circuit, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
America, 99 F.3d 138, was still binding.
Payne noted that other federal trial
courts were divided about whether to
defer to the Baldwin ruling, but in any
event he felt bound by circuit precedent
to dismiss the claim.
A district judge on Long Island,
Sandra J. Feuerstein, reached a similar
result in Magnusson v. County of
Suffolk, 2016 WL 2889002, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 64897 (E.D.N.Y., May 17,
2016), dismissing a Title VII claim by
an openly-lesbian custodial worker
at the Suffolk County Department of
Public Works, who alleged that her
failure to comply with her supervisors’
stereotypes of how women should
dress had led to discrimination against
her. Relying on prior decisions by the
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, such as
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211 (2nd Cir. 2005), Judge Feuerstein
refrained from discussing more recent
developments and dismissed the claim,
asserting that the plaintiff’s “claims
regarding incidents of harassment
based on her sexual orientation do not
give rise to Title VII liability.”
Also relying on Dawson, U.S.
District Judge Jeffrey Alker Meyer
(D. Conn.) dismissed a Title VII sex
discrimination in Pelletier v. Purdue
Pharma LP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84099, 2016 WL 3620710 (June 29,
2016), holding that the gay male
plaintiff had failed to alleged facts
sufficient to fit within the narrow sex
stereotyping theory that the 2nd Circuit

might recognize in a Title VII claim
brought by a gay man. “Here, construing
plaintiff’s complaint liberally,” wrote
Judge Meyer, “he has alleged that his
employer decided to discipline and fire
him as a result of learning that he was
in a long-term relationship with another
man. On the facts alleged, there is ‘no
basis to surmise that [plaintiff] behaved
in a stereotypically feminine manner
and that the harassment he endured was,
in fact, based on his non-conformity
with gender norms instead of his sexual
orientation,’” quoting from another 2nd
Circuit case, Simonton v. Runyon. Judge
Meyer granted the motion to dismiss
the Title VII sex discrimination claim
“without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing
an amended complaint within 14 days
from the date of this ruling that re-pleads
the claim if such facts actually exist and
are alleged that would warrant a claim
of gender-based sex discrimination.”
Judge Meyer never mentioned Baldwin
or the alternative argument, which some
other district judges have accepted, that
a man having a long-term relationship
with another man can be considered
sufficient to state a gender stereotype
claim, which is part of the EEOC’s
underlying reasoning in Baldwin v.
Foxx. Plaintiff Gary Pelletier had also
filed a sexual orientation complaint
with the Connecticut Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities, but
he did not assert a supplementary state
law claim in his Title VII lawsuit, and
in any event there were no allegations
that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies under Connecticut law. His
complaint was filed pro se, but he was
represented by counsel at the hearing on
the motion, which may partly explain
why Judge Meyer is willing to entertain
a new complaint. The case also raises
a claim under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, which was not
dismissed. (Imagine a supervisor
telling somebody prior to his discharge
that “they could get younger people to
take your job.”)
On May 31, a senior district judge
in Illinois decided that prudence
in light of the developing situation
counseled against dismissing a pending
“perceived sexual orientation” claim
in the case of Matavka v. Board of

Education, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70451 (N.D. Ill.). Judge Milton I.
Shadur confronted the school district’s
motion to dismiss a discrimination
claim by an employee at J. Sterling
Morton High School, who alleged that
“he experienced severe harassment
from his coworkers and supervisors,
including taunts that he was ‘gay’ and
should ‘suck it,’ frequent jokes about his
perceived homosexuality, and hacking
of his Facebook account to identify
him publicly as ‘interested in boys and
men’, and an email stating ‘U . . . are
homosexual.’” Judge Shadur observed
that the Chicago-based 7th Circuit
Court of Appeals had in the past rejected
sexual
orientation
discrimination
claims under Title VII, which “would
appear to bury” Matavka’s Title VII
claim. But, he noted, Baldwin v. Foxx,
while not binding on the court, may
prompt a rethinking of this issue, and
that the 7th Circuit heard oral argument
on September 30 of a plaintiff’s appeal
from a different federal trial judge’s
dismissal of a sexual orientation
discrimination claim in the case of
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25813, 2015
WL 926015 (N.D. Ind., March 3, 2015).
“Should Hively follow recent district
court decisions in finding Baldwin
persuasive,” he wrote, “that finding
plainly would affect the disposition of
Morton High’s motion. That being so,
the prudent course at present is to stay
this matter pending the issuance of a
decision in Hively.” The 7th Circuit had
not issued a decision in Hively as of this
writing. Judge Shadur stayed a ruling
on the motion until July 29, and said
that if the 7th Circuit had not issued a
ruling by then, he might stay it further.
The EEOC filed an amicus brief in
Hively, urging the Circuit to adopt a
new precedent consistent with Baldwin.
The federal appeals courts are not
bound by any rules about how soon
after oral argument they must issue
opinions. Sometimes the 7th Circuit
moves quickly. During 2014 it took just a
week after the August 26 oral argument
to rule affirmatively on a marriage
equality case on September 4, giving
the states of Wisconsin and Indiana
time to petition the Supreme Court for

review before the start of the Court’s
October term. The panel that heard
the Hively argument had not ruled in
more than eight months, suggesting that
an extended internal discussion may
be happening among the nine active
judges of the 7th Circuit, to whom the
panel’s proposed opinion would be
circulated before it is released. Panels
may not depart from circuit precedent,
but a majority of the active judges
on the circuit can overrule their past
decisions. A 7th Circuit ruling reversing
the district court’s dismissal of the
Hively complaint would be a major
breakthrough for Title VII coverage of
sexual orientation claims.
In an Indiana case that could be
affected by a ruling in Hively while it
is pending, Somers v. Express Scripts
Holdings, 2016 WL 3541544, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84268 (S.D. Ind.,
June 29, 2016), the plaintiff, who may
or may not be gay, avoided dismissal of
his Title VII sex discrimination claim
by taking care never to mention sexual
orientation in his sexual harassment
complaint, hoping to bring his case
within the Supreme Court’s same-sex
harassment precedent of Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523
U.S. 75 (1998). Brian Somers alleged
that harassing co-workers called him
“fat motherfucker,” “faggot,” “gay,” and
“prison bitch,” and that one said that
Somers “had a soft ass and he would
like to poke it.” Somers asserted that
when he complained to a supervisor, he
was told to “get over it” and no action
was taken. The employer argued that
Title VII did not govern the claim,
because it was clearly – in the eyes of
the employer – a sexual orientation
discrimination claim not covered by
Title VII. While acknowledging 7th
Circuit precedent holding that sexual
orientation claims may not be brought
under Title VII, District Judge Jane
Magnus-Stinson notes that Somers is
not explicitly alleging sexual orientation
discrimination and comments, “Express’
assumption that Mr. Somers’ claims
must be based on sexual orientation
assumes a key fact that is not alleged
in Mr. Somers’ complaint – namely,
his sexual orientation. Instead, the only
question before the Court at this time

is whether the factual allegations in
Mr. Somers’ complaint set forth a Title
VII claim based on his sex that is both
plausible on its face and gives Express
sufficient notice of the nature of Mr.
Somers’ claims.” The judge concluded
that this standard had been met, and
that the employer’s argument “ignores
the federal notice pleading standard.”
Since the court found that Somers
had pleaded “plausible claims for
harassment and constructive discharge
based on his sex,” the motion to dismiss
must be denied. In Oncale, the Supreme
Court said that one way a plaintiff could
prove a same-sex harassment claim
would be to show that the harasser
was homosexual. In a footnote, Judge
Stinson wrote: “To the extent that
Mr. Somers suggests in his response
brief that the employee who allegedly
harassed him may be a homosexual, the
Court will not accept that as true at this
stage of the litigation because it is not
alleged in his complaint.”
Meanwhile, two other decisions
issued in June have taken opposite
views on the question. In Brown v.
Subway Sandwich Shop of Laurel, 2016
WL 3248457, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76526 (S.D. Miss., June 13, 2016), U.S.
District Judge Keith Starrett bowed
to prior 5th Circuit rulings, such as
Brandon v. Sage Corp., 808 F.3d 266
(2015), rejecting sexual orientation
claims under Title VII, and he even
claimed, somewhat disingenuously, that
the Baldwin decision did not support the
plaintiff’s claim, stating that Baldwin
“takes no position on the merits of the
claim and resolves only timeliness and
jurisdictional issues.” While this may
appear to be technically true, since the
EEOC was ruling on an appeal from the
Transportation Department’s dismissal
of the claim and not ultimately on the
merits, on the other hand the EEOC
definitely did take a “position” on the
question whether sexual orientation
discrimination claims are covered by
Title VII; it had to address this question
in order to determine that it had
jurisdiction over the claim. The EEOC
clearly stated in Baldwin that sexual
orientation
discrimination
claims
are “necessarily” sex discrimination
claims.
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By contrast, U.S. District Judge
Mark E. Walker of the Northern
District of Florida, finding that the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals has not issued
a precedential ruling on the question,
refused to dismiss a “perceived sexual
orientation” discrimination claim in
Winstead v. Lafayette County Board
of County Commissioners, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80036, 2016 WL 3440601,
on June 20. Pointing out that the 11th
Circuit had ruled in 2011 in Glenn v.
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, that a gender
identity discrimination claim could be
considered a sex discrimination claim
under the Equal Protection Clause
using a sex stereotyping theory, Judge
Walker found that the Baldwin ruling,
which also discussed sex stereotyping
as a basis for a sexual orientation claim,
was persuasive and should be followed.
Judge Walker rejected the argument
made by some courts that using the
stereotyping theory for this purpose was
inappropriately “bootstrapping” claims
of sexual orientation discrimination
under Title VII. “These arguments
seem to this Court to misapprehend the
nature of animus towards people based
on their sexual orientation, actual or
perceived,” he wrote. “Such animus,
whatever its origin, is at its core based
on disapproval of certain behaviors
(real or assumed) and tendencies
towards behaviors, and those behaviors
are disapproved of precisely because
they are deemed to be ‘inappropriate’
for members of a certain sex or gender.”
He concluded: “This view – that
discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is necessarily
discrimination based on gender or
sex stereotypes, and is therefore sex
discrimination – is persuasive to this
Court, as it has been to numerous
other courts and the EEOC.” He also
contended that it “follows naturally
from (though it is not compelled by)
Brumby, which is binding Eleventh
Circuit precedent. Simply put, to treat
someone differently based on her
attraction to women is necessary to
treat that person differently because
of her failure to conform to gender
or sex stereotypes, which is, in turn,
necessarily discrimination on the
basis of sex.”
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Ironically, Judge Walker turned to
an opinion written by the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, an outspoken opponent
of LGBT rights, to seal the deal. He
quoted from Scalia’s opinion for the
Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, a 1998
decision that same-sex harassment
cases could be brought under Title VII.
“No one doubts,” wrote Judge Walker,
“that discrimination against people
based on their sexual orientation was
not ‘the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title
VII,’” quoting Scalia, and continuing
the quote, “‘But statutory prohibitions
often go beyond the principal evil to
cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions
of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.’” Scalia was opposed
to relying on “legislative history” to
determine the meaning of statutes,
instead insisting on focusing on the
statutory language and giving words
their “usual” meanings.
Judge Walker concluded that his
decision not to dismiss the Title
VII claim “does not require judicial
activism
or
tortured
statutory
construction. It requires close attention
to the text of Title VII, common
sense, and an understanding that ‘in
forbidding employers to discrimination
against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes,’” a quotation from Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971), which had been quoted by
the Supreme Court in Manhart, an
important early sex discrimination case
under Title VII that rejected the use of
sex-based actuarial tables to require
women to make larger contributions
for pension coverage than men because
they live longer on average.
Judge Walker rejected an alternative
analysis proffered by the EEOC in
Baldwin, however, observing that it
would not support coverage for sex
discrimination claims by bisexual
plaintiffs!
Judge Walker’s decision provides the
most extended district court discussion

of the merits of allowing sexual
orientation discrimination claims
under Title VII, but it will not be the
last word, as the EEOC pushes forward
with its affirmative agenda to litigate
this issue in as many federal courts
around the country as possible, building
to a potential Supreme Court ruling. So
far, the Supreme Court has refused to
get involved with the ongoing debate
about whether sexual orientation or
gender identity discrimination claims
are covered under Title VII. It refused
to review the 11th Circuit’s decision
in Glenn v. Brumby, for example,
presumably because of the absence of
a circuit split, as Glenn is so far the
only case holding that gender identity
discrimination claims should be dealt
with as sex discrimination claims under
the Equal Protection Clause. But the
Court can’t put things off much longer.
An affirmative 7th Circuit ruling in
Hively would create the kind of “circuit
split” that usually prompts the Supreme
Court to agree to review a case. That
may not be long in coming.
Although the 7th Circuit is likely to
be the first to rule on this, an appeal
is also pending in the 2nd Circuit from
a March 9, 2016, district court ruling
in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group,
Inc., 2016 WL 951581 (S.D.N.Y.), in
which the district judge also dismissed
a gay plaintiff’s Title VII claim,
relying on 2nd Circuit precedents.
On June 28, the deadline for amicus
filings, both the EEOC and a group of
128 members of Congress filed briefs
urging the 2nd Circuit to abandon its
past decisions and embrace the broader
understanding of sex discrimination
that the EEOC described in its Baldwin
decision. The congressional brief
argued that the history of repeated
unsuccessful introductions of bills to
adopt an express federal ban on sexual
orientation discrimination should not
be construed as a belief by Congress
that Title VII does not already cover
this form of discrimination. Instead,
the brief argues, particularly with
respect to the Equality Act introduced
last year, the purpose of the bill is to
“clarify” and make “explicit” what is
already implicitly covered in the ban
on sex discrimination. ■

Restrictive Definition of Employment Presents a Challenge
to Discrimination Claimants

I

n a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed
the decision of the District Court
for the District of Maryland, which
dismissed Karen Greene’s complaint
against the Harris Corporation and its
employee, Harl Dan Pierce. Greene v.
Harris Corp., 2016 WL 3425579, 2016
U.S. App. LEXIS 11316 (June 22, 2016).
Greene alleged that Harris and Pierce:
(1) discriminated against her because
of her sexual orientation and personal
appearance in violation of Howard
County, Maryland Code (HCC) §
12.208; and (2) tortiously interfered
with her business relationship with
Eurest Services, Inc., a cleaning
contractor that employed Greene and
assigned her to work at Harris Corp.
Both claims were dismissed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)
(6), with the Court notably concluding
that Greene’s discrimination claim
failed to allege sufficient facts showing
that an employment relationship
existed between herself and Harris.
Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan
wrote for the court.
Howard
County’s
ordinance
explicitly prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination by an “employer,” who
is defined under HCC § 12.208(I)(a)
as a person engaged in an industry
or business who has at least five fulltime or part-time employees during a
specific time period. Section 12.208(I)
(a) also defines an employee as an
individual employed by an employer —
a definition that the court characterizes
as circular. These definitions undermine
the county’s attempt to protect
LGBT workers from workplace
discrimination. Plaintiffs, who work
under independent contracts, cannot
easily establish that an employment
relationship existed between themselves
and their respective defendants; like
Greene, they therefore cannot state
discrimination claims that survive a
dismissal motion.
In Greene’s case, she had previously

operated her own cleaning company
that contracted with Harris for 14 years,
until Pierce terminated her contract
supposedly for budgetary reasons
in March 2010. Greene’s complaint
characterized her relationship with
Pierce as “contemptuous.” Since he
began working at Harris in 2008,
Pierce treated Greene in a rude manner
and made derogatory statements about
her personal appearance to other
Harris employees. He also became
visibly upset after learning from a coworker that she is a lesbian, just one
or two months before he terminated
Greene’s services.
Later that year in December, Greene
was employed by Eurest, Harris’s new
cleaning contractor, and assigned to
return to Harris as a janitor. When
Pierce learned that Greene was working
there, he promptly had a Harris security
officer escort her from the premises on
her first day. He then emailed Harris’
facilities manager, stating that Greene
was previously dismissed for charging
too much money, inappropriately
searching his office, and screaming
obscenities at him. Afterwards, he
told Eurest that Greene was banned
from Harris and must be removed
immediately from working at the
office. Eurest subsequently terminated
Greene’s employment, which it admits
it would not have done but for Pierces
statements (which Pierce ultimately
recanted in this case).
By the time Greene appealed the
district court’s decision, the 4th Circuit
was no stranger to the joint-employment
doctrine or the challenges presented
by staffing agency-client contracts.
The Court had recently issued its
decision in Butler v. Drive Automotive
Industries of America, Inc., 793 F.3d
404 (4th Cir. 2015), which concerned
a Title VII discrimination claim. In
Butler, the court developed a ninefactor test to identify joint employers
and prevent them from evading
liability by hiding behind staffing

agencies. The Butler court concluded
that the plaintiff had established an
employment relationship necessary to
sustain her Title VII claim by showing
that: (1) she worked side-by-side
with workers solely employed by the
defendant-client; (2) she was directly
engaged in producing the client’s
product; and (3) she was supervised
by a manager employed by the client.
Thus, showing these three of the nine
factors was sufficient to establish an
employment relationship in Butler.
The court came to a different
conclusion when applying the ninefactor test in Greene, finding that
Greene’s allegations failed to raise
sufficient facts showing an employment
relationship with Harris. In support
of her claim, Greene alleged that
Harris contracted for various powers
typically retained by employers,
including the rights to: (1) accept or
reject prospective janitors provided by
Eurest, and remove them from their
assignments “for cause”; (2) assign an
on-site Harris employee to supervise
Greene; (3) select which days Greene
would work at the office; and (4)
provide the cleaning supplies Greene
must use. However, the court instead
concluded that Harris’ authority to
accept or reject Eurest personnel
merely arose from the company’s
right to ensure that its service contract
was performed to its satisfaction. The
court also rejected Greene’s assertion
because she failed to allege that: (1) her
duties were related to Harris’ business
product; (2) she performed work also
undertaken by Harris employees;
(3) Eurest and Harris intended that
their contract established any type
of employment relationship between
Eurest personnel and Harris; or (4) she
met with or received direction from
any Harris supervisor in the few hours
she worked there.
continued on page 327
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Federal Judge Orders Indiana to List Two Moms on Birth
Certificates

U

.S. District Judge Tanya Walton
Pratt has ruled that Indiana
was failing to comply with the
Supreme Court’s mandate for marriage
equality in Obergefell v. Hodges,
decided last June 26, when the state
refused to list the same-sex spouses of
birth mothers on their children’s birth
certificates. Ruling on cases brought
by several same-sex couples who were
married before their children were born,
Judge Pratt found that the mandate to
afford equal marriage rights to samesex couples included a requirement
that the “parental presumption” applied
to husbands of women who give birth
should also be applied to their wives.
Henderson v. Adams, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 84916, 2016 WL 3548645 (S.D.
Ind., June 30, 2016).
Judge Pratt explained that the usual
procedure in Indiana for issuing birth
certificates starts when hospital staff
“work with the birth mother to complete
the State of Indiana’s ‘Certificate of Live
Birth Worksheet,’” which was created by
the state as part of its Birth Registration
System. “Staff at the hospital upload the
information provided on the Indiana
Birth Worksheet to a State database. The
county health department then receives
notification that birth information
has been added to the database. A
notification letter to the birth mother
is generated on a form provided by the
State, which indicates that information
has been received by the county health
department and requests that the mother
notify the county health department
if there is an error with respect to the
child’s identifying information.” If the
mother wants a birth certificate, she
has to request one, which will then be
generated out of the database.
One of the questions on the
Worksheet is whether the birth mother
is married. If she answers “no,” she is
asked whether a paternity affidavit has
been completed for the child, in which
case the person identified as the father
will go into the database and be listed
on the birth certificate. If there has been
no affidavit, then the space is left blank,
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even if the mother knows the identity of
the child’s biological father, and the birth
certificate will list only the mother. If
the answer is “yes,” the husband’s name
will go into the database, and ultimately
will be listed on the birth certificate.
Even if the child of a married couple is
conceived with donated sperm, there is
a presumption that the husband is the
father, unless the mother takes steps
during this initial information-gathering
process to make clear that her husband
is not the biological father.
Even though all of the plaintiff
couples in this case are married, the state
refused to accept same-sex spouses into
the database or to list them on the birth
certificate. The state’s position was that
the database and the birth certificates
generated from it are supposed to create
a true record of the biological parentage
of the child, and that because a samesex spouse of a birth mother is not
biologically related to the child, listing
her in the database and on the birth
certificate would create a false record.
The state took the position that a samesex spouse could only be listed in the
database and the birth certificate if she
adopted the child with the permission
of the birth mother, a process involving
expenses and delay, during which time
the child would have only one legal
parent.
Judge Pratt accepted the plaintiffs’
argument that “Indiana’s refusal to
grant the status of parenthood to female
spouses of artificially-inseminated
birth mothers while granting the status
of parenthood to male spouses of
artificially-inseminated birth mother
violates the Equal Protection Clause,”
because it was sex discrimination, pure
and simple.
Furthermore, sex discrimination
requires heightened scrutiny, putting
the burden on the state to justify its
policy and show that it advances an
important state interest. Because the
state presumes, without proof, that
the husbands of birth mothers are the
parents of their children, the policy does
not, in fact, advance the state’s asserted

interest of creating a “true” record
of the child’s biological parents. The
state argued that it was the duty of the
married birth mother to advise hospital
staff while completing the Worksheet if
her child was conceived through donor
sperm so that her husband’s name would
be excluded from the database, but this
was clearly a spurious argument, since
the Worksheet does not prompt hospital
staff members to ask this question.
“The State Defendant’s argument that
the birth mother should acknowledge
that she is not married to the father of
her child when she has been artificially
inseminated or else she is committing
fraud when she has been artificially
inseminated is not consistent with the
Indiana Birth Worksheet, Indiana law,
or common sense,” wrote Judge Pratt.
“The Indiana Birth Worksheet asks,
‘are you married to the father of your
child,’ yet it does not define ‘father.’
This term can mean different things to
different women. Common sense says
that an artificially-inseminated woman
married to a man who has joined in the
decision for this method of conception,
and who intends to treat the child as his
own, would indicate that she is married
to the father of her child. Why would she
indicate otherwise?”
Judge Pratt pointed out that the
Worksheet, devised by the state, made
no attempt to elicit the information that
the State deemed to be so important,
and, furthermore, “there is no warning
of fraud or criminal liability.” She
pointed out that some other states had
enacted specific statutory language to
deal with the use of donor insemination
by married couples and the issuance
of appropriate birth certificates, but
Indiana has failed to do so. She pointed
out, however, that in one such state,
Wisconsin, litigation is pending because
that state has also been refusing to list
same-sex spouses on birth certificates.
Ultimately, she pointed out, the
Worksheet process as set up by the state
did not achieve its articulated purpose
of creating a “true” record of biological
parents, and was administered in a

way that clearly discriminated against
same-sex couples. Rejecting the state’s
argument that employing a parental
presumption was not required under
Obergefell’s mandate of equal marriage
benefits, she pointed out, “the state
created a benefit for married women
based on their marriage to a man, which
allows them to name their husband on
their child’s birth certificate even when
the husband is not the biological father.
Because of Baskin [the 7th Circuit’s
marriage equality ruling, which the
Supreme Court declined to review]
and Obergefell, this benefit –which is
directly tied to marriage – must now be
afforded to women married to women.”
In addition to finding an equal
protection violation, Judge Pratt found
a Due Process violation because in
Obergefell the Supreme Court referred to
both clauses of the 14th Amendment as a
source of the freedom to marry. Since the
Supreme Court identified that freedom
as a fundamental right, strict scrutiny
would apply, and the state’s rationale for
its position of this case was obviously
insufficient to meet the “compelling
interest” test, and Judge Pratt so found.
The judge concluded: “Given Indiana’s
long-articulated interest in doing what is
in the best interest of the child and given
that the Indiana Legislature has stated
the purpose of Title 31 is to protect,
promote, and preserve Indiana families,
there is no conceivable important
governmental interest that would justify
the different treatment for female
spouses of artificially-inseminated
birth mothers from the male spouses of
artificially-inseminated birth mothers.
As other district courts have noted, the
holding of Obergefell will inevitably
require ‘sweeping change’ by extending
to same-sex married couples all benefits
afforded to opposite-sex married
couples. Those benefits must logically
and reasonably include the recognition
sought by Plaintiffs in this action.”
Counsel for plaintiffs include Megan
L. Gehring, Richard A. Mann, PC,
Raymond L. Faust, Skiles Detrude;
Richard A. Mann; William R. Groth,
Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth &
Towe LLP; and Karen CelestinoHorseman, Austin & Jones PC (all are
of Indianapolis). ■

Maryland High Court Adopts De Facto
Parent Standing for Lesbian Co-Parents

O

verruling a 2008 precedent and
reversing lower court decisions
in this case, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, that state’s highest court,
ruled on July 7 that the same-sex spouse
of a birth mother, who gave birth to
their child shortly before they were
married, has standing as a “de facto
parent” to pursue custody and visitation
in the context of their present divorce
proceeding even though she never
adopted the child. Conover v. Conover,
2016 WL 3633062, 2016 Md. LEXIS
433, reversing 224 Md. App. 366, 120
A.3d 874 (2015). The co-parent will not
be required to show that the birth mother
is unfit or that she can prove “exceptional
circumstances” justify departing from
the general rule that unrelated “third
parties” do not have standing to seek
custody of children.
The court found that the decision it
overturned, Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404
Md. 661 (2008), was based on a faulty
reading by the court of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000), that failed adequately
to perceive the narrow scope of that
ruling, and had also relied improperly on
distinguishable earlier Maryland cases.
Furthermore, the court characterized
Janice M. as an “archaic” precedent
that was out of step with the trend of
decisions in other states. (Ironically, on
July 5 the Court of Appeals of Michigan
issued a ruling on the exact same issue
taking the opposite position, see below.)
Judge Sally D. Adkins wrote the
court’s opinion, which had the support
of four judges. There were concurring
opinions by three judges suggesting
slightly different tests to establish “de
facto” parent status, but all ultimately
ruling in favor of the co-parent’s right
as a “de facto” parent to seek custody
and/or visitation depending upon the
trial court’s determination of the best
interest of the child.
“Child custody and visitation
decisions are among the most serious
and complex decisions a court must
make,” wrote Judge Adkins, “with
grave implications for all parties. The
dissolution of a non-traditional marriage

just compounds the difficulties of this
already challenging inquiry.” Michelle
and Brittany Conover’s relationship
began in July 2002. They decided
together that Brittany would conceive
a child with anonymous donor sperm
obtained through Shady Grove Fertility
Clinic. She became pregnant in 2009,
giving birth to their son in April 2010.
The birth certificate listed only one
parent: Brittany. The space for a father
was left blank. When their son was
about six months old they married in the
District of Columbia. Maryland at that
time recognized same-sex marriages
contracted in D.C. but did not issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
After a year of marriage the women
separated. Brittany allowed Michelle
overnight and weekend access to their
son until July 2012, when she prevented
further contact. Brittany filed a formal
divorce action in February 2013 in
the Circuit Court in Hagerstown. Her
divorce complaint stated that there were
no children of the marriage. Michelle
filed an answer seeking visitation
rights with their son, and subsequently
counter-complained for divorce, again
requesting visitation rights (but not
custody). Brittany opposed custody,
arguing that Michelle was not related to
the boy and thus lacked standing under
Maryland law.
Michelle asked the court to interpret
Maryland’s statute governing custody
disputes involving children “born to
parents who have not participated in a
marriage ceremony with each other”
to place her in the same position as
a father. The statute allows a father in
such circumstances to assert parental
rights if four tests are met: a judicial
determination of paternity, the father’s
acknowledgement in writing that he is
the father, the father has “openly and
notoriously recognized the child to be
his child; or has subsequently married
the mother and has acknowledged
himself, orally or in writing, to be the
father.” Michelle took the position
that she satisfied at least three of these
tests, most pertinently the last, so she
should be deemed a parent. The lower
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courts determined, however, that
Michelle lacked standing. Since the son
was conceived and born before they
married, no presumption applied that
Michelle, as the spouse of Brittany, was
the boy’s parent, and the court found
that the statute Michelle was relying
upon could not be construed in genderneutral terms. The courts also rejected
Michelle’s argument that she should be
deemed a “de facto” parent, relying on
the precedent of Janice M. holding that
Maryland did not recognize that doctrine.
The court granted the divorce but denied
Michelle’s request for visitation based
solely on lack of standing. Thus, the
trial court never determined whether
ordering visitation would be in the best
in interest of the child. The intermediate
appellate court affirmed, and the Court
of Appeals granted Michelle’s petition
for certiorari. The court’s opinion
answers affirmatively the first question
posed in Michelle’s petition: “Should
Maryland reconsider Janice M. v.
Margaret K. and recognize the doctrine
of de facto parenthood?”
Ultimately the logic of the court’s
decision was derived from its conclusion
that “the primary goal of access
determinations in Maryland is to serve
the best interests of the child.” This
must be done while respecting the
constitutional right of a fit parent to have
custody and to control the raising of her
child, where it is claimed that a “nonparent” should be entitled to access to
the child. Courts in other states have
used a variety of legal theories when
confronted with unmarried same-sex
couples terminating their relationships
and battling over access to the children
they were raising. One doctrine that has
emerged and achieved wide acceptance
– the de facto parent doctrine – was
first adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2 419 (1995). This doctrine poses
a four-part test: “the legal parent must
consent to and foster the relationship
between the third party and the child;
the third party must have lived with
the child; the third party must perform
parental functions for the child to a
significant degree; and most important,
a parent-child bond must be forged.” In
other words, in order to be a de facto
parent, somebody must be a parent in
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all practical respects as a result of a
relationship supported by the child’s
legal parent. (In a concurring opinion
in Conover, Judge Shirley Watts would
modify this test in cases where the child
has two known legal parents to require
that the relationship of the third party
have been fostered with the consent
of both of them; her reservations were
not essential to deciding this case,
because the son was conceived through
anonymous donated sperm.)
The Maryland Court of Appeals
concluded that this de facto parent
doctrine should be adopted to determine
whether an unmarried partner of a birth
parent should be able to seek custody and/
or visitation in the event of dissolution
of the adults’ relationship. Thus, the coparent would not be obliged as a mere
third party to prove that the child’s legal
parent is “unfit” or that “exceptional
circumstances” would justify invading
her constitutional parental rights. In
deciding whether to award visitation in
this case, the court would be concerned
with the best interest of the child once
the de facto parent status of Michelle
was recognized. The court rejected
Brittany’s argument that the legislature
has the sole authority to make this
change in Maryland law, pointing out
that the existing legal framework is
largely the result of judicial decisionmaking, not legislation.
“We overrule Janice M. because
it is “clearly wrong” and has been
undermined by the passage of time,”
wrote Judge Adkins, making clear
that “de facto parents are distinct from
other third parties. We hold that de
facto parents have standing to contest
custody or visitation and need not
show parental unfitness or exceptional
circumstances before a trial court
can apply a best interests of the child
analysis.” Judge Adkins described
the best interest of the child as being
“of transcendent importance,” and
concluded, “With this holding we fortify
the best interests standard by allowing
judicial consideration of the benefits a
child gains when there is consistency in
the child’s close, nurturing relationships.
We do so carefully, adopting the
multi-part test first articulated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in H.S.H.-K.
This test accommodates, we think, the

dissonance between what is in the best
interest of a child and a parent’s right to
direct and govern the care, custody, and
control of their children.”
The court returned the case to
the Circuit Court “for determination
of whether, applying the H.S.H.-K.
standards,
Michelle
should
be
considered a de facto parent, and conduct
further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.” Thus, it will remain for the
trial court both to determine Michelle’s
status and, if she is a de facto parent,
whether it is in the child’s best interest to
order visitation. This determination will
naturally have to take into account the
fact that Brittany has not allowed contact
with the child, now age 6, since July
2012, four years ago, so one anticipates
that the trial court will hear expert
testimony from both parties about the
impact of reestablishing contact after
this prolonged gap in the life of a very
young child.
Interestingly, Michelle Conover
now identifies as a transgender man
and transitioned after the divorce, but
the court indicated in a footnote that
“she explained that she would refer
to herself using female pronouns and
her former name for consistency with
the record and that her gender identity
is not material to any legal issue in
this appeal.” The court agreed to this
arrangement, and Michelle’s current
name appears nowhere in the opinion,
but a press release by Free State Legal,
whose deputy director and managing
attorney Jer Welter represents Michelle,
identifies the appellant as “Michael
Conover.” One wonders whether or how
the trial court will take this transition
into account in making the “best
interest” determination. If Brittany
(who is no longer using Conover as her
surname) remains strongly opposed to
visitation, it would not be surprising
if she sought to make this an issue in
the best interest determination by the
Circuit Court.
More than forty-five organizations
collaborated on seven amicus briefs
that were filed in support of the
appellant before the Court of Appeals,
including LGBT rights groups,
women’s rights groups, and a large
group of law professors specializing in
family law. ■

Michigan Appeals Court Rejects Lesbian Co-Parent Standing
in Visitation Suit

A

panel of the Court of Appeals
of Michigan unanimously ruled
on July 5 that Michelle Lake,
a lesbian co-parent, lacked standing
to seek “parenting time” with the
biological child of her former samesex partner, Kerri Putnam. Reversing
a decision to award parenting time by
the Washtenaw Circuit Court in Lake
v. Putnam, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS
1297, 2016 WL 3606081, the appeals
court held that the co-parent was a mere
“third party” who did not come within
the standing requirements of the state’s
Child Custody Act. Judge Colleen A.
O’Brien wrote the opinion for the panel,
with Judge Douglas B. Shapiro filing a
concurring opinion.
Judge Shapiro’s concurrence provides
a more sympathetic version of the facts
than O’Brien’s. “While the parties
disagree as to details,” he wrote, “it is
undisputed that they lived together for
about a decade as a same-sex couple,
that about five years into the relationship
defendant bore a child by artificial
insemination, that for several years the
parties each acted as a parent to the
child, and that they were both viewed as
parents by the child. It is also undisputed
that several years later, around
September 2014, defendant ended the
relationship, moved out with the child,
and entered into a new relationship
with a different woman. Defendant
initially allowed plaintiff visitation with
the child, but eventually she refused
to do so. In June 2015, plaintiff filed
this action seeking parenting time.” In
addition, as Judge O’Brien pointed out
in her opinion for the court, although
the women could have married in other
jurisdictions, they did not do so. Neither
did the plaintiff adopt the child with
the consent of the defendant, although
that would have been possible when the
women were living with the child for
some time in Florida, where the state
courts had invalidated a statutory ban on
“homosexuals” adopting children. (At
the time, Michigan courts did not allow
co-parent adoptions, which was one of
the issues in DeBoer v. Snyder, one of the
cases that was ultimately consolidated in

Obergefell v. Hodges.) Thus, the plaintiff
was not legally related to the child or to
the child’s mother at any time.
The Family Court judge in
Washtenaw County, Darlene O’Brien,
overruled the defendant’s objection to
the plaintiff’s standing and awarded
parenting time to the plaintiff, but the
court of appeals granted the defendant
leave to appeal.
The question, then, was whether
some legal doctrine recognized in
Michigan was available for her to assert
standing to seek visitation after the
women’s relationship ended. Courts in
other states are divided on this question.
The plaintiff pinned her hopes on the
doctrine of “equitable-parent” that
is recognized in Michigan. As Judge
O’Brien describes Michigan’s version

crucial, and dispositive, requirement for
the equitable-parent doctrine to apply
– the child must be born in wedlock.”
She pointed out that Michigan courts
have consistently refused to extend this
doctrine to heterosexual partners who
have a child while living in unmarried
cohabitation where the man is not
the biological father of the child. In
other words, although the court did
not describe it as such, this equitable
–parent doctrine is similar to the
“parental presumption” that other states
apply to determine a husband’s parental
status when his wife gives birth, without
requiring proof in every case that the
husband is the child’s biological father.
Responding to the plaintiff’s argument
that refusing to extend this doctrine
to give her standing discriminates

The plaintiff pinned her hopes on the doctrine
of “equitable-parent.”
of the doctrine, “a husband who is not
the biological father of a child born
or conceived during wedlock may,
nevertheless, be considered that child’s
natural father if three requirements are
satisfied: (1) the husband and the child
must mutually acknowledge their fatherchild relationship, or the child’s mother
must have cooperated in the development
of that father-child relationship prior to
the time that the divorce proceedings
commenced; (2) the husband must
express a desire to have parental rights
to the child; and (3) the husband must
be willing to accept the responsibility
of paying child support.” If these tests
are met, the husband would be deemed
an equitable parent with standing to
seek custody and/or visitation as part of
a divorce proceeding, the determining
factor in that ruling being the best
interest of the child. Plaintiff asserted
that she met the tests. However, O’Brien
pointed out, the plaintiff “ignores one

because of her sexual orientation, the
court asserted that its failure to extend
the doctrine to unmarried heterosexual
couples refutes that argument. As to the
argument that the two women should be
treated as if they were married because
Michigan and Florida’s refusal to allow
same-sex marriage during the time
they were living together violated their
constitutional rights as proclaimed in
Obergefell v. Hodges, the court pointed
out that plaintiff did not introduce any
evidence suggesting that the women
would have married had that option
been available to them. After all, at
the time their child was born, they
could have married in other states or
Canada (just across the border from
Michigan), although their home states
did not then recognize out-of-state
same-sex marriages. Another part of
the Obergefell ruling, however, was that
states were obligated to recognize such
out-of-state marriages.
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As an alternative argument, the
plaintiff urged the court to follow
the persuasive precedent of Ramey v.
Sutton, 2015 OK 79, 362 P.3d 217 (2015),
in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court
applied a theory of “in loco parentis” to
a similar set of facts to find that a lesbian
co-parent should be afforded a hearing
to show that it was in the best interest of
the child for her to be recognized as a
legal parent for purposes of custody and/
or visitation. Judge O’Brien found that
Oklahoma’s version of “in loco parentis,”
which had never been embraced by
Michigan courts, was distinguishable
from
Michigan’s
equitable-parent
doctrine, and “our Supreme Court has
squarely rejected the argument that
holding oneself out as a child’s parent,
alone, is sufficient to be considered that
child’s parent under the equitable-parent
doctrine.”
The court acknowledged that
“especially in light of the Obergefell
decision” this sort of case is “complex”,
but “we simply do not believe it is
appropriate for courts to retroactively
impose the legal ramifications of
marriage onto unmarried couples several
years after their relationship has ended,”
which the court said was “beyond the
role of the judiciary.”
“In sum,” concluded O’Brien,
“while we acknowledge that the issues
presented in child-custody disputes,
including those involving same-sex
couples, present challenges, we conclude
that the equitable-parent doctrine does
not extend to unmarried couples. This
is true whether the couple involved is
a heterosexual or a same-sex couple.”
Thus, the trial court’s visitation order
had to be reversed.
In his concurring opinion, Judge
Shapiro asserted that the case could have
turned out differently had the plaintiff
presented some evidence that the
women would have married before their
child was born had the states where they
resided (Michigan and, briefly, Florida)
allowed it. He pointed out that last year
the Court of Appeals had ruled in favor
of parental standing in a case where a
same-sex couple had married out-ofstate before having their child, using
the reasoning of Obergefell to confer,
in effect, retroactive recognition of the
marriage for purposes of determining
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standing of the non-biological parent.
See Stankevich v. Milliron, 313 Mich.
App. 2233 (2015). “I would not limit
our application of Obergefell to cases
where the parties actually married in
another jurisdiction,” he wrote. “The
fact that marriage was available in
some other jurisdiction did not remove
the unconstitutional burden faced by
same-sex couples residing in a state that
barred same-sex marriage within its
borders. The impediment was defined
by state law, and the existence of that
law to those who lived under it should
not now be treated as constitutionally
insignificant because other states treated
the issue differently.”
Thus, in Shapiro’s view, “plaintiff
is correct that Obergefell demands
extension of the equitable-parent
doctrine,” but only if the plaintiff
can show that the women would have
married had the state allowed it. “My
colleagues are rightfully concerned
about retroactively imposing marriage
on a same-sex couple simply because
one party now desires that we do so,”
he continued. “However, that concern
is fully addressed by a factual inquiry
into the facts as they existed at the time
the child was born or conceived. The
question is whether the parties would
have married before the child’s birth
or conception but did not because of
the unconstitutional laws preventing
them from doing so.” He referred to the
Oregon Court of Appeals decision In re
Madrone, 350 P.3d 495 (2015), to support
this point. “I would adopt this approach
and hold that a party is entitled to seek
equitable-parent rights arising out of a
same-sex non-marital relationship where
the evidence shows by a preponderance
of the evidence that but for the ban on
same-sex marriage in the parties’ state
of residency, they would have married
prior to the birth of the child.” But that
is not this case. “While the affidavits
presented to the trial court on behalf of
the plaintiff state that the parties were
in a committed relationship and that
while in that relationship they raised the
child together as co-parents, none of the
affidavits, including plaintiff’s, state or
allow for an inference that but for the
then-existing unconstitutional barriers
to same-sex marriage the parties would
have married.” Shapiro concluded

that if the plaintiff had presented such
evidence, the correct move for the
court of appeals would be to remand
the case for a hearing by the trial court
to determine whether such a thwarted
intent to marry could be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence.
This kind of opinion can be very
frustrating to read, because it focuses
on legality and avoids human issues
that should, logically, weigh heavily in a
family relationship dispute. The keystone
of custody and visitation determinations
is supposed to be what is in the best
interest of the child. Asserting technical
standing requirements prevents the
court from reaching this issue. The trial
judge in this case, having accepted the
plaintiff’s argument that she could assert
the rights of an equitable-parent, did get
to that ultimate issue and concluded she
should have parenting time with the
child. The court of appeals’ insistence on
the technical rules of standing override
that finding, resulting in a decision that
seemingly sacrifices the best interest of
the child, which is contrary to the usual
policy goal of family law.
The plaintiff also tried to argue that
depriving the child of contact with
one of her parents violates the child’s
own constitutional rights, but the court
quickly dismissed this argument without
any serious consideration, blithely
asserting, “Generally, persons do not
have standing to assert constitutional
or statutory rights on behalf of another
person. That is precisely what plaintiff
is trying to do, i.e., assert the child’s
constitutional rights. Accordingly,
we reject this argument as well.”
One wonders whether the trial judge
appointed a guardian ad litem to
represent the child’s interest, as such a
party could advance this constitutional
argument on the child’s behalf. Perhaps
Michigan attorneys will respond to this
ruling by adopting a different litigation
strategy to require the court to confront
the issue of the child’s best interest free
of the standing barrier. In the meantime,
of course, the plaintiff could seek review
of this decision in the Michigan Supreme
Court.
The plaintiff is represented by Jay
Kaplan of the American Civil Liberties
Union of Michigan. Anne Argiroff
represents the defendant. ■

Massachusetts Gay Man’s Workplace Discrimination Case
Survives Summary Judgment

T

he U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts has
granted in part and denied in part
a summary judgment motion made
by Shiver Jobs Corps Center and their
employee Jamie Wilson in a sexual
orientation discrimination case brought
against them by a former employee in
Griffin v. Adams & Assocs. Of Nevada,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83760, 2016 WL
3580613 (D. Mass., June 28, 2016).
William Griffin, an overnight center
shift manager at Shriver’s business in
Devens, Massachusetts, alleged that
starting in February 2012, when Wilson
was made his supervisor, Wilson began
to make discriminatory statements
at or regarding him. In April 2012,
Griffin wrote to Human Resources and
an investigation into the claims was
made. Months later, Griffin received
a disciplinary letter for not being in
the area to which he was assigned and
shortly thereafter he wrote a second
letter to Human Resources raising
sexual
orientation
discrimination
issues. Following an investigation that
resulted in no findings of discriminatory
conduct, Wilson allegedly became very
upset and stated to Griffin that she
was “protected” and would see that
“everything that needs to happen to
[him] happens to [him]” and later made
graphic comments to Griffin regarding
his conduct “in the bathroom and with
other gay men.” Upon returning to
work after several months on leave,
Griffin found Wilson was no longer his
supervisor but now a peer, and found
that a photo of him and his boyfriend
was damaged and in the trash. Griffin’s
performance was subsequently found to
be below acceptable standards and he
was placed in a corrective action plan.
One evening, Griffin was suspected
of being intoxicated at work and it is
disputed whether coworkers later found
Griffin at a bar consuming an alcoholic
beverage. Griffin was shortly thereafter
terminated.
Griffin sued in state court asserting
claims under Massachusetts’ Law against
Discrimination and 42 U.S.C. Section
1983. Defendants removed the case to

federal court and secured dismissal of
the federal claim. Defendants moved for
summary judgment on all of Griffin’s
state claims for unlawful hostile work
environment and retaliation.
District Court Judge Denise Casper
ruled on the motion for summary
judgment on June 28. A preliminary
issue was whether Griffin’s claims were
timely pursuant to Massachusetts law
requiring a claim be brought within 300
days of discriminatory conduct. Judge
Casper ruled that Griffin had failed to
link earlier discriminatory acts under the
“continuing violation doctrine” because
he failed to establish that no reasonable
person would have refrained from filing
a complaint during the limitations
period when Griffin had written a fifteen
page letter to management outlining the

Griffin and defendants disagreed as to
whether there was a causal connection
between his protected conduct and
the reason for his termination. Judge
Casper noted that while the nine
months between Griffin’s letter and his
termination did tend to undermine any
casual connection, Griffin also relied
on “alleged discriminatory conduct he
was subjected to after his complaints
and the allegedly unjustified citations
for poor performance.” Noting that
on the evening Griffin was allegedly
intoxicated at work defendants did not
send Griffin to the hospital for a drug and/
or alcohol test as was company policy,
Judge Casper relied on a Massachusetts
Supreme Court case ruling that “failure
to follow established procedures or
criteria . . . may support a reasonable

Griffin alleged Wilson made discriminatory
statements at or regarding him.
discrimination he believed he had faced,
and therefore he could not have had
“good reason to believe” that the issues
he encountered would cease.
With respect to Griffin’s hostile work
environment claim, Judge Casper noted
that conduct outside the 300 days, while
not actionable, could still be considered
for background on the overall situation.
Judge Casper found that since the alleged
discriminatory acts against Griffin were
more than “garden-variety expletives or
annoyances,” a reasonable fact-finder
could find they were motivated because
of gender stereotypes or Griffin’s sexual
orientation. She further ruled that the
conduct may be found to be sufficiently
severe or pervasive and that therefore
triable issues of fact existed.
With respect to Griffin’s retaliation
claim, there was no question that
Griffin engaged in protected conduct
by writing a letter alleging the
discriminatory conduct, and that he
was eventually terminated; however,

inference of intentional discrimination.”
She further noted that while those
who made the final determination to
terminate Griffin did not know of his
prior complaints, the decision was made
on the recommendation of a supervisor
to whom he had made his earliest
complaint, and that fact coupled with
the failure to have him take an alcohol
test as well as Wilson’s threats following
the discrimination investigation were
“sufficient to raise a reasonable inference
of pretext.” Accordingly, Judge Casper
denied summary judgment against
Griffin.
Having found that conduct prior to
September 2012 was not actionable,
Judge Casper granted defendants’
summary judgment with respect to
“liability regarding discriminatory acts
prior to September 22, 2012,” and denied
defendants’ motions for summary
judgment on Griffin’s hostile work
environment and retaliation claims.
– Bryan Johnson-Xenitelis
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Federal Court Agrees to Let VAWA Funding in North
Carolina to Continue During Pendency of H.B. 2 Lawsuit

W

hen the Justice Department
filed suit against North
Carolina for a declaration that
H.B.2’s bathroom provision violates
the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), it put into play a provision of
that statute, 42 U.S.C. sec. 13925(b)(13)
(c), which provides that upon the filing
of a civil action “alleging a pattern
or practice of discriminatory conduct
on the basis of sex in any program or
activity of a State government or unit
of local government which receives
funds made available under [VAWA],
and the conduct allegedly violates
the provisions of [VAWA] and neither
party within forty-five days after
such filing has been granted such
preliminary relief with regard to the
suspension or payment of funds as
may be otherwise available by law, the
Office of Justice Programs shall cause
to have suspended further payment of
any funds under this chapter to that
specific program or activity alleged by
the Attorney General to be in violation
of the provisions of [VAWA] until such
time as the court orders resumption
of payment.” In other words, federal
funding for a variety of rape prevention
and domestic violence programs in
North Carolina that depend on federal
funds under VAWA would have to be
suspended 45 days after May 10.
For a while nobody was really
paying attention to this, but suddenly
somebody woke up to the reality that
before the end of June the federal
money would stop flowing to these
programs unless the court issued a
preliminary injunction to keep the
money flowing. United States v. State
of North Carolina, 2016 WL 3561726
(M.D.N.C., June 23, 2016). The State
and the Justice Department quickly
reached an agreement to ask the federal
court to issue such a preliminary
injunction, which District Judge
Thomas Schroeder did on June 23.
However, Judge Schroeder agonized
through a rather lengthy opinion trying
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to explain how such an injunction could
be issued when the state failed to show
that it was likely to prevail on the merits
of the underlying issue: whether the
bathroom provisions of H.B. 2 violate
the VAWA, as alleged by the Justice
Department. Alone among the statutes
cited by DOJ in its complaint, VAWA
actually explicitly defines its ban on
discrimination “because of sex” to
include discrimination because of
gender identity; on top of that, of course,
the 4th Circuit has already ruled in G.G.
v. Gloucester County School Board,
822 F.3d 709 (April 19, 2016), rehearing
en banc denied (May 31), that the ban
on sex discrimination in Title IX (and
by analogy Title VII), also cited in the
complaint, includes a ban on gender
identity discrimination.
The state is arguing, without
much credibility, that the bathroom
provision does not discriminate
against transgender people, “merely”
requiring them to use single-gender
facilities or facilities consistent with
their biological sex as specified on
their birth certificate when they need
a bathroom. In a summary judgment
motion subsequently filed on July 5,
DOJ blasted that contention out of the
water, but, of course, that motion hadn’t
been filed yet when Judge Schroeder
had to decide before a statutory
deadline for suspending funding that
would hit on June 23.
Ultimately, he concluded that even
though preliminary injunctive relief
normally depends on a strong showing
that the defendant is likely to prevail on
the merits, there is no controlling 4th
Circuit precedent that would prevent
him from issuing the jointly-requested
injunction in light of the practical
consequences of cutting off federal
funding for these important programs
for the duration of the litigation. While
pointing out that lack of a showing
of likelihood of success “is normally
fatal to any request for a preliminary
injunction,” this was not the usual

case. “With the consent of all parties,
however,” he wrote, “courts sometimes
enter preliminary injunctions without
any findings regarding the likelihood
of success on the merits . . . The Fourth
Circuit has acknowledged this practice
without comment.”
In stating his decision to grant
the injunction, he wrote: “The
court does so particularly mindful
of how the entrenched positions of
the parties would otherwise likely
inflict substantial harm on innocent
third parties if VAWA funding
were to be suspended. As the
parties acknowledge, the continued
operation of rape crisis centers and
the other VAWA-funded programs
unquestionably serves the public
interest. The court is also cognizant,
however, that if the allegations of the
complaint are correct, maintenance of
the status quo will continue to inflict
harm on transgender individuals under
enforcement of the law.” He cautioned
that by agreeing to allow funding for
these programs to continue, neither
party was making any representation
“as to any other party’s likelihood of
success on the merits. As a result, the
entry of this preliminary injunction
shall not prejudice the parties’ positions
in this case or further findings by the
court.”
Presumably, if Judge Schroeder
were to grant the DOJ’s motion for
preliminary injunction that was filed
on July 5, the State would have to cease
enforcing H.B.2’s bathroom provision
while the litigation continued, and thus
the flow of federal money would no
longer be endangered. Since the G.G.
ruling by the 4th Circuit intimated,
if not actually holding, that schools
receiving federal funds from the
Education Department might have
to let transgender students access
bathrooms consistent with their gender
identity, chances do not look good for
the State to succeed in defeating DOJ’s
motion for preliminary injunction. ■

Federal Magistrate Orders Jail Officials’ Personal E-Mail
Searched for Evidence of Transphobic Bias in Medical Case

T

o prove an Eighth Amendment
claim of denial of health care,
a prisoner must show both a
serious medical need and “deliberate
indifference” to that need. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1977). The
“deliberate indifference” element includes
a subjective inquiry into the correctional
defendants’ state of mind, Farmer v.
Brennan, 522 U.S. 825, 837 (1994),
on the shoals of which many inmate
plaintiffs founder. But only rarely does
a court allow direct inquiry into a health
care providers’ state of mind.
In Sunderland v. Suffolk County,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77212
(E.D.N.Y., June 14, 2016), U.S.
Magistrate
Judge
A.
Kathleen
Tomlinson ordered Suffolk County,
New York, jail officials to search
their personal computers for evidence
of what they were thinking when
they denied hormonal treatment to
transgender inmate Jeremy Sunderland.
While the opinion is light on medical
background, it recites that jail officials
failed to continue pre-incarceration
hormone treatment (or any other
transgender treatment) for Sunderland
during 16 months she was at the jail,
because they deemed it “non-essential”
or “frivolous.” The complaint includes
a claim against Suffolk County under
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City
of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging
a failure in training and supervision
of providers of care for transgender
patients and an attitude of “let the next
correctional facility” deal with it.
Judge Tomlinson granted a motion
to compel discovery of the providers’
computerized business and personal
e-mails and hard drive information
according to a list of agreed search
terms that included gender dysphoria,
gender identity, transgender status,
gay, lesbian, bisexual, homosexual
and sexual preference, as well as more
colloquial words or phrases, such as
“tranny, trannie, trannies, she-male,
transvestite, queer, cross-dress . . . ,
hermaphrodite, he-she, [and] she-he.”

She allowed a “look-back” period of
five years. “The Court concludes that
Plaintiff has the right to pursue emails
and other correspondence the Individual
Defendants may have created/saved
on their personal computers or sent
from their personal email accounts
which reference Plaintiff or discuss
issues related to gender dysphoria. This
information falls within the broad scope
of relevant discovery under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) in light
of Plaintiff’s allegations against the
Individual Defendants and her Monell
claim against the County.”
The decision surveys several
federal decisions from the Second
Circuit and from District Courts

Citing
Greene
v.
Netsmart
Technologies, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59710, 2011 WL 2225004,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2011), report
and recommendation adopted, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59730, 2011 WL
2193399 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2011),
Judge Tomlinson observed: “[C]
ounsel is responsible for coordinating
her client’s discovery efforts[,] both
in terms of the client’s duty to locate
relevant information and the client’s
duty to preserve and timely produce
that information.” The Court required
individual affidavits if no responsive
documents were found and in camera
inspection for any documents deemed
“private,” accompanied by a “cover

Judge Tomlinson did not require production
of the computers themselves, nor did she
order a “forensic inspection.”
in New York allowing discovery
of personal computer information
“which may contain information
going to bias or motivation” and “may
support Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate
indifference” – noting in particular
the Eighth Amendment state of mind
cases Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d
698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998); and Hathaway
v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.
1996).
Judge Tomlinson did not require
production of the computers themselves,
nor did she order a “forensic
inspection”; but she reminded counsel
that they were “obliged to supervise and
oversee the search for and production
of electronically stored information
and documents from the Individual
Defendants’ computers and email
accounts. Simply handing over the search
terms to the Individual Defendants to
run on their own is not sufficient.”

letter setting forth the asserted privilege
for each document.”
Such broad judicial leave to explore
bias is uncommon in prison medical
care cases in this writer’s experience.
Perhaps the court was persuaded in
part by the allegations of such recent
and cavalier handling of a transgender
patient in a major jail. The case is useful
for those contemplating discovery of
defendants’ LGBT bias in civil rights
cases generally.
Sunderland is represented by David
Bradley Shanies and by Hughes
Hubbard & Reed, LLP, New York City.
– William J. Rold
William J. Rold is a civil rights
attorney in New York City and a former
judge. He previously represented the
American Bar Association on the
National Commission for Correctional
Health Care.
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Federal Court Rules New York Medicaid Must Cover Medically
Necessary Cosmetic Surgery for Gender Transitions

U

.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff ruled
on pending pre-trial motions in
Cruz v. Zucker, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87072, 2016 WL 3660763
(S.D.N.Y., July 5, 2016), a lawsuit
brought by a team of public interest and
pro bono lawyers challenging the way
New York’s Medicaid program provides
or withholds coverage for gender
transition medications and procedures.
Most significantly, he granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs on their claim
that a Medicaid regulation’s categorical
ban on “cosmetic surgery” in connection
with gender transition violates the
requirement under Medicaid to fund
medically necessary treatment.
The named plaintiffs are four
transgender individuals suing “on
behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated.” The lawsuit targets
both the exclusion of coverage for
gender reassignment surgery and
hormone therapy for individuals
under age 18 and the regulation that
imposes, according to Judge Rakoff’s
interpretation, “a blanket ban on
coverage of cosmetic procedures
related to gender dysphoria,” including
procedures that plaintiff contends are
“medically necessary” as part of a
gender transition process.
Judge Rakoff had previously ruled
in favor of class certification last year
in Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). The named defendant,
Howard Zucker, the Commissioner
of the New York State Department of
Health (DOH), which administers the
Medicaid program, asked the court to
reconsider its prior decision against
dismissal of the cosmetic surgery claim,
contending that the program does not
actually have a “blanket ban” because
it has occasionally approved coverage
for particular procedures on a case-bycase basis, but Judge Rakoff concluded
that regardless of whatever steps
the department was taking to make
exceptions, the written regulation is,
as he previously construed it, a blanket
ban, and denied that motion, because
the overriding federal Medicaid
statute requires coverage of “medically
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necessary” treatments for Medicaideligible individuals.
The
defendant
also
sought
decertification of the plaintiff class,
arguing that individual issues presented
by each transgender Medicaid participant
predominate over common issues,
making one big class inappropriate.
The defendant argued that none of the
named plaintiffs could represent the full
range of issues presented by everybody
in the proposed class. Rakoff denied
this motion as well, finding that it would
be appropriate to create “subclasses” to
deal with different aspects of the case,
but that there were enough common
questions of law among all class
members to justify retaining the full
class certification.
Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment, which are
supposed to be granted if there are no
material factual issues requiring trial
and it is appropriate to rule as a matter
of law in favor of the moving party.
The defendant’s motion for summary
judgment argued that the plaintiffs lack
standing to challenge the law. While
Judge Rakoff agreed that some of the
named class plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had actually obtained
coverage for requested services, and
granted summary judgment as to them,
he found that this was not true as to all
of them or the entire class, so refused
to grant summary judgment on the
ultimate issues in the case.
As to the merits, Rakoff granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on the claim that a blanket
exclusion of coverage for cosmetic
surgery regardless of medical necessity
violates the Medicaid statute. For some,
this will be the big news coming out of
this decision, since the categorical ban
in the regulation presented a substantial
barrier to individuals seeking coverage
of all the procedures they and their
doctors deemed necessary to a full,
successful transition.
However, as to the issue of providing
therapy for minors, Judge Rakoff
concluded that there are significant
material factual disputes that would

preclude a complete summary judgment,
although partial summary judgment in
favor of defendants was appropriate.
This claim naturally fell into two
distinct categories: hormone therapy
and surgical procedures. The judge
ordered that the case proceed to trial on
contested factual issues. Significantly,
he found that some of the materials
upon which the defendant was relying
for its position should be excluded as
hearsay. As to what remains for trial,
he wrote: “This case will proceed to
trial to determine (1) what treatments
are medically necessary for individuals
under 18 with gender dysphoria and (2)
to what extend DOH has consistently
followed a bona fide policy of limiting
coverage of drug uses to those listed in
the Medicaid Compendia [an official
publication of federally-approved uses
for drugs] in the context of treatments
for gender dysphoria.” If hormone
therapy and/or surgery are determined
to be medically necessary for at least
some members of the under-18 class,
then a blanket rule against them
violates the statute. The second issue
is important because the governing
Medicaid statute does not generally
require coverage for the administration
of drugs that are not in the Medicaid
Compendia for the uses described
therein (which greatly oversimplifies
the disputed issue), and there is a lively
dispute whether particular drugs should
or should not be covered in the context
of gender dysphoria therapy.
The bottom line, then, is that DOH
cannot impose a blanket exclusion for
what it labels “cosmetic treatments” in
connection with gender dysphoria for
adults, and yet to be determined is the
extent to which DOH can deny coverage
for transition-related treatments for
minors.
Plaintiffs are represented by
attorneys from the Legal Aid Society
and the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, as
well as attorneys working pro bono
from various private firms and some
solo practitioners. The New York
Attorney General’s Office represents
the Department of Health. ■

Italian Supreme Court Allows Stepparent Adoption for Same-Sex
Couples

O

n June 22, 2016 the Italian
Supreme Court of Cassation
(Corte Suprema di Cassazione)
rendered an important judgment
regarding the possibility, for a person in a
same-sex relationship, to adopt the child
of her partner. The ruling’s importance
lies in the fact that it addresses a matter
– stepparent adoption in the context of a
same-sex couples – that was expressly
excluded from the scope of the recent
civil union statute approved by the
Parliament (Act on Same-Sex Civil
Unions and De Facto Partnerships
(Law No. 71/2016, Official Journal No.
118 of May 21, 2016, commented upon
in 2016 LGBT Law Notes 226).
The petition to the Supreme
Court was introduced by the public
prosecutor (Procuratore Generale della
Repubblica) against a co-mother who
had sought to adopt the child of her
same-sex partner. In the first instance,
the Juvenile Tribunal of Rome (No.
299/14 of July 30, 2014, commented
upon in 2014 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes
425) granted the petition, arguing that
under the current law, sexual orientation
is not a factor that could prevent such
an adoption, and that the applicant
was simply seeking to consolidate,
from a legal standpoint, a situation
that already existed as a matter of fact.
Moreover, the Tribunal found that the
child had developed a genuine bond
with the applicant, so that the adoption
could in no way harm the child. Upon
appeal presented by the juvenile public
prosecutor, the Court of Appeals of
Rome affirmed the ruling (Procuratore
della Repubblica presso il Tribunale dei
Minori v. X, Dec. 23, 2015), concluding
that stepparent adoption was a viable
tool for same-sex couples to create a
legal relationship between the biological
parent’s same-sex partner and her child
in absence of any statutory recognition.
The application filed by the public
prosecutor with the Supreme Court
concerned two arguments, plus a third
one that was added in the course of the
hearing. The prosecutor claimed, in
particular, that there was a conflict of

interest between the second mother and
the child, as the former was attempting
to create a relationship of a couple of the
same sex that was by definition against
the best interest of the latter. Second,
she argued that the Court of Appeals
had erred in granting the stepparent
adoption, as the law requires child
abandonment as a legal precondition for
all kinds of adoption. Further, because
of its ethical implications, the prosecutor
asked the petition to be adjudicated en
banc (i.e., before the entire Supreme
Court, the so-called “Sezioni Unite”, as
opposed to a single panel or “Sezione”).

of Rome has already recognized such
an adoption (Juv. Trib. Rome, Dec. 23,
2015). Third, the Court excluded that
a conflict of interest could exist in the
case, as the respondent was simply
seeking to consolidate a relationship
that already existed as a matter of fact.
In this regard, the Court clarified that
any evaluation of such a conflict of
interest is a matter for lower courts to
decide on the merits, not the Supreme
Court. Finally, it rejected the claim that
stepparent adoption requires the child’s
abandonment as a precondition for
adoption. In fact, the Law on Adoption

The Court of Appeals of Rome concluded
that stepparent adoption was a viable
tool for same-sex couples to create a legal
relationship between the biological parent’s
same-sex partner and her child in absence of
any statutory recognition.
The Supreme Court rejected all these
claims and elaborated some principles
to direct lower courts presented with
petitions for same-sex stepchild adoption.
First, the Court stated that hearing a
case en banc is a purely discretionary
decision which the Court is therefore
not obliged to take depending on the
case’s alleged ethical implications. “The
Court of Cassation,” the Court said,
“has already decided through single
panels on questions related to socially or
ethically significant matters.” Second,
it stressed that the case at stake did
not concern surrogacy, because the
biological mother (the respondent’s
partner) had recognized the child at
her birth. This statement would exclude
that the same plain reasoning could
be applied to a couple of men seeking
stepparent adoption of a child born from
a surrogacy abroad, even if the Tribunal

of 1983 (Law No. 184 of May 4, 1983,
Right of the Minor to a Family) provides
for a residual mechanism, the so-called
“adoption in particular cases”, which
requires only that pre-adoption foster
care not be feasible.For same-sex
couples, foster care is by definition not
feasible because the child already has a
parent – the biological one.
At the end of the ruling the Supreme
Court stated very clearly that, in the
context of adoption in particular cases,
courts may not consider the parent(s)’s
sexual orientation to be relevant, either
directly or indirectly. The judiciary
made a point that the legislature hasn’t
even dared to take with the new law. –
Matteo M. Winkler
Matteo M. Winkler is an Assistant Professor in the Tax & Law Department at
HEC Paris.
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Massachusetts Appeals Court Vacates Statutory Rape Conviction
Because of Improper Admission of Gay Porn in Evidence

T

he Appeals Court of Massachusetts
ruled in Commonwealth v.
Christie, 2016 WL 3581839,
2016 Mass. App. LEXIS 79 (July 6,
2016), that the conviction of a man
on charges of statutory rape, indecent
assault and battery on a boy had to be
reversed because of improper evidence
based on the defendant’s possession
of videos depicting “generic samesex sex” involving adults. At the
same time, the court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction on a charge of
“dissemination to a minor of matter
harmful to minors” for showing his
12-year-old male victim a pornographic
video.

defendant “inserted the sex toy into
Daniel’s anus, stopping when Daniel
said he was ‘uncomfortable.’” Daniel
also testified that defendant showed
him some gay pornography depicting
men having intercourse.
The court described the defendant
as “openly gay.” Referring to rulings
at trial on admissibility of the
pornography evidence, “the judge
concluded correctly that evidence of
a man’s homosexuality is irrelevant
to whether he has a sexual interest in
children,” wrote Judge Peter J. Rubin,
“but in part in reliance on our decision
in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 70 Mass.
App. Ct. 757 (2007), he concluded that

“As the judge in this case recognized, however,”
wrote Judge Rubin, “and as this court has
held, evidence of an adult’s homosexuality is
irrelevant to sexual interest in children.”
In 2005, wrote Judge Rubin, Daniel
“disclosed to his mother and the police
a single alleged act of the defendant
performing oral sex on him, and on that
basis the defendant was charged with
one count of statutory rape. On the eve
of trial, in 2007, Daniel disclosed to the
district attorney and the police all the
other alleged sex acts.” Police obtained
a search warrant for the defendant’s
residence, and turned up DVDs and
videotapes depicting both heterosexual
and homosexual pornography depicting
adults. At trial, Daniel testified that
during the summer of 2005, when he was
12, he and his mother were living with
the defendant, who twice performed
oral sex on him and got him to penetrate
the defendant anally. He also testified
about waiting in the car while defendant
purchased a “sex toy” (i.e., a dildo) and
some pornographic DVDs, and that the
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the same-sex pornography was relevant
to the defendant’s sexual interest in
Daniel and to the manner and means
by which the charged rapes and sexual
assault were allegedly committed,
that the risk of unfair prejudice from
this evidence did not substantially
outweigh its probative value, and that
with a proper limiting instruction
the videotapes could be admitted in
evidence. The judge excluded the
heterosexual pornography.” As an
attempt to lessen prejudice to the
defendant, the trial judge refused to
have the gay pornography exhibited
to the jury, instead allowing the
prosecution to introduce testimony
describing its content.
The appeals court disagreed with
the trial judge as to admissibility of
the descriptions of the gay videos.
While agreeing with the prosecution

that “these descriptions were not
introduced as impermissible propensity
evidence” and that the judge had
carefully instructed the jury that “the
challenged evidence could not be
used to demonstrate the defendant’s
propensity to engage in such conduct
in order to prove that he committed the
charged acts in this case,” nonetheless
it was improper for the judge to tell
the jury that they could rely on these
descriptions of the videotapes as
evidence of “sexual interest and state of
mind . . . as it relates to [Daniel] and
as it relates to the manner and means
by which the Defendant allegedly
accomplished the alleged sexual
assault.” While the Wallace case had
allowed admission of heterosexual
pornography, the court found the
circumstances distinguishable in light
of the contentions of the parties and the
overall state of the evidence in that case.
“As the judge in this case recognized,
however,” wrote Judge Rubin, “and
as this court has held, evidence of an
adult’s homosexuality is irrelevant to
sexual interest in children.” Rubin cited
on this point the appeals court’s ruling
in 2009 setting aside the conviction of
Bernard Baran, a young man who was
convicted of molesting children at the
day care center where he work based on
subsequently-discredited “rehearsed”
testimony by young children and by
the fact that he was openly gay. (Baran
was discharged from state prison after
a lengthy and debilitating incarceration
and died prematurely a few years later.)
Once again citing the Baran ruling
(74 Mass. App. Ct. 256), Rubin wrote,
“the myth that homosexual men
have an interest in sex with underage
children has been discredited. The use
of evidence of an adult’s homosexuality
to demonstrate a sexual interest in
underage boys (or, indeed, underage
children of either gender) is thus
impermissible. Given this, we agree
with the defendant that evidence of
his interest in viewing depictions of
adult males engaged in generic acts

lawfully possessed depictions of adults
engaged in heterosexual sex cannot
support a conclusion that a male adult
has an interest in engaging in sex acts
of the same kind with underage girls.”
Judge Rubin also commented that
because it was “undisputed” that the
videos seized by the police in 2007 were
not shown to Daniel by the defendant
in 2005, they could not be admitted in
support of a theory that the defendant
showed him the videos to “groom him”
into accepting the idea of having sex with
the defendant. “Any such corroborating
value of the defendant’s possession of
these videotapes of generic acts of adult
same-sex sex – at a different residence,
two years after the crimes are alleged to
have been committed – is too attenuated
to overcome the risk of undue prejudice
from this evidence,” he wrote. “These
depictions thus may not be admitted for
such a corroborative purpose under the
applicable standard.”
One of the videos seized by the
police showed the use of a dildo, and
one of the counts of statutory rape
“involves an allegation of the use of such
a device in a similar manner on Daniel,”
wrote Rubin. However, he wrote, the
prosecutor “has not put any evidence
in the record before us to show that use
of a sex toy is a sufficiently distinctive
sexual act that it could be admitted to
show the defendant’s specific interest in
this practice . . . There is nothing in the
record to support a conclusion that this
conduct is so unusual that the probative
value of evidence that the defendant
possessed a visual depiction of it is more
probative of his interest in engaging in
it than unfairly prejudicial. Nor is there
evidence that interest in the use of
such a sex toy with an adult would be
probative of an individual’s interest in
using one with an underage child with
whom he was unlawfully having sex.”
The court disclaimed expressing
any view about the defendant’s guilt or
innocence, but held that the statutory
rape convictions must be reversed
and the verdicts set aside, although,
as noted above, the conviction on the
dissemination charge was affirmed.
Alexei Tymoczko represented the
defendant on this appeal. ■
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of same-sex sex, absent any additional
factors like the ones present in
Wallace, is irrelevant to whether he
has an interest in sexual contact with
an underage boy. The impropriety of
admitting this evidence to show the
defendant’s state of mind and sexual
interest with respect to boys becomes
clear if one imagines that the evidence
was about heterosexual pornography
and the victim were a girl. No court
properly could find a defendant’s
mere possession of adult heterosexual
pornography relevant to proving his
sexual interest in a female child.”
“The ingrained stereotypes and
mistaken views still held by some
individuals render evidence such as that
introduced here unfairly prejudicial.
Even though there was other evidence
that the defendant here, who never
disputed his sexual orientation, was
gay, and that he owned pornography,
the error in the admission of the explicit
descriptions of his interest in same-sex
sex, exacerbated by the instruction on
its permissible use, was prejudicial.”
The court concluded that reversal
was required on all counts except
dissemination, “with respect to which
the jury were expressly informed they
could not use this evidence.”
Since retrial was likely, the court
addressed other flaws in the trial court’s
instructions. The jury had been told
they could take the descriptions into
account “as it relates to the manner
and means by which the defendant
allegedly accomplished the alleged
sexual assaults.” Judge Rubin rejected
the prosecution’s argument that the
acts depicted in the videos were
“unique enough” to “show that the
defendant had an interest in engaging
in those acts, whether with an adult or
a child.” This was “generic” gay porn,
the judge pointed out, “the ordinary
means of men having same-sex sex. It
follows from our holding above that,
standing alone, an interest in viewing
lawfully possessed depictions of adult
men having gay sex is not relevant to
the question whether a male adult has
an interest in engaging in sex acts of
that kind with underage boys, just as,
standing along, an interest in viewing

CIVIL LITIGATION
ALABAMA – The Alabama Court of
the Judiciary has acceded to a request
by suspended Alabama Chief Justice
Roy Moore to hold a hearing on his
motion to dismiss ethical charges
that were levied against him by the
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission
in response to complaints that he had
violated judicial ethics by advising
probate judges not to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples after
the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in
Obergefell that same-sex couples have
a constitutional right to marry. Moore
contends that the directive he issued was
merely informing the probate judges
of his opinion about the situation; he
consistently took the view that the
state courts, including the probate
judges, were not bound by federal court
rulings when it came to interpreting
and enforcing the provisions of the state
constitution, including its ban on samesex marriage. The hearing will take
place on August 8. Meanwhile, Moore
has filed a federal lawsuit, contesting the
constitutionality of Alabama’s judicial
disciplinary system, under which he
was automatically suspended when the
JIC asserted the charge against him. He
is represented in the federal lawsuit by
Alliance Defense Freedom, the rightwing anti-gay litigation group that is
also representing another member of the
Alabama Supreme Court, Tom Parker,
who has been notified that the JIC is
investigating him for public comments
he made about same-sex marriage. Oral
arguments on JIC’s motion to dismiss
the federal case, pending before U.S.
District Judge W. Harold Albritton III,
will be held on August 4. Moore was
previously removed as Chief Justice
in 2003 after he defied a federal court
order to remove a Ten Commandments
monument from the state supreme court
building, but he was subsequently reelected by the people of Alabama, who
evidently prize spunk over judgment
in their Supreme Court justices.
Huntsville Times, June 29. * * * The
Associated Press reported on July 16
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that the Judicial Inquiry Commission
had filed papers with the Court of
Judiciary arguing that Moore should
be removed as Chief Justice in order to
“preserve the integrity, independence,
impartiality of Alabama’s judiciary.”
The Commission asserted that Moore
had “disrespected the judiciary” by
instructing probate judges in January
2016 that a state injunction against
same-sex marriage remained in “full
force and effect” even though the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in June 2015 that
same-sex couples have a constitutional
right to marry and a U.S. District Court
had issued an order to probate judges
banning enforcement of the state’s
same-sex marriage ban. * * * The
Associated Press (June 17) reported
that Alabama Supreme Court Justice
Tom Parker filed a lawsuit in federal
district court, claiming that the Judicial
Inquiry Commission is violated the
First Amendment rights of Alabama
judges to speak out against the U.S.
Supreme Court’s marriage equality
decision. The Southern Poverty Law
Center filed a complaint before the
Commission against Parker after
he spoke out against the Obergefell
decision on a conservative radio talk
show in 2015. He is represented by
Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel, who
asserts that Parker “has a constitutional
right to speak out on the case so long
as he is not presently presiding over
it.” Parker’s lawsuit challenges the
“automatic suspension” provision,
under which judges are suspended from
active duty if the Commission decides
to investigate charges against them.
ALABAMA – Is the Alabama marriage
equality case finally at an end? On
June 7, Senior U.S. District Judge Callie
V. S. Granade denied a motion by Judge
Don Davis to withdraw as defendant
class representative and a motion by
Attorney General Luther Strange to
dismiss the case as moot; instead, she
granted plaintiffs’ motion for permanent

injunction and final judgment in
Strawser v. Strange, 2016 WL 3199523
(S.D. Alabama). She found no evidence
in the record to justify reconsidering
her prior decision to designate Davis
as the defendant class representative.
Responding to the mootness argument,
in which Attorney General Strange
conceded that Obergefell v. Hodges is
binding on Alabama officials – a point
not yet conceded by suspended Alabama
Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore, who
maintains that Obergefell is binding
only on the states of the 6th Circuit – she
found persuasive the plaintiffs’ argument
that “none of the Defendants’ assurances
provide Plaintiffs or the members
of the Plaintiff Class with a formal,
enforceable order should the Attorney
General (or a future Attorney General)
or other Defendants violate this Court’s
injunction or fail to fully recognize
marriages validly entered into in
Alabama or elsewhere. Current or future
state and county officials may disagree
about Obergefell’s applicability to the
challenged Alabama laws or otherwise
resist the decision. This Court agrees
that the need for a permanent injunction
is clear.” She quoted from a similar
ruling by the district court in Florida in
Brenner v. Scott, stating “a government
ordinarily cannot establish mootness
just by promising to sin no more.” “To
demonstrate the case is moot,” she
wrote, “Defendants must show that both
of the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) it can be said with assurance that
there is no reasonable expectation that
the alleged violation will recur, and (2)
interim relief or events have completely
and irrevocably eradicated the effects of
the alleged violation.” Those conditions
have not been met in Alabama, she
found. “Given the actions of Alabama
state and local officials during this
litigation, both before and after the
Supreme Court decided Obergefell,
it cannot be said with assurance that
there is no reasonable expectation that
Alabama’s unconstitutional marriage
laws will not again be enforced.
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Although the Attorney General
professes that he will continue to abide
by the decision in Obergefell, like the
defendant in Brenner v. Scott, ‘there
has been nothing voluntary about
the defendants’ change of tack.’ The
Defendants defended this case with
vigor from the outset and the challenged
statutes remain on the books.” She
pointed out the technicality that these
plaintiffs cannot enforce the injunction
that she issued in the companion case of
Searcy v. Strange, which is the injunction
against the Attorney General, and, “It is
also apparent that certain Alabama state
courts do not view this Court’s ruling
in Searcy as binding precedent, as
demonstrated by the writ of mandamus
issued by the Alabama Supreme Court
on March 3, 2015, requiring probate
judges to discontinue the issuance of
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.”
So there, Roy Moore, your antics
have helped to prevent Strange from
obtaining a mootness dismissal! She
also pointed out that although Moore
is currently suspended, other members
of the Alabama Supreme Court in
concurring opinions “also expressed
disagreement with Obergefell” and
implied in their opinions that their
court’s decision finding the marriage
laws constitutional was still in effect.
As long as that mandamus order has
not been rescinded, there is no certainty
that Alabama officials will behave
appropriately. Thus, Judge Granade
issued a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the unconstitutional
statutes.
ARKANSAS – Reuters reported July 5
that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit
accusing a McDonald’s restaurant
in Bentonville, Arkansas, of firing a
worker because he is HIV-positive.
EEOC v. Mathews Management Co.,
No. 16-05166 (W.D. Ark., filed July 1,
2016). The complaint alleges violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

both in discharging the worker and
in requiring employees to report their
use of prescription medications which
would reveal conditions deemed to be
disabilities. The John Doe worker was
hired in November 2014 to perform
janitorial duties, operate a cash register,
work the drive-thru window, and open
and close the restaurant. Doe was not
hired as a food handler.

either as to the Title VII/ADEA claims
or the state law defamation claim. That
the plaintiff is a lay person representing
himself does not excuse failing to
file within statutory deadlines. The
discrimination statutes require that a
claim be filed in federal court within
90 days after the Right to Sue letter is
received, and Arkansas slander claims
must be filed within a year.

ARKANSAS – In Huff v. Regis
Corporation, 2016 WL 3453471, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79925 (W.D. Ark.,
June 20, 2016), the plaintiff suffered
dismissal of his Title VII and ADEA
complaint because he waited too long
after receiving a right-to-sue letter from
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission before filing his complaint
in federal court. Robert Huff was
employed as a stylist at a hair salon in
Fayetteville from 1992 until he was
discharged on January 13, 2015. In
his EEOC charge he related a tale of
ridicule and harassment focused on his
sexual orientation and age that would
possibly be sufficient to meet federal
pleading requirements. However, the
EEOC dismissed his charge and issued a
right to sue letter on September 23, 2015.
Huff then waiting until March 23, 2016,
to file his pro se complaint in the federal
district court, alleging discrimination
and defamation. The employer moved
to dismiss, asserting both causes of
action were time-barred. Responding to
the motion, Huff wrote: “I understand
about the time limits clearly. It was a
misjudgment to turn the EEOC Right
to Sue letter in late.” But he argued his
case should not be dismissed because,
wrote District Judge Timothy L. Brooks,
“he feels he has evidence to prove his
case on the merits, and ‘everyone in the
United States has a right to be heard
in front of a judge and even a right to
a fair trial.” But time limits are, after
all, time limits, and Judge Brooks found
that this case did not qualify for any
of the exceptions for equitable tolling,

CALIFORNIA – On June 27 Los
Angeles County Superior Court Judge
Ann I. Jones signed a settlement
judgment in the coordinated actions
of Werner v. Spark Networks, Inc.
and Wright v. Spark Networks, Inc.,
Case No. JCCP4823, in which two
gay men alleged that the defendant,
the owner/operator of several dating
websites (including, most prominently,
ChristianMingle.com), was violating
the Unruh Act, California’s public
accommodations statute, by providing
services that only made matches for
different-sex couples. As part of the
settlement, Spark must allow users of
the websites to seek same-sex matches,
and has up to 24 months to tailor the
websites to enhance its receptiveness
to same-sex searches. In the words of
the judgment, “Spark represents and
warrants that it is updating the Mingle
Sites, and to the extent Spark continues
to operate any of the Mingle Sites in
the future, such sites will be updated to
create an experience which will allow
individuals seeking same sex partners
to use Spark’s matching technologies to
find and be matched with others seeking
same sex partners. For all of Spark’s
sites to remain operational, Spark will
update them within 24 months of the
date of this Judgement.” Prior to this
settlement, those registering on the
site had to identify themselves either
as “man seeking woman” or “woman
seeking man.” Messrs. Werner and
Wright felt unfairly left out. Media
comment focused on ChristianMingle.
com, and the intriguing idea that gay
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Christians might be seeking religiously
compatible mates. Wall Street Journal,
June 30; Washington Post, July 7.

substantive unconscionability, and both
must be present to provide grounds to
void an arbitration agreement.

CALIFORNIA – The 2nd District Court
of Appeal, reversing a decision by
Los Angeles County Superior Court
Judge Michael L. Stern, ruled on June
27 that an employment discrimination
plaintiff alleging, inter alia, sexual
orientation discrimination in violation
of California law, was required to
submit his claim to binding arbitration.
Urchasko v. Compass Airlines, 2016
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4836, 2016
WL 3597425. John Urchasko sought to
avoid arbitration by claiming that when
he filled out the on-line employment
application he had failed to check a
box acknowledging his agreement to
arbitrate. There was testimony on the
motion that some sort of “computer
glitch” had caused the relevant box not to
appear on the application completed by
Urchasko. But the text of the application
made clear that the applicant agreed to
submit all disputes to arbitration, said the
court of appeal, rejecting Judge Stern’s
conclusion that failure to check the box
meant that Urchasko had not agreed to
arbitrate. The court also rejected Stern’s
conclusion that the text of the arbitration
provision was unconscionable as a takeit-or-leave-it contract in “tiny font” that
was “replete with confusing exceptions,
legalisms, and legal authorities”
and lacked a copy of the American
Arbitration Association rules to which it
referred. The court of appeal pointed out
that there was no dispute that Urchasko
had signed the employment application,
which included the text binding
him to arbitrate disputes with the
company. “Urchasko’s signature on that
agreement, therefore, unquestionably
constituted an objective manifestation
of his assent to arbitration.” As to
unconscionability, the court found
that while there might be “aspects”
of procedural unconscionability in
this case, there was no evidence of

CALIFORNIA – U.S. District Judge
Roger T. Benitez denied summary
judgement to a man who was suing
for false arrest and violation of his 4th
Amendment rights as a result of his arrest
by undercover police officers patrolling
a known gay “cruising area” in Balboa
Park. Cobb v. Rodriguez, 2016 WL
3585459 (S.D. Cal., May 13, 2016). Police
officers Calderson and Rodriguez were
“notified that an individual may have
propositioned an undercover officer for
sex.” While questioning two individuals,
they “heard moaning of a sexual nature
and rustling coming from behind some
bushes.” They aimed flashlights at the
bushes and saw John Cobb “walking out
of the wooded area and zipping up his
pants.” They identified themselves as
police officers and asked Cobb to speak
to them. Cobb moved away from them
and they moved to block his path. They
claim that he began “cursing and yelling
that the officers had no right to speak to
him.” They put him in handcuffs and sat
him on a bench. “Calderson observed
that plaintiff could not sit still, was
sweating profusely on a cool night, and
that his eyes and fingers were moving
uncontrollably.” Calderson concluded
that Cobb was “under the influence of
a controlled substance” and took him to
the police station, where a blood sample
was drawn and Cobb was booked and
spent the night in jail. The test proved
negative and he was not prosecuted.
Cobb sued for false arrest and violation
of his 4th Amendment rights, relying in
part on recorded comments Calderson
made during his shift: “BTW were
working Redwood Circle . . . otherwise
known as Gay Sex Ville . . . we’re
scoops fir he lucky UC units hahaha”
and “Well at least I wasn’t the UC
units getting propositioned for gay
sex LMAO.” Whatever that means . . .
Judge Benitez denied Cobb’s summary
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judgment motion, finding that there
were contested facts. For purposes of
deciding the motion, he considered
whether Cobb’s claims would be valid
if the officers’ version of events was
believed, and concluded that under those
facts the officers had cause to do what
they did. If their physical description
of Cobb was believed, they could have
reasonably concluded that he was high
on something. The judge observed, in
connection with Calderson’s recorded
remarks, that Cobb was not arrested for
a sex crime, but rather for being under
the influence of drugs in public. That
the police turned out to be mistaken
as to that was not dispositive of the
question of their legal liability to Cobb
because, “where an officer has probable
cause for an arrest, he cannot be liable
for false arrest. As genuine issues of
material fact exist and as Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate as a matter of law
that Defendants did not have probable
cause, he has also failed to show that he
was falsely arrested as a matter of law.”
The court also rejected a conspiracy
claim, saying that Cobb “does little
more than conclude that Calderson and
Rodriguez (and others who are not a
party to this action) are engaged in a
conspiracy to harass homosexual men,”
but that he had presented no evidence of
any agreement between the officers, and
Calderson testified in discovery that “no
one directed him to arrest Plaintiff and
the record reveals no evidence to dispute
Calderon’s testimony.” Furthermore,
of course, Calderson did not stop and
arrest Cobb “for activity related to
Plaintiff’s homosexuality” but rather
for his appearance of being stoned. The
court deemed Calderson’s comments
irrelevant to Cobb’s case.
CALIFORNIA – The opinion by Justice
Kenneth R. Yegan of the California 2nd
District Court of Appeal in Butler v.
LeBouef, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 480,
2016 WL 3398418 (June 20, 2016),
sounds like a synopsis of an anti-gay
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noir movie plot. One gets the gist from
an introductory paragraph summarizing
what the case is about: “An ethical
estate planning attorney will plan for
his client, not for himself. A license
to practice law is not a license to take
advantage of an elderly and mentally
infirm client. As we shall explain,
the factual findings of the trial court
compel the conclusion that appellant
used his license to take advantage
of an elderly and mentally inform
person to enrich himself. The trial
court factual findings are disturbing,
fatal to appellant’s contentions, and
suggest criminal culpability.” What
makes the case relevant for Law Notes
is that appellant, John F. LeBouef, is a
gay attorney, and the elder client, John
Patton, was a gay “renowned interior
designer” who was grieving the death
of his domestic partner “and by the
end of his life, was often emotionally
out of control.” He was befriended by
the appellant and the appellant’s life
partner, who insinuated themselves into
the client’s affairs and who instigated
a change in the client’s estate plan to
substitute appellant for client’s nieces
as his principal beneficiary and gifted a
vintage car to a friend and tenant of the
appellant. “It was a radical change” in
the estate plan, according to the court,
and after the client died, the nieces
challenged the will successfully in this
case. The nieces were able to show that
the appellant had pulled off similar
schemes on eight prior occasions, but
the trial court limited the evidence to
the two most recent cases in which
“appellant befriended an elderly
person and drafted a will or trust
naming himself or his partner principal
beneficiary.” Indeed, in one case,
appellant actually married an elderly
woman who was a caretaker who had
inherited substantial money from her
patient; before the caretaker passed
away, the appellant drafted her trust
naming himself principal beneficiary,
received the bulk of the estate on her
death and collected surviving spousal

social security benefits for the next seven
years! The court noted a California
statute that “prohibits donative transfers
to broad categories of persons who,
because of their relationship with the
settlor/trustor, might exercise undue
influence. Undue influence is presumed
where the donative transfer is in favor of
the person who drafted the instrument
or where the person who transcribed
it or caused it to be transcribed had a
fiduciary relationship with the settlor/
trustor.” Of course an attorney-client
relationship would qualify. The court
rejected the appellant’s argument
against reliance on the prior incidents,
noting that a forensic expert had credibly
testified to the unitary authorship of
the documents in the various cases,
which showed a pattern of operations.
In a footnote, the court noted that the
“original trust document and a laptop
computer used by the appellant to
prepare trust documents” had been
“lost” in a suspicious “burglary” the
“occurred just before appellant was
scheduled to produce the documents
for his deposition and a forensic
examination. The police suspected it
was a staged burglary because nothing
else was taken and the house was made
to look like it was ransacked. Expensive
watches and art work were in plain sight
but were not taken.” There were also
discrepancies about when the client’s
death was reported to 911, which the
trial court found “troubling because it
suggested that appellant spent hours
in Patton’s house before reporting the
death.” This is an amazing case to read.
Somebody should consider turning it
into a film. An unfortunate tale of gay
people acting badly . . .
CALIFORNIA – Halliburton, a major
defense contractor that earns millions of
dollars from government contracts every
year, is being sued by Harrison Y. Harris,
an African-American transgender man,
an Army veteran who holds a computer
engineering degree, who, according

to his complaint, was treated in a
discriminatory manner throughout his
employment, both because of his race
and his gender identity, was set up to
fail by the work group to which he was
assigned, and obtained no relief despite
his frequently complaints, the last of
which apparently led to his discharge.
Harris v. Halliburton Company, 2016
WL 3255074 (E.D. Cal., June 13, 2016).
But his claims will probably never see
the inside of a courtroom, because U.S.
Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston
recommended granting the company’s
motion to compel arbitration of all
claims. The key ruling came in the part
of her opinion discussing “governing
law.” Harris pointed to a provision of
the Defense Appropriations Act of
2010, under which “any government
contractor which accepts a contract in
excess of $1M from the Department of
Defense must agree to not enter into
any new or enforce any arbitration
agreement that requires arbitration
of Title VII and certain employment
tort claims. Thurston found this did
not apply to the case. “Significantly,”
she wrote, “however, the Defense
Appropriations Act applies to “military
contractors with contracts of at
least $1 million,” and “imposes no
substantive prohibitions on arbitration.”
“Because this action does not involve a
government contract,” she wrote, “the
Defense Appropriations Act ‘simply
does not apply’.” On the other hand,
she found that the Federal Arbitration
Act does apply and mandates ordering
arbitration so long as the arbitration
agreement is not both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. In
this case, Halliburton seems to have
designed its forms to comply with
the objections that California courts
have raised at times to employment
arbitration agreements as being too
one-sided or imposing inequitable
financial burdens on employees. She
found in this case a “knowing waiver”
of the right to trial by Harris, and that
the arbitration agreement itself was
Summer 2016
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not oppressive or substantively unfair.
“Plaintiff and Defendants entered into
a valid arbitration agreement, which
encompasses the issues in dispute,”
she concluded. “As a result, ‘there
is a presumption of arbitrability’
and Halliburton’s motion to compel
arbitration should not be denied.” Judge
Thurston’s report and recommendation
will go to Chief District Judge Lawrence
J. O’Neill.
COLORADO – Lambda Legal filed
a partial summary judgment motion
in Smith v. Avanti, Civ. Action No.
1:16-cv-00091-RM-MJW (D. Colo.,
motion filed June 16, 2016), an action
challenging a landlord’s discrimination
against a same-sex couple, one of
whom is transgender, who were denied
rental housing in Gold Hill, Colorado,
because, as the landlord informed them,
she feared the couple’s “uniqueness”
would jeopardize the landlord’s
position in the small community. In
terms of building anti-discrimination
doctrine for LGBT people, this case
is an important potential precedent to
establish that discrimination because
of sexual orientation or gender identity
(both implicated in the case) is
“discrimination because of sex” within
the meaning of the federal Fair Housing
Act. (If the Equality Act introduced in
Congress in July 2015 were to be passed,
the Fair Housing Act would be amended
to explicitly prohibit discrimination
because of sexual orientation and
gender identity.) In its motion, Lambda
Legal uses federal court decisions
under other sex discrimination statutes
– most prominently Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 – in arguing
that the discrimination alleged in this
case, if proven, should be deemed to
be sex discrimination. Although the
basic facts are not disputed, the motion
does not seek an ultimate ruling on the
merits, but focuses on getting the court
to rule that the FHA applies to this case.
Lambda staff attorneys working on the
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case include Omar Gonzalez-Pagan and
Karen Loewy; cooperating attorneys
working on the case include Benjamin
N. Simler and Matthew P. Castelli of
Holland & Hart LLP.
CONNECTICUT – Superior Court Judge
William J. Wenzel denied a motion by the
Connecticut Department of Corrections
to dismiss a sexual orientation
discrimination claim by an employee
of the Department on exhaustion of
administrative remedies grounds in
Velazquez v. State of Connecticut
Department of Corrections, 2016 WL
3265950 (Judicial Dist. of Fairfield at
Bridgeport, May 18, 2016). In the form
complaint that Ernesto Velazquez filed
with the Commission on Human Rights,
Velazquez did not expressly state that he
had been subjected to sexual orientation
discrimination and did not identify his
sexual orientation. He checked off the
boxes for the general state employment
discrimination statute and Title VII,
but not the specific provision on sexual
orientation claims. “The operable
language of the Affidavit” that he
submitted with his administrative
complaint states “I was sexually
harassed, subjected to unequal terms
and conditions of my employment,
and treated unfairly based on my sex
(male).” In the space on the form for
narrative, he “alleges being referred to
as ‘homo’ and ‘faggot’ and being called
‘bitch’ and ‘crazy.’ He alleges he was
intimidated and insulted by being told
to provide oral sex to another male staff
member. He also alleges other forms of
insult or harassment not overtly sexual
in nature.” The Commission “released
its jurisdiction over this complaint
allowing plaintiff to commence a civil
action based on that complaint.” In the
civil action, he alleges sexual orientation
discrimination. The agency’s motion to
dismiss argued that because Velazquez
did not explicitly posit his administrative
complaint as a sexual orientation
discrimination complaint or specifically

identify the sexual orientation provision
of the state law on that form, he failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and his
claim must be dismissed by the court.
Judge Wenzel, while characterizing the
issue as a “close call,” found that “the
discrimination asserted in Count One
was reasonably related to the allegations
contained in plaintiff’s Affidavit and
hence not barred by the doctrine of
exhaustion.” Indeed, it is hard to credit
that the agency is asserting that it was not
put on notice of the nature of the claim
when the affidavit refers to plaintiff
being called “homo” and “faggot” and
being subjected to demands to give
oral sex to another male staff member!
“Clearly being called ‘homo’ and
‘faggot’ immediately raise questions
about sexual orientation as these are
the very essence of such terms,” wrote
the judge. “These terms, especially the
later, are immediately recognized as
almost always intended to insult and
demean a person simply because of
their orientation.” Furthermore, “to
expect a self-represented person trying
to complete this form to recognize the
appropriate statutory cite is indeed
asking quite a bit,” and his citation of
the general statute at least invoked the
state’s anti-discrimination law, “which
expressly includes the deprivation of
rights based on sexual orientation.
Whether or not it is a perfect fit, it puts
the agency on notice of all the potential
claims covered by the statutory
language.” In other words, Judge Wenzel
was being very kind to the attorney for
the Corrections Department when he
called this a “close call.” The exhaustion
argument strikes us a bordering on the
frivolous.
FLORIDA – Florida Attorney General
Pam Bondi’s office has reached a
settlement with two sets of attorneys
who represented successful plaintiffs
in marriage equality litigation over
the subject of attorneys’ fees, after
U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle
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ruled in April that the plaintiffs were
prevailing parties and urged the state
to negotiate a fee settlement. According
to an Associated Press report, the total
agreed upon is just under $500,000.00.
The ACLU of Florida will receive
$213,000.00, and attorneys from
Jacksonville will receive $280,000.00.
thenewstribune.com, June 2, 2016.
HAWAII – Honolulu Civil Beat (June
8) reported that the Hawaii Department
of Education has created guidelines and
policies for use by the state’s public
schools in accommodating transgender
students. The policies, modeled on
those adopted by California and New
York, “will offer transgender students
alternative bathroom, uniform and locker
room arrangements that correspond
with their gender identity,” according
to the article. “Nurse’s bathrooms
will also be an option for transgender
students or non-transgender students
who are uncomfortable changing in
the same locker room.” The guidelines
also recognize the right of students
to wear clothing typically associated
with their gender identity, to use their
preferred names and gender identity and
pronouns, but official school documents
will contain the same information as
legal documents, such as passports or
birth certificates. A student can begin
“transitioning” at school without any
involvement of a doctor or their parent.
DOE “also drafted an individualized,
confidential support plan to make it
easier for school staff to keep track of
the students’ legal names, preferred
names and pronouns, chosen locker
room/bathroom facilities, ‘go-to adults’
on campus and other arrangements.”
ILLINOIS – In Students and Parents
for Privacy v. U.S. Department of
Education, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77728, 2016 WL 3269001 (N.D. Ill.), U.S.
District Judge Jorge L. Alonso granted a
motion on June 15 to allow the Illinois

Safe Schools Alliance and several
transgender students to intervene in
order to defend the settlement agreement
between the federal government and
Township High School District 211
under which transgender students at the
school will be allowed to use restroom
facilities consistent with their gender
identities. The case was instigated by
lawyers from the Alliance Defense Fund
(a/k/a Alliance Defending Freedom),
an anti-gay “religious” litigation group
that organized some disgruntled parents
and students to form “Students and
Parents for Privacy” in order to bring
this lawsuit, challenging the settlement.
They are arguing that the Education
and Justice Departments violated the
Administrative Procedure Act by
adopting a “new rule” without going
through the notice and hearing process,
and that this “new rule” (that Title IX
forbids gender identity discrimination)
is not a valid interpretation of the
statutory ban on sex discrimination
by educational institutions that receive
federal funding. They have also filed
a copycat lawsuit in North Carolina,
seeking to uphold that state’s “bathroom
bill” which is being attacked in court
by the federal government and private
plaintiffs represented by the ACLU
and Lambda Legal. While conceding
that allowing intervention might make
the case more “complex” because the
individual stories of the intervening
students will now become relevant,
Judge Alsonso wrote that it would not
make it “unnecessarily complex,” since
the issues they will present are germane
to the lawsuit, and resolving those
issues in this case might stave off future
lawsuits. A large team of attorneys
represent the intervenors, including
ACLU national and local offices and
pro bono attorneys from the law firm
Mayer Brown LLP in Chicago.
INDIANA – In a state where there is no
law against a business discriminating
against a transgender person because of

her gender identity, potential plaintiffs
have to be inventive to find a cause of
action. A transgender woman, Carmen
Carter-Lawson, who encountered
disrespectful conduct from a towtruck driver, sought to hold the driver’s
employer liable under 42 U.S.C. sec.
1983, alleging sexual harassment and
“misconduct of business.” CarterLawson v. Affordable Towing, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79097 (N.D. Ind.,
June 17, 2016). Carter-Lawson filed pro
se and asked to have filing fees waived.
District Judge Philip P. Simon pointed
out that because of the requested fee
waiver, he was obligated to review the
complaint and dismiss it if the action
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a legal claim, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. He decided this case
fell in the second category, because
there was no plausible allegation
that the defendant was a state actor,
a prerequisite for a suit brought
under Sec. 1983, which deals with
deprivations of rights secured by the
Constitution by a defendant who was
acting under color of state law. CarterLawson ingeniously suggested that
because the local police department
required Affordable Towing to have
her sign a release in order to get her car
back, there was state action involved,
but the court was not buying. “In plain
English,” wrote Simon, “the mere
fact that the Gary Police Department
instructed Affordable Towing to have
Carter-Lawson sign a release regarding
her settlement with Gary when she
picked up her car is not enough to claim
that the employee was acting at the
state’s direction when he insulted her.
For the same reasons, the ‘misconduct
of business’ allegation – whichever
constitutional right, privilege, or
immunity that corresponds to – is
therefore also insufficiently pled.”
Consequently, the complaint was
dismissed for failure to state a claim,
and the request to proceed without
paying a filing fee was denied.
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LOUISIANA – Granting summary
judgment to the employer, U.S. District
Judge Susie Morgan ruled in White v.
Rouses Enterprises LLC, 2016 WL
3127232, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72740
(E.D. La., June 3, 2016), that a male
employee’s Title VII claims of quid
pro quo sexual harassment, hostile
environment, and retaliation, levelled
against a gay supervisor, were not
supported by the summary judgment
record before the court. Marcus
White was employed as a butcher
at defendant’s Metairie, Louisiana,
grocery store from April 23, 2012, until
he was discharged on September 15,
2014. White claimed that a few days
prior to his discharge he encountered
his gay supervisor in the restroom
and was propositioned for sex, which
he angrily declined. He alleged that
in order to legitimate the subsequent
discharge his supervisor schemed with
others at the store to frame him on a
theft of merchandise charge. The court
found that White’s factual allegations
fell short of what would be required
to withstand summary judgment; the
supervisor’s statement in the restroom
did not constitute a clear quid pro quo
statement (“So, how bad you want that
raise?” with no explicit mention of
a sexual demand), there were plenty
of factual allegations in the record
documenting the charge that White had
stolen groceries, that this was brought to
light by a co-worker who knew nothing
about the alleged sexual solicitation,
that the decision to discharge White
was made by higher-level managers
who were also unaware of the alleged
sexual solicitation, and that the gay
supervisor was merely a conduit for
communicating the discharge decision
to White. The supervisor denied making
any sexual solicitation, alleging that
White had misconstrued his statement,
and White’s credibility was impaired
by his failure to complain about the
alleged solicitation or to mention it to
anybody until after he was discharged.
Judge Morgan also found that White’s
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allegations were insufficient to put into
play a “hostile environment” claim
based on one equivocal incident.
MARYLAND – The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
announced a favorable settlement of
one of its first lawsuits asserting that
an employer violated Title VII’s ban on
sex discrimination by discriminating
against a person because of his sexual
orientation. EEOC v. Pallet Companies,
Civ. Action No. 1:16-cv-00595-CCB
(D. Md., Consent Decree filed June
23, 2016). A BNA Daily Labor Report
account of the settlement indicated
that the proposed Consent Decree was
subject to approval by District Judge
Catherine C. Blake. The settlement
requires the employer to pay $182,000 to
Yolanda Boone, the lesbian complainant
who claimed she was harassed due to
her sexual orientation and discharged
in retaliation for complaining to
management. The settlement also
requires the company to donate
$20,000 to Human Rights Campaign to
develop an employee training program,
including a module on LGBT workplace
issues. The training would have to
be provided to employees at all the
company’s facilities in its North Region,
which covers Maryland, New Jersey,
Maine, Massachusetts and Virginia.
The employer agrees to post workplace
notices concerning the company’s
responsibilities under Title VII,
including making personnel decisions
“without regard” to an individual’s
sexual orientation, and to provide
employees copies of the company’s antidiscrimination policy with a description
of how and where to report violations.
MARYLAND – U.S. District Judge
Catherine Blake (D. Md.) has approved a
settlement agreement in EEOC v. Pallet
Companies, No. 16-00595, the first
sexual orientation discrimination case
under Title VII initiated by the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission
on behalf of a lesbian victim of
employment discrimination. After its
ground-breaking ruling last July 15 in
Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC has added
to its litigation priorities engaging
in affirmative litigation to establish
that sexual orientation discrimination
claims can be brought under Title VII.
The ultimate goal is to achieve binding
appellate precedents, and the agency has
amicus briefs on file in pending appeals
in the 2nd and 7th Circuits in cases
where gay plaintiffs suffered dismissals
of Title VII suits because of adverse
appellate precedents in those circuits.
Under a consent decree signed by Judge
Blake on June 28, 2016, the employer
will pay complainant Yolanda Boone
$7,200 in back-pay and $175,000 in
damages, and will contribute $20,000 to
Human Rights Campaign. The company
will also retain an expert on LGBT
issues to develop a training program,
provide a toll-free hotline number for
employee complaints, and provide a
letter of recommendation for Boone,
who is seeking new employment. In
a statement released in response to
approval of the settlement, the company
said that is decision to settle rather
than litigate a challenge to the EEOC’s
jurisdiction reflects a commitment by
the company to its LGBT employees,
and that it offered to make the donation
to HRC as part of the settlement. Reuters
Legal, June 29.
NEVADA – The widow of Tommy “The
Duke” David Morrison, former world
heavyweight boxing champion who
was disqualified from boxing allegedly
because of an inaccurate HIV test result,
suffered a setback in her suit against the
testing laboratory and other defendants
on June 23 when U.S. Magistrate Judge
Peggy A. Leen granted Defendant’s
motion to strike expert report and exclude
testimony from Dr. Henry Soloway,
whom Patricia Morrison claimed to
have retained as her expert witness in
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the case. Morrison v. Quest Diagnostics,
2016 WL 3475432 (D. Nevada). Plaintiff
alleges that her husband was informed
shortly before the first of a series of
scheduled heavyweight bouts that he
had tested HIV-positive and would not
be allowed to fight. According to the
complaint, this false diagnosis – not
discovered to be false until an unrelated
medical procedure was performed
several years later – “led to a downward
spiral of Tommy’s life and eventually
what was likely his early death.” In her
initial designation of expert witnesses,
Morrison disclosed Dr. Soloway as
her expert, providing an affidavit and
CV, and sought identification of other
medical personnel who had in any way
treated Tommy, reviewed his medical
records, or “undertaken any diagnostic
or treatment procedures.” Quest moved
to strike Soloway as an expert for failure
to comply strictly with a requirement
under the rules to file a detailed expert
report laying out the testimony he
was prepared to give. Opposing the
motion, Morrison stated her belief that
Soloway “may have been harassed,
threatened, silenced, intimidated, or is
‘suffering from fear of the unknown,’”
as a result of which he had disavowed
being an expert in the case. The court’s
discussion of the twists and turns the
case has taken is too lengthy to be
summarized here, but culminates in an
itemization of things that are required
to be in an expert report but are not
included in Soloway’s affidavit. Judge
Leen found that Soloway’s affidavit
was not sufficient to meet the detailed
expert report requirements. “Plaintiff’s
opposition does not address these
deficiencies or request additional time
to cure the deficiencies,” she wrote.
Indeed, plaintiff indicated that Soloway
“has broken off communication with
her.” Morrison’s counsel had told Quest’s
counsel to contact Soloway directly to
set up a deposition, but when contacted
Soloway denied being a retained expert
for Morrison. Leen rejected Morrison’s
suggestion that the court compel

Soloway to appear for a deposition,
finding that “the court has no authority
to compel a witness to serve as an
involuntary expert witness for a party,
or to provide uncompensated expert
opinions.” (Morrison had claimed that
Soloway offered to provide his expertise
pro bono.) Thus, the motion to strike
was granted, possibly putting a practical
end to Morrison’s case.
NEW JERSEY – Ruling unanimously
in Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture
Company, 2016 WL 3263896 (June
15, 2016), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an employer’s attempt
to contractually require employees to
accept a shorter statute of limitations
than that provided by the N.J. Law
Against
Discrimination
(which
prohibits, inter alia, discrimination
because of sexual orientation or gender
identity) is unenforceable as a violation
of public policy. The legislature’s
judgment that individuals alleging
unlawful discrimination should have
up to two years to file their claims
supports the important public purpose
of protecting equal opportunity in
employment, wrote Justice LaVecchia
for the court, and the six-month
limitation that the employer sought to
enforce in this disability discrimination
case would undermine that public policy.
The plaintiff, a delivery driver, suffered
a work-related knee injury and was laid
off two days after he reported back for
work after recovering from his injury.
The employer claimed he was let go in
a reduction-in-force, but the employee
claimed that less senior people than
him had been retained and asserted that
the lay-off was also retaliatory because
he had sought and obtained workers
compensation benefits for his injury.
The employer got the case dismissed
by the Superior Court, affirmed by the
Appellate Division, on the argument
that the employee had waived his right
to assert a discrimination claim against
the company by filing it more than

six months after his claim accrued, as
required by his at-will employment
contract as evidenced by the written job
application he had signed. The plaintiff
claimed that he had not understood
the meaning of the terms “statute
of limitations” and “waive” on the
application form, but the lower courts
noted that he had signed a statement
that he had read and understood the
application, and rejected his public
policy claim. Because the Supreme
Court found the public policy analysis
sufficient to decide the case, it did
not have to address the plaintiff’s
unconscionability and adhesion contract
arguments.
NEW YORK – The New York City
Council passed Local Law 40 in 2003,
providing that city police may not
engage in “racial or ethnic profiling,”
defined as an act “that relies on race,
ethnicity, religion or national origin as
the determinative factor in initiating
law enforcement action against an
individual, rather than an individual’s
behavior or other information or
circumstances that links a person or
persons of a particular race, ethnicity,
religion or national origin to suspected
unlawful activity.” Concerned that this
law was ineffective, the Council acted
again in 2013 and passed Local Law 71,
which expanded the list of protected
characteristics in the anti-profiling
provision to include “actual or perceived
race, national origin, color, creed, age,
alienage or citizenship status, gender,
sexual orientation, disability, housing
status.” The new measure added a private
right of action limited to injunctive
and declaratory relief and the award
of attorneys’ fees and expert fees to
prevailing parties. This law took effect
November 20, 2013. The Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Association, the police
officers’ union, filed suit challenging
the validity of the law. On June 23,
a unanimous panel of the New York
Appellate Division, 1st Department,
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ruled in Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Association v. City of New York, 2016
N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4910, 2016 NY
Slip Op 05057, that the state’s Criminal
Procedure Law does not preempt the
local law, citing the following two
reasons: “the two laws occupy different
legislative fields (criminal procedure
and antidiscrimination); and second,
there is no direct conflict between
them.” The opinion stated “great respect
and appreciation for the important
contributions of police officers who
enforce our laws and protect us all daily
at risk to their own personal safety,”
but recognized “the City’s legitimate
interest in protecting New Yorkers from
discriminatory law enforcement.”
NEW YORK – Although the New York
Court of Appeals usually attempts to
issue decisions relatively promptly after
oral arguments, the court announced
early in July that it would not be issuing
rulings in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth
A.C.C. or Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D.
(argued at the beginning of June) before
taking its summer recess. These are
cases in which the court was being
asked by appellants to reconsider its
quarter-century-old precedent in Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991),
as more recently reaffirmed in Debra
H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010),
under which unmarried same-sex coparents who have not adopted the legal
or adoptive children of their partners do
not have standing to seek visitation after
the partnership breaks up, despite having
formed a parental bond with the child.
The New York Law Journal commented
on July 6, “If the court does not make a
ruling when it next convenes, beginning
on Aug. 23, for its annual meeting to
hear appeals over September’s primary
elections, the judges are not expected to
make a determination until after they
resume hearing cases on Sept. 6.” In
the meantime, trial courts continue to
grapple with the difficulties of deciding
these kinds of cases in the absence of
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appropriate modern precedents (as to
which see the article above about the
Maryland Court of Appeals’ recent
adoption of the “de facto parent”
doctrine for such cases). On July 8,
the Law Journal reported Matter of
P.R. v. C.B., V-15266-15/16C (Family
Ct., Suffolk County, May 26, 2016),
a typical co-parent dispute in which
the respondent moved to dismiss on
standing grounds in reliance on Alison
D. and Debra H.. Judge Bernard Cheng
observed that in light of the Court
of Appeals precedents, he could not
find standing based solely on the coparent relationship. However, the coparent’s detailed factual allegation that
the parent had been neglectful of the
child’s dental health resulting in serious
complications (numerous cavities and an
untreated abscess in the child’s mouth)
might support an argument that this was
a case in which “parental unfitness” or
“extraordinary circumstances” could
justify allowing the “legal stranger”
to seek custody, pursuant to Matter
of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543
(1976). “The Court must view the
allegations in the petition in the light
most favorable to Ms. P.R. and afford
her the benefit of every inference which
could be reasonably drawn,” wrote
the judge. “In this case the petitioner
has raised sufficient issues of fact
regarding the respondent’s care of
C.R.B. necessitating a hearing in order
to ascertain whether the allegations
of ‘persistent neglect’ or ‘unfitness’
rise to the level of ‘extraordinary
circumstances.’” The court ordered
counsel to confer on setting up a hearing
to determine this issue.

Dist. LEXIS 88399 (E.D.N.Y., July 6,
2016). Matthew Nadolecki, a special
education teacher formerly employed
by the District (which spans several
towns along the south shore of Long
Island), asserted three claims under 42
U.S.C. section 1983, alleging retaliation
for exercise of his 1st Amendment free
speech rights, and discrimination and
hostile environment claims under the
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment. Judge Shields found that
the speech for which he was claiming
protection was “employer speech” not
protected by the First Amendment
under the precedent of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, because it involved formally
filing grievances with his union, and
that the various slights directed at him
(mainly by students) concerning his
sexual orientation were not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile
environment.
Furthermore,
found
the judge, the school district did take
disciplinary action against students
when Nadolecki complained about
them. Judge Shields recognized that
“an equal protection claim may be
stated by alleging facts in support of a
plausible claim that plaintiff was treated
differently than others similarly situated,
and that such treatment was motivated
by an intent to discriminate on the basis
of an impermissible consideration. Such
impermissible considerations include
disparate treatment based upon sexual
orientation.” However, she found that the
plaintiff’s factual assertions fell short
in meeting the pleading standard on
the equal protection claims. Nadolecki
is represented by Steven A. Morelli of
Garden City.

NEW YORK – U.S. Magistrate Judge
Anne Y. Shields has filed a report and
recommendation to District Judge
Joan M. Azrack suggesting that a
constitutional discrimination complaint
by a gay public school teacher should be
dismissed. Nadolecki v. William Floyd
Union Free School District, 2016 U.S.

NEW YORK – U.S. District Judge Joanna
Seybert ruled in Carr v. North ShoreLong Island Jewish Health Systems, Inc.,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81994, 2016 WL
3527585 (E.D.N.Y., June 23, 2106), that a
transgender woman who is a member of
the Unitarian Universalist Church and
who was working as an unpaid medical
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assistant extern at the defendant’s
hospital could proceed to discovery on
her claim that she was discriminatorily
denied employment because of her sex
and religion in violation of Title VII
and the New York Human Rights Law.
Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the
complaint was “too speculative,” Judge
Seybert wrote that “the relevant inquiry
is whether the [complaint] plausibly
alleges that ‘plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, was qualified, suffered
an adverse employment action, and
has at least minimal support for the
proposition that the employer was
motivated by discriminatory intent.’” In
this case, plaintiff alleged that almost
all the externs were offered employment
upon satisfactory completion of their
externship, that there were several
distinct incidents involving remarks
or actions by her supervisor indicating
discomfort with her gender and
disapproval of her religion, and after a
specific incident she was informed that
her externship had been terminated,
even though she had previously been told
that her performance was satisfactory.
The court found that the complaint
“provides
enough
circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory intent to
allow Plaintiff’s failure to hire claim to
survive Defendant’s motion. Although
much of the conduct described in the
[complaint] lacks a tangible link to
a discriminatory purpose, Plaintiff
claims that her supervisor made specific
negative comments about her gender on
three separate occasions. Specifically,
Demers (1) told Plaintiff she could
not use the women’s restroom, (2)
refused to allow her to participate in an
examination, stating ‘only females are
allowed beyond this point’; and (3) told
Plaintiff that Jesus does not recognize
her religion, and told others that ‘heshes. . . and the gays will needs to answer
to Jesus some day.’ Moreover, Plaintiff
was terminated via email on the same
day Demers made her last comments
about Plaintiffs gender and religion.”
However, the court granted defendant’s

motion to dismiss Carr’s separate
complaint that she was subjected to
unlawful discrimination during the
externship. The relevant statutes pertain
to discrimination within an employment
relationship, but an unpaid extern is not
considered to be an employee. (Had
Carr’s externship occurred in a hospital
in New York City and more recently,
she could have had a cause of action
for discrimination because the City
has enacted an ordinance extending its
anti-discrimination law to externships,
but this hospital is located out on Long
Island.)
NORTH CAROLINA – On June 29, U.S.
District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan
(E.D.N.C.) issued an order refusing to
consolidate H.B. 2 cases brought by
state legislative leaders and North
Carolinians for Privacy with an action
that had been filed by Governor Pat
McCrory in the Eastern District seeking
a declaration that Section 1 of the statute
– limiting access to sex-designated
multiple use public restrooms to persons
whose sex as indicated on their birth
certificate is consistent with the sexdesignation of the facility – is
constitutional. At the same time, and on
her own motion, Judge Flanagan ruled
that these lawsuits defending the statute
should be transferred to the Middle
District of North Carolina, to be
considered in tandem with cases
pending
there
challenging
the
lawfulness of that Section. Most of
Judge Flanagan’s Order in Berger v.
United States Department of Justice,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84307, 2016 WL
3620752, is devoted to reciting the
complex history leading up to the
decision of the motion, including the
filings of cases by Governor McCrory
on May 9 and the federal government on
May 10 in different districts, and
subsequent consolidation and intervention
motions, and specifying the different
legal theories raised for and against
H.B. 2 in the different cases. Ultimately,

she determined, there was enough
overlap in the constitutional and
statutory issues to be presented to justify
putting before one judge in one district
the question whether H.B. 2 violates the
constitutional rights of transgender
people, and also whether the state law
violates the Violence Against Women
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
and Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act, as well as questions
raised by the Eastern District plaintiffs
challenging the federal government’s
compliance with the Administrative
Procedure Act in adopting its interpretation
of the various sex discrimination laws.
As to whether that should be in the
Eastern District or the Middle District,
Judge Flanagan was inclined to give
primacy to the first case filed, Carcano
v. McCrory, No. 1:16-CV-236-TDS-JEP
(M.D.N.C., filed March 28, 2016),
brought on behalf of private plaintiffs
by civil rights groups a few days after
the legislature passed and Gov. McCrory
signed the measure. When Gov.
McCrory decided to defy the federal
government by filing suit against it in
the Eastern District at the deadline for
responding to a Justice Department
letter seeking a response to DOJ’s
determination that the state was in
violation of several statutes, the federal
government filed its own suit against
McCrory in the Middle District, which
Judge Flanagan’s transfer order now
fixes as the locus for resolution of the
underlying issues. That still leaves
Governor McCrory’s lawsuit, the most
narrowly focused of all those pending,
dangling by itself in the Eastern District
. . . Sorting this all out is a procedural
nightmare. Anybody looking for a
chronological history of the litigation
events leading up to the present will
find it in Judge Flanagan’s meticulously
constructed
Order.
Conveniently
enough, also on June 29, U.S. District
Judge Thomas D. Schroeder filed an
order in United States v. North Carolina,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84788, 2016 WL
3626386 (M.D. N.C.), granting a motion
Summer 2016
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by the legislative plaintiffs in Berger to
intervene permissively in the case
brought against the state by the Justice
Department, having previously granted
a motion allowing them to intervene as
co-defendants in the private action
brought against state officials by the
ACLU & Lambda. See Carcano v.
McCrory, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73136,
2016 WL 3167180 (M.D.N.C., June 6,
2016). Noting the overlap in issues and
arguments between the cases and the
extent to which they have gotten under
way, Judge Schroeder concluded that
allowing intervention of these plaintiffs
would not “significantly complicate the
proceedings or unduly expand the scope
of any discovery in this case” and
“should not significantly delay
proceedings in this case.” Judge
Flanagan mentioned in her order that a
preliminary injunction motion had
already been briefed in the Carcano
case, pending before Judge Schroeder.
Judge Schroeder’s decision on the
preliminary injunction motion could
ultimately prove outcome-dispositive
for all these cases, depending how many
of the various legal theories he considers
in determining whether to grant pretrial relief and whether the state
immediately seeks appellate review
from any adverse ruling. He scheduled a
hearing on the motion for August 1,
2016. * * * On July 5, the Justice
Department filed a motion for
preliminary
injunction
against
enforcement of the bathroom provision
of H.B. 2 in United States v. State of
North Carolina, Case No. 1:16-cv-425
(M.D.N.C.), and requested oral
argument on the motion, which was
accompanied by a 68-page brief setting
out in full the Obama Administration’s
position that the bathroom provisions
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
Title IX of the Education Amendments
Act, and the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA). The brief relies heavily on
the 4th Circuit’s ruling in G.G. v.
Gloucester County School Board, 2016
WL 1567467 (April 19, 2016), rehearing
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en banc denied (June 1), in which the
Circuit held that the Education
Department’s interpretation of Title IX
to apply to gender identity discrimination
claims should be deferred to by the
federal courts as a reasonable
interpretation of ambiguous statutory
and regulatory language. The G.G.
court noted and relied up Title VII
precedents
on
gender
identity
discrimination to reach this result, and
observed that several different circuit
courts have now found that gender
identity claims can be asserted under a
variety of federal sex discrimination
statutes. The brief also notes that
Congress has amended VAWA expressly
to provide protection against gender
identity discrimination by programs
receiving federal law enforcement
assistant under VAWA, such as codefendant North Carolina Department
of Public Safety. The motion is pending
before U.S. District Judge Thomas D.
Schroeder, who, as noted above, has
granted a motion by state legislative
leaders to intervene as co-defendants in
the case. An amicus brief in support of
the Justice Department’s motion was
filed by Human Rights Campaign with
68 corporate co-sponsors, authored by
former Solicitor General Ted Olson,
who was co-counsel in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, the litigation that
brought marriage equality back to
California by successfully challenging
the constitutionality of Proposition 8.
* * * On July 7, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dennis Howell denied a motion by state
Republican legislative leaders to
intervene as defenders in a case in which
some same-sex couples are challenging
the constitutionality of S.B.3, a North
Carolina law passed in 2014 allowing
local magistrates to recuse themselves
from performing same-sex marriages
under a procedure which also requires
them not to perform other marriages for
a defined period of time. The rejected
intervenors
claimed
that
their
intervention was necessary because the
state’s Attorney General, Roy Cooper,

had refused to defend that state’s antigay marriage ban and thus could not be
counted on to give a vigorous defense to
the law. Interestingly, even Governor
McCrory, champion of H.B.2, had
vetoed S.B. 2 when it first passed the
legislature due to doubts about its
constitutionality. Before S.B. 2 was
passed, Cooper had said that he would
veto it if he were governor, asserting
that it was an unnecessary law.
Magistrate Howell said that the Attorney
General’s office was “aggressively
defending” the law, and the legislative
leaders failed to show that their interests
were not adequately represented. He did
say that he would reconsider this motion
if “the state no longer intends to defend
the constitutionality” of the law. A
motion to dismiss the lawsuit is pending
before District Judge Max Cogburn,
who has scheduled argument on the
motion for August 8. Raleigh News
Observer, July 8.
NORTH CAROLINA – Advancing its
affirmative litigation strategy under
Title VII, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission announced
on July 6 that it had filed a lawsuit in
federal district court against Bojangles
Restaurants on behalf of Jonathan
Wolfe, a transgender woman who
claims she was subjected to a hostile
environment at the chain’s Fayetteville
store because of her gender identity, and
then suffered retaliation for complaining
about it. A company spokesperson
responded that Wolfe was discharged
because of insubordination and other
misconduct, not her gender identity.
The company is unlikely to be able to
get the case dismissed on an argument
that Title VII does not extend to gender
identity discrimination, in light of the
4th Circuit’s G.G. v. Gloucester County
School District decision, which took
note of Title VII precedents from other
jurisdictions in holding that a district
court within the circuit should have
deferred to the Education Department’s
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determination that gender identity
discrimination is covered by Title
IX’s ban on sex discrimination by
educational institutions.
OHIO – The Highland School District
filed a lawsuit on June 12 in U.S. District
Court in Columbus against federal
education department officials, seeking
a declaration that it is not required under
Title IX to allow a transgender grade
school student to use girls’ restrooms.
The district claims that it stands to lose
more than $1 million in federal money,
and that the Department of Education
had threatened an enforcement action on
behalf of the student unless the district
met federal demands by June 28. Alliance
Defending
Freedom
(surprised?)
represents the school district, claiming
that the threat is an illegal attempt
by the Obama Administration to
“rewrite” federal law. (Never mind
that federal courts, including the 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has
appellate jurisdiction over federal cases
from Ohio, have been recognizing sex
discrimination claims by transgender
litigants for a decade now.) Columbus
Dispatch, June 12.
PENNSYLVANIA – Should an HIVpositive plaintiff be allowed to proceed
on a discrimination lawsuit using a
pseudonym? Yes, ruled U.S. Magistrate
Judge Martin C. Carlson in Bonnie
Jones v. OSS Orthopedic Hospital, 2016
WL 3683422 (M.D. Pa., July 12, 2016).
The plaintiff, who has adopted “Bonnie
Jones” as her proposed pseudonym,
has alleged that she has been denied
equal access to certain facilities of the
defendant because of her HIV status.
The judge noted that many other courts
have allowed HIV-positive plaintiffs to
conceal their identification, observing:
“At the outset, consistent with those
cases that have considered similar claims
by HIV positive litigants, we find that
Jones has made a substantial showing

that disclosure of her identity will result
in an social stigma in some quarters
of a type which may, and should, be
avoided. Further, while the issues in this
litigation present matters which may
garner some public interest, that public
interest can be met without the necessity
of disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.
Therefore, all of these considerations
strongly favor granting Jones’ request
to proceed under a pseudonym. Indeed,
the presence of these factors favoring
granting this request are undisputed by
any defendant. Instead, one defendant
simply insists that Jones did not
sufficiently protect her privacy and
identity during the course of the state
agency proceedings to warrant granting
her request in this case. We disagree.
In our view Jones has persuasively
demonstrated that she repeatedly sought
leave to proceed under a pseudonym
during these state agency proceedings.
In fact, we note that such leave to proceed
under a pseudonym was granted by the
state agency on July 1, 2016. (Doc. 12.)
Therefore, we also find that the plaintiff
has made continuing efforts to protect
her identity and privacy in this litigation,
and in state agency proceedings. Having
found that the prerequisites set by law
for proceeding under a pseudonym are
met in this case, the motion to proceed
under a pseudonym is granted.”
SOUTH CAROLINA – The U.S.
Department of Education found that
Dorchester County School District Two
violated Title IX by discriminating
against a transgender elementary school
student. Negotiations ensued, and on
June 23 the Department’s Office for
Civil Rights announced a voluntary
resolution agreement, under which the
district will provide the transgender girl
with access to girls’ bathrooms at her
elementary school and take other steps
to facilitate the student’s enjoyment
of equal educational opportunity,
including revising its policies and
procedures and providing training to

district and school level administrators
on the district’s Title IX obligations
to transgender students. U.S. Official
News, June 23.
TENNESSEE – 4th Circuit Court Judge
Greg McMillan has ruled that a lesbian
spouse has no legal relationship with the
child born to her spouse and thus cannot
seek custody upon a divorce, but has
stayed his ruling to allow the plaintiff
to seek review from the state court of
appeals, reported the Knoxville News
Sentinel on June 24. Erica Witt and
Sabrina Witt married in the District of
Columbia in April 2014, bought a home
in Knoxville and decided to have a child
together through donor insemination
with an anonymous donor. The child was
born to Sabrina in January 2015. At the
time Tennessee did not recognize samesex marriages contracted out of state, so
Erica’s name was not listed on the birth
certificate. In February 2016 Sabrina
filed for divorce and opposed Erica’s
standing to seek custody or visitation
with the child on the ground that Erica
and the child had no legal relationship
under Tennessee law. Tennessee has the
usual presumption that when a married
woman bears a child, her husband is
deemed the legal parent of the child.
Erica argued that under Obergefell the
court is required to accord her the same
rights as a husband, and the court should
read the statute as being gender neutral.
Sabrina’s attorney contended, based
on the wording of the statute, that this
presumption applies only to husbands,
and Judge McMillan agreed, stating that
it was not up to the court to enact “social
policy” and, he said, “I believe as a trial
court I am not to plow new ground, but to
apply precedent and the law.” However,
he said that Erica could possibly seek
visitation as a “stepparent.” Sabrina
is represented by John Haber. Erica
is represented by Virginia Schwamm.
See also Memphis Commercial Appeal,
June 25.
TENNESSEE – Bleu Copas of Anderson
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County, Tennessee, and Caleb Laieski
of Virginia, filed a complaint on June
5 in the Anderson County Chancery
Court against Governor Bill Haslam,
seeking a declaratory judgment that
a recently-enacted Tennessee statute
allowing mental health therapists to
refuse treatment to patients because
of the therapists’ religious or personal
moral beliefs is unconstitutional.
Copas v. Haslam (Tenn., Anderson Co.
Chancery Ct., filed June 5, 2016). The
complaint alleges that the law singles out
LGBT individuals for “discriminatory
treatment,” as “There is no other group
which could conceivably be the target
of the statute,” even though it does not
expressly mention sexual orientation,
gender identity, or homosexuality.
The statute says that counselors
and therapists whose “sincerely
held principles” prevent them from
providing services may refrain from
doing so without adverse consequences.
It does provide that services may not
be withheld in emergency situations,
and that referrals to providers
without such objections should be
made. Governor Haslam stated upon
signing the bill that professionals
should have a right to refrain from
providing services to people whose
“personal beliefs” don’t match their
own. Knoxville News-Sentinel, June 8.
The American Counseling Association
disagrees, providing in its ethics code
that counselors should set aside their
personal beliefs when it comes to
rendering professional services, and
the organization has announced it will
move a national convention previously
scheduled to be held in Nashville next
year to a different location.
TENNESSEE – The law firm Ropes
& Gray received more than $600,000
from the fee award in the Tennessee
marriage equality litigation, having
represented prevailing plaintiffs. (R&G
partner Douglas Hallward-Driemeir
argued the marriage recognition issue
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before the Supreme Court.) The firm
announced on June 24 that it would
donate $100,000 to the National Center
for Lesbian Rights, and use the rest of
the fee award to underwrite the firm’s
pro bono activities. NCLR Legal
Director Shannon Minter said that this
was the single largest donation that the
organization had ever received from a
law firm. In reporting about the donation
on July 5, the National Law Journal
noted that other firms that received fee
awards in marriage equality litigation
had also made donations. Perkins Coie,
for example, which helped to represent
same-sex marriage plaintiffs in Arizona
and Oregon, made donations out of the
fee awards to Lambda Legal and the
ACLU.
TEXAS – Plaintiffs in State of Texas v.
United States of America, Civ. Action
No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex.), which
challenges the Obama Administration’s
interpretation of “sex discrimination”
under Title VII and Title IX to include
gender identity discrimination, filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction on
July 6, seeking to forestall enforcement
of Title VII and Title IX nationwide
against employers subject to Title
VII and schools that receive federal
financial
assistance,
subjecting
themselves to coverage under Title
IX, until a final determination can be
made whether the statutes reach the
issue of bathroom and locker-room
access for transgender individuals.
Texas picked up a few more states after
filing the case, so now it is brought on
behalf of Alabama, Wisconsin, West
Virginia, Tennessee, Arizona, Maine,
Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah, Georgia,
Mississippi, and Kentucky, although
standing is premised on the tiny
Harrold Independent School District,
which was lured into participating by
Texas A.G. Ken Paxton to facilitate his
forum shopping before Reed O’Connor,
a district judge who is perceived to
be predisposed against the Obama

Administration’s administrative actions
because of his ruling enjoining the
Administration’s policy protecting noncitizen parents of U.S.-born children
against deportation. The complaint
argues that when the Administration
adopted its interpretation of Title
VII and Title IX, it was violating the
Administrative Procedure Act because
it was adopting a new rule of law
without going through the procedure
required for adopting regulations.
The brief in support of the motion
conveniently ignores the growing body
of federal case law supporting the view
that sex discrimination includes gender
identity discrimination, almost all of
which predates the Administration’s
embrace of this view. The brief also
disingenuously contends that the
Administration’s position is that any
person of any biological sex is free at any
time to use any restroom they want to,
regardless of its designation as restricted
to males or females, which of course is
not the position of the Administration.
As such, the plaintiffs argue from the
premise that gender identity is not real
and that everybody is and remains the
sex recorded in state records when
they were born, contrary to a growing
body of professional opinion and
judicial rulings. While this is a position
supported by some early cases under
Title VII and state sex discrimination
laws, it is not supported by more recent
case law, most notably the 4th Circuit’s
decision in G.G. v. Gloucester County
School Board, 2016 WL 1567467
(April 19, 2016), which held that the
Administration’s interpretation of Title
IX was reasonable, not inconsistent with
the state and existing regulations, and
entitled to deference from the federal
courts. The EEOC’s ruling on point
cites a wide variety of federal appellate
and trial court rulings in support of the
broader view of the sex discrimination
ban. Of course the 4th Circuit’s
opinion is not binding within the 5th
Circuit, a notably conservative circuit
on employment discrimination issues,
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and it is possible that a ruling on this
motion will generate the kind of circuit
split that could capture the attention of
the Supreme Court, especially as the
Gloucester County defendants have
announced they will file a petition for
certiorari this summer. * * * Early in
July there were news reports that an
additional ten states had joined in a
similar lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District
Court in Nebraska. The collaborating
states are Arkansas, Kansas, Montana,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
South Carolina, Wyoming and Michigan.
It seems like that eventually all of the
states that lack a legislative prohibition
of gender identity discrimination may
end up being co-plaintiffs in one or
another of the lawsuits contesting the
Obama Administration’s interpretation
of Title IX in the context of restroom
access for transgender students. New
York Times, July 8.
TEXAS – The 6th District Court of
Appeals ruled in In the Interest of
E.R.C., a Minor Child, 2016 Tex. App.
LEXIS 6231 (June 14, 2016), a bitterly
contested child custody suit, that the
fact that a judge had been endorsed
by LGBT political groups was not by
itself grounds for finding that the judge
should be disqualified from hearing a
case because of presumed bias. Wrote
Justice Jim Moseley for the court:
“Stokes [the mother] argued at the
recusal hearing and on appeal that Judge
Sulak was biased in favor of the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT)
community and against Christians. At
the hearing, Stokes introduced evidence
that Judge Sulak had been endorsed in
his election campaign by two groups
representing the LGBT community
and of the endorsement procedures of
one of the groups. She also introduced
evidence consisting of articles written
either by or about LGBT activist groups,
emails to and from Corsbie [the father],
and emails to and from Stokes, none
of which concerned Judge Sulak or

evidenced any bias or partiality on
his part. Further, no evidence was
introduced regarding Judge Sulak’s
involvement with the LGBT community
or LGBT activist groups, or of his written
or oral statements concerning LGBT
rights or his religious views. Stokes’
speculation that Judge Sulak was biased
based merely on the fact that he received
endorsement from LGBT activist groups
in an election campaign is not sufficient
to overcome the presumption of judicial
impartiality. Further, a reasonable,
disinterested observer would recognize
the reality that a judge participating
in a political campaign may receive
many endorsements from politically
active groups and individuals and that
at the same time, a judge is under the
ethical obligation to remain impartial.”
Furthermore, the record showed that
in the course of the litigation Judge
Sulak had made rulings both in favor
and against both parties, further
undermining any contention of bias.
VIRGINIA – Responding to the 4th
Circuit’s reversal and remand of his prior
decision dismissing a Title IX claim
asserted by transgender teen Gavin
Grimm against the Gloucester County
School District, U.S. District Judge
Robert Doumar issued a preliminary
injunction on June 23 requiring the
Gloucester schools to allow Grimm to
use restrooms consistent with his gender
identity pending ultimate disposition
of the case. Protesting that it would
be filing a petition for certiorari and
should not be required to comply with
an injunction until a final decision on
the merits, the school district filed a
motion asking that the injunction be
stayed, but on July 6 Judge Doumar
denied the motion, tersely stating, “This
Court is bound by the Judgment of the
Court of Appeals.” The school district
immediately appealed the denial to the
4th Circuit in an “emergency motion.”
On July 12, the 4th Circuit denied the
motion, by the same 2-1 vote by which

the panel issued its earlier decision.
G.G. v. Gloucester County School
District, 2016 WL 3743189. Senior
Judge Davis filed a concurring opinion
to refute dissenting Judge Niemeyer’s
contention that the panel’s earlier
decision was “unprecedented,” pointing
out that four other circuit courts had
previously opened that gender identity
discrimination was a form of sex
discrimination. The school district has
until August 29 to file a cert petition
with the Supreme Court, but it might
file a motion with the Supreme Court
seeking its stay. If the Supreme Court
were to grant a stay until it decides on
the cert petition, Grimm would not be
able to use restrooms consistent with his
gender identity when school beings in
the fall, since a decision on the petition
would not be announced until shortly
before the beginning of the Court’s
October 2016 Term, at the earliest.
Judge Doumar set the case for trial on
January 31, 2017. The school district’s
response to the complaint requests a
jury trial. Newport News Daily Press,
July 7 and 12.
WASHINGTON – U.S. Magistrate
Judge John T. Rodgers denied a
transgender plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment in her challenge to
a denial of Social Security Disability
Benefits in Herrington v. Colvin, 2016
WL 3579222 (E.D. Wash., June 28,
2016). This is a rather complicated
case. The plaintiff, identified female at
birth, identifies as male, but is referred
to as “she” throughout the opinion. She
applied for disability benefits when she
was 20 years old and has never worked.
She has a high school education. At her
hearing, she testified to various kinds of
physical pain, claimed that “she hears
voices and on average she stays in her
room all day.” “Plaintiff further testified
that she would prefer to be male, but that
due to her health, she could not proceed
with any transitional procedures,” wrote
the judge. Later in the opinion, there
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is reference to a doctor having advised
against hormone therapy because of the
plaintiff’s high cholesterol. The doctors
who testified agreed that the plaintiff has
“gender identity disorder” and suffers
from “depression and anxiety” but did
not directly opine that she was disabled
from working. The occupational expert
who testified contended that she could
undertake various kinds of jobs, but her
attempts to apply for jobs have been
unsuccessful, apparently due to her
lack of education, training, and ability
to present herself as a desirable job
candidate. She also presented testimony
from a clinical social work, who testified
through two letters, the first of which
stated that plaintiff “is very isolated and
is avoidant of public situations due to her
anxiety. She is further restricted due to
her social limitations of presenting as a
young man vs. the female person that she
is.” The social worker said that plaintiff
perceives herself as unemployable; “Her
negativity as well as her avoidance
prohibit her from engaging in the
community at large,” and she concluded
in her second letter, “I do not believe
that she is able to present herself in a
positive light regarding a job interview
even if she were invited to do so.” The
ALJ concluded that she was capable
of working and denied her benefits,
a conclusion that was sustained by
Judge Rodgers, who granted summary
judgment to the Commissioner. Judge
Rodgers found that the ALJ had
provided sufficient reasons for finding
the plaintiff not credible concerning
the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of her symptoms, although
conceding that the ALJ may have
erred in concluding that plaintiff’s
“self-reports” about her condition were
not supported by “objective medical
evidence.”
WASHINGTON – Chief U.S. District
Judge Thomas O. Rice granted the
government’s motion to dismiss Mark
C. Wilhelm’s lawsuit challenging the
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denial of his petition to “correct” his
court martial record by the Board for
Correction of Naval Records. Wilhelm v.
U.S. Department of the Navy, 2016 WL
3149710, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72884
(E.D. Wash., June 3, 2016). The story
behind this case is complicated. Wilhelm
served with distinction in the Navy from
1982 until 1995, when he was released
from duty with an honorable discharge.
Shortly thereafter he figured out that
he was gay, but this did not deter him
from enlisting in the Naval Reserves,
intending to keep his homosexuality a
secret. (At the time, the military was
operating under the recently-enacted
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, under
which gay people could serve so long
as everybody could pretend they weren’t
gay and they didn’t say or do anything
to reveal their homosexuality.) He was
designated a Chief Warrant Officer.
According to Judge Rice’s opinion,
“However, not long after Wilhelm
returned to active duty in February
2000 and was assigned to Atsugi, Japan,
it was widely rumored that Wilhelm was
homosexual. Wilhelm told a number
of inconsequential lies about himself
during this time, primarily to make
himself sound more masculine and
reduce suspicion about his sexuality.”
While Wilhelm was on leave in April
2002 he visited Moscow and engaged
in consensual gay sex, leading to a
confrontation with Russian intelligence
officers who threatened to expose his
homosexuality to the Navy unless he
agreed to spy for Russia. “Wilhelm
declined and reported the attempted
blackmail to the U.S. Embassy.” This
of course led to an investigation by the
Navy, during which Wilhelm eventually
confessed to being gay and engaging in
gay sex. He was then charged with 38
specifications of wrongdoing, three of
which related to violation of the military
sodomy ban, the balance relating to a
wide variety of offenses under military
law, some seemingly trivial. On April 9,
2003, he pled guilty at a general courtmartial to nine specifications, none

of them directly involving sexual
misconduct but relating to other offenses
charged against him, and he was
sentenced to dismissal from the Navy.
At around that time, the Supreme Court
ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that criminal
bans against private, consensual adult
homosexual conduct violated the Due
Process Clause, and subsequently, the
highest military appeals court ruled in
U.S. v. Marcum that sodomy charges
against military personnel “would be
subject to a different analysis than they
had previously.” In essence, the military
courts would only move against those
who engaged in conduct that fell outside
the scope of Lawrence or could be
deemed prejudicial to the service.
Wilhelm sought “correction” of his
military record, but was turned down
by the Naval Board and went to court.
Judge Rice pointed out that judicial
review would be quite limited (while
rejecting the government’s argument
that Wilhelm’s claim was not justiciable),
since the courts grant substantial
deference to the administrative
decisions of the military on personnel
matters, but what really determined the
ruling to dismiss Wilhelm’s case was
that he pled guilty to charges that did not
relate directly to homosexual conduct.
The court found it reasonable for the
Naval Board to omit any mention of the
“homosexual” aspect of the case when it
declined to change Wilhelm’s military
records. Wilhelm argued that the antigay bias of the military, and particularly
of the individuals who investigated his
situation, should count to invalidate
his bad conduct discharge, especially
in light of Lawrence, Marcum, and the
repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” but the
court rejected this argument. “Whether
or not the Board made the right decision
in denying Wilhelm clemency is not the
focus of a reviewing court under the
[Administrative Procedure Act],” wrote
Judge Rice; “rather, the task is merely to
determine whether the Board’s decision,
afforded ‘all due deference,’ contains ‘a
rational connection between the facts
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found and the choice made.’ Because
it is clear based on the allegations
in the Amended Complaint together
with the attachments thereto that the
Board did just that, Wilhelm has not
stated an actionable claim.” Wilhelm
is represented by Dale F. Saran of
Oceanside, California and Matthew Z.
Crotty of Spokane, Washington. If he
cares to persist, he can appeal this to the
9th Circuit, but it doesn’t look good . . .

CRIMINAL LITIGATION NOTES
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 6TH
CIRCUIT – On July 13 the 6th Circuit
issued a decision dismissing Rowan
County, Kentucky, Clerk Kim Davis’s
appeal from the U.S. District Court’s
ruling against her on the question
whether she was violating the law by
refusing to issue marriage licenses to
same-sex couples based on her personal
religious objection to same-sex
marriages. However, at the same time
the court vacated the district court’s
preliminary injunction on grounds of
mootness, since Kentucky has modified
the law governing marriage licenses
in such a way that Davis no longer
has objections to issuing them, as the
names of county clerks have been
removed from the forms. However, the
6th Circuit held that the district court’s
September 3, 2015, order holding Davis
in contempt of course “does not meet
the requirements for vacatur” under
the court’s precedents, and thus is
“not vacated.” The contempt judgment
stands. Miller v. Davis, Nos. 15-5880
& 5-5978.
CALIFORNIA – Santa Clara County
Superior Court Judge Jose S. Franco
has ruled that police sting operations
at Columbus Park focused on the men’s
restroom facility there constituted
“selective enforcement in violation
of the suspects’ equal protection

rights,” according to a June 17 report
in The Mercury News. Judge France
agreed with the argument by Deputy
Public Defender Carlie Ware, who had
argued for dismissal of charges on the
ground that the police had specifically
targeted gay men for their enforcement
action. Ruled Franco: “The claim that
this investigative focus was driven by
complaints is minimally supported by
the evidence presented, especially as it
relates to the park. Unpopular groups
have too often been made to bear the
brunt of discriminatory prosecution
or selective enforcement.” The article
noted that in May a Los Angeles County
judge had thrown out similar charges
involving Long Beach police, and that
police in several southern California
communities have stopped conducting
such sting operations because of judicial
disapproval of the tactics.
MICHIGAN – During his trial on charges
that he got straight men too drunk to
consent and then performed oral sex
on them, Larry Lee was dissatisfied
with appointed defense counsel and
wrote letters to the trial judge asking
to be able to defend himself or to have
new counsel assigned. He alleges that
the trial judge refused to consider his
requests and steamrollered him into
continuing with his original appointed
counsel. Lee was convicted despite his
insistence that in both cases charged
against him the straight men had
flirted with him at parties and then had
consented to have sex with him, only
later repenting of the experience and
contacting law enforcement to complaint
against him. Appellate counsel was
appointed for him, but he claims that
appellate counsel provided ineffective
representation by failing to raise the
violation of his 6th Amendment right to
self-representation as part of his direct
appeal. In this habeas proceeding, after
reciting the complicated procedural
history of the case, U.S. District Judge
Robert H. Cleland concluded that

despite several procedural faults, Lee
should get habeas relief, directing the
state of Michigan to appoint counsel for
him so that he can file an appeal as of
right to the Michigan Court of Appeals,
contending that his conviction should
be vacated for denial of his right to selfrepresentation. Lee v. Haas, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82194, 2016 WL 3437599
(E.D. Mich., June 24, 2016).
MISSISSIPPI – Jackson County
(Mississippi) Circuit Judge Robert
Krebs sentenced Josh Vallum to life
in prison on July 12 after taking his
guilty plea in the beating death of
Mercedes Williamson, a transgender
woman. The U.S. Justice Department
is considering whether to lodge federal
hate crime charges against Vallum,
who was scheduled to go to trial just a
week before he agreed to plead guilty.
Vallum had told law enforcement
authorities that he killed Williamson
after he reached between her legs and
realized she had a penis, but this was
not consistent with other witnesses who
said that Williamson and Vallum had
dated and had an active sex life and
that Vallum knew that Williamson was
transgender and considered them to have
a “homosexual” relationship, which he
was trying to keep secret from the gang
he ran with. AP National News, July 13.
NEVADA – The Court of Appeals of
Nevada affirmed the jury conviction
of Rodger O. Evans on charges of
“exploitation of elderly over $5,000”
in Evans v. State of Nevada, 2016 WL
3586687 (June 20, 2016). On appeal
Evans argued, among other things,
that the trial judge erred in excluding
evidence as to the victim’s sexual
orientation. Evans’ theory was that the
fact the victim was a gay man without
children was relevant to Evans’ argument
that the money to him was a gift typical
of the victim’s generosity to friends.
Wrote the court: “Evans contends that
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the victim’s sexual orientation is relevant
to show why the victim does not have
children of his own and why he would
give such generous gifts to Evans, rather
than to his own family. But one does
not need to be of a particular sexual
orientation in order not to have children;
many people do not have children from
many reasons having nothing to do with
their sexual orientation or preferences.
Furthermore,” continued the court,
“one’s sexual orientation has nothing to
do with one’s generosity or stinginess
toward others; the victim’s sexual
orientation has no discernible relation
to whether he did or did not voluntarily
give large amounts of money to Evans
or to any other person.” Thus, it was not
relevant and the trial judge correctly
excluded the evidence. What the court
does not say but seems implicit was that
the court suspected Evans’ aim was to
get the jury to sympathize with him and
against a gay victim. Didn’t work . . .
NEW YORK – On June 14 New York
County Supreme Court Justice A. Kirke
Bartley sentenced Elliot Morales to
40-years-to-life after a jury convicted
Morales of second-degree murder as
a hate crime because of the victim’s
sexual orientation in the shooting death
of Mark Carson in the West Village,
Manhattan, in May 2013. People v.
Morales. Morales shot Carson in the
head while mouthing homophobic
epithets. Carson and his friend Danny
Robinson had been walking together
on 6th Avenue near 8th Street when
Morales encountered the two men and
started shouting at them, pursued them,
and gunned down Carson. Morales
claimed he acted in self-defense
because he thought Carson was armed
and prepared to shoot him. (Carson
was not armed.) Morales also argued
he could not be convicted of a hate
crime because he identified as bisexual.
In addition to the murder conviction,
Morales, who fled the scene of the
shooting but was quickly apprehended
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by a police officer, was convicted on
five counts of criminal possession
of a weapon, one count of menacing
the police officer who apprehended
him, and one count of menacing a gay
bartender in a West Village restaurant
prior to his confrontation with Carson
and Robinson. Morales also had a
prior violent felony conviction on his
record, and Justice Bartley rejected
his argument that it should not be
taken into account in determining
the sentence in this case. The murder
of Carson in the heart of the heavilygay neighborhood shocked the NYC
LGBT community, leading to vigils
and protests. Morales, who insisted the
shooting was an “accident,” represented
himself at trial and announced he would
appeal the convictions and sentence.
GayCityNews.com, June 14.
NEW YORK – U.S. District Judge David
N. Hurd granted a motion for acquittal
at the end of the government’s case
against Michael J. Mahannah, who
was charged with attempting to induce
a young boy into having sex with him.
United States v. Mahannah, 2016 WL
3675569 (N.D.N.Y., June 22, 2016). It
is embarrassing to read Judge Hurd’s
summary of the testimony. It seems that
a government agent, one Investigator
Schmitter, was out trolling to arrest
gay men and started texting Mahannah,
posing as a sex-starved gay boy eager to
find an adult man with whom to have
sex. Schmitter was persistent, even
when Mahannah dismissed him as too
young and said he had previously had
a relationship with somebody who was
HIV positive, but finally Mahannah
agreed to an assignation and was
arrested. All the “inducement” here
seemed to come from the government
agent. Wrote Hurd, “The terms persuade,
induce, entice and coerce are not defined
in the statute and ‘are words of common
usage that have plain and ordinary
meanings.’ Given such meanings,
Mahannah did not urge, influence or

tempt the alleged minor towards illegal
sexual activity as demonstrated by the
facts [in cases the government was
citing]. The proof presented by the
government is a very rare case where
the defendant may have had an interest
in performing an illegal sexual activity
but did not attempt to persuade, induce,
entice or coerce the alleged minor. Even
viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government and in the
context of the totality of the evidence, a
jury could not find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mahannah had the requisite
intent to satisfy the second element of
Section 2422(b), to knowingly attempt
to persuade, induce, entire or coerce
a minor.” He also found that the
government filed to offer “sufficient
evidence that Mahannah took a
substantial step toward the commission
of the crime.” Mahannah testified that
he set a meeting with the “minor” to
“advise the minor that what he was doing
was wrong and could result in a sexually
transmitted disease.” Concluded Judge
Hurd, “Once the suggestive influence
of the investigator was removed, there is
no evidence that the defendant had any
intent to persuade a minor or engaged
in the proposed sexual activity.” Judge
Hurd noted the lack of any physical
evidence “to counter Mahannah’s
stated reason for meeting with the
minor. After text conservations with
a very persuasive, very professional
investigator, riding a bicycle to meet
the boy to advise him that what he was
doing was wrong is not a substantial
step toward the commission of the
alleged crime.” Thus, the prosecution
fell apart at the end of the government’s
case, and the charges against Mahannah
were dismissed by the court.
WASHINGTON – Musab Mohammed
Masmari was sentenced to 120 months
in federal prison for attempting
to set fire to a gay club in Seattle,
“Neighbors,” on New Year’s Eve 2013.
Masmari was subsequently spotted and
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identified from a security video and
was apprehended when he traveled to
the airport, having purchased a ticket
to fly to Turkey. He was represented
by counsel, who advised him to take
a plea with the understanding that the
government would recommend the
mandatory minimum sentence of 60
months, which it did. An employee of
Neighbors who was present at the bar
when the fire was discovered filed a
victim impact statement and addressed
the court during sentencing, describing
the impact that a fire set at Seattle’s
“largest and longest running gay club”
on a crowded holiday evening had on
the LGBT community in that city. Thus
persuaded, the trial judge, Ricardo S.
Martinez, sentenced Masmari to double
the mandatory minimum for his offense.
On June 15, 2016, Judge Martinez
rejected Masmari’s motion to set aside
or correct the sentence downward to
60 months. Masmari v. U.S., 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78820, 2016 WL
3780381 (W.D. Wash.). Masmari’s
main claim was that he suffered from
ineffective assistance of counsel,
because his attorney urged him to
plead guilty based on the government’s
representation that it would seek the
mandatory minimum sentence but he
ended up getting sentenced to twice as
long. Judge Martinez pointed out that
even if the government might have had
difficulty proving beyond a reasonable
doubt the “knowing and malicious
intent” necessary for conviction
under the statute, in part because
Masmari claimed to be inebriated at
the time he set the fire, that was not
a basis for finding defense counsel’s
recommendation defective. The court
found that Masmari was not entitled to
raise a defense of voluntary intoxication
because this was a general intent crime,
and that he did not dispute that despite
his intoxication he had the requisite
intent to set the fire, intending to cause
damage to property and persons. (One
consequence of the fire was more than
$87,000 in costs to fix up the damage it

caused, an amount that the court ordered
Masmari to pay as restitution.) It was
also noted that the government lived
up to its promise, but advocating a 60
month sentence to the court. Masmari,
now an inmate, represented himself pro
se on the motion.

REFUGEE LITIGATION NOTES
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 2ND
CIRCUIT – How bad are things for gay
men in Angola? To judge by the July 6
ruling by a 2nd Circuit panel in Silva v.
Lynch, 2016 WL 3621925 (not officially
published), the BIA could plausibly
resolve the question against the claims
of a gay Angolan who argued that
he would be persecuted if forced to
return there, both by his homophobic
father and by the general population.
On March 17, 2015, the Board of
Immigration Appeals affirmed a 2013
decision by an Immigration Judge
denying Silva’s application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention against Torture.
Silva did not allege that he had been
harmed in the past, but claimed “that
he would be persecuted in the future
by his father and by the Angolan
population because he is gay.” Wrote
the court as to the former, “the agency
reasonably concluded that there was no
evidence in the record that the Angolan
government would be unwilling or
unable to prevent Silva’s father from
harming him or punishing his father
if he did.” The court dismissed the
salience of a letter from Silva’s mother
stating “that she was forced to flee
to the Congo to avoid Silva’s father,”
because it “was from an interested
witness who was not subject to crossexamination.” The burden was on Silva
to show that his father was likely to
harm him because of his homosexual
orientation if he was returned to
Angola, and the court found that the
agency could conclude Silva had

not met that burden. As to Silva’s
other argument, the court observed
that “the record contains conflicting
evidence concerning the prevalence of
violence against gay men in Angola,
and the task of resolving conflicts
in the record evidence is ‘largely
within the discretion of the agency.’
The 2011 State Department Report
notes that gay men in Angola report
facing violence and discrimination,
but it does not disclose the extent of
that violence or its frequency. Silva
submitted an additional article stating
that homosexuals in Angola do not
reveal their sexual orientation for
fear of stigma and social exclusion;
the article also reported on one gay
man who had rocks thrown at him.”
But the Department of Homeland
Security “submitted two articles,
one of which states that, although
homosexuality is technically illegal
in Angola, there are no reports of an
prosecutions for violating the law, and
that a new proposed law criminalizes
discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Moreover, the articles
quote an HIV/AIDS activist, as well
as a human rights observer, to the
effect that violence against gay men is
uncommon in Angola and that Angola
is ahead of other African nations with
respect to the treatment of LGBT
individuals.” The court concluded that
it was up to the BIA, not the court, to
decide how to resolve this conflicting
evidence. These claims are supposed
to be assessed based on conditions in
the country when the applicant left, not
present conditions. It appears, however,
that since 2011 Angola has repealed
express criminal penalties for gay sex
and it is at least arguable that more
recent legislative action might provide
some protection against discrimination
because of sexual orientation in that
country. That is, a recent on-line search
for information tends to confirm the
suggestion that conditions for gay
people have been improving in Angola.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 2ND
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CIRCUIT – A notably unsympathetic
2nd Circuit panel rejected the
contention that hundreds of murders
of gay men each year in Brazil would
support a claim that a gay Brazilian
would have the necessary reasonable
fear of persecution sufficient to justify
withholding of removal from the United
States in Feitosa v. Lynch, 2016 WL
3190549, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9990
(June 2, 2016). On December 31, 2014,
the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed an Immigration Judge’s ruling
denying the petitioner’s application for
asylum, withholding of removal and
relief under the Convention against
Torture. The court’s summary order
rejecting the petitioner’s appeal,
assuming the parties’ familiarity with
“the underlying facts and procedural
history in this case,” is skimpy on
details, not revealing how the petitioner
came to the United States or the
circumstances under which his case
was initiated. The petitioner’s asylum
petition was untimely, and the court
held that it had no jurisdiction to review
the IJ’s dismissal of the asylum petition
on this ground in the absence of any
constitutional or legal issues about the
IJ’s decision; the petitioner “simply
‘quarrels over the correctness of the
factual findings,’” wrote the court. As to
the withholding of removal ruling, the
petitioner’s burden would be to show
that past harms he suffered in Brazil
and/or evidence about conditions for gay
men in Brazil at the time of his hearing
would support the conclusion that he
had a reasonable fear of persecution
if he were deported to his homeland.
“Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s
conclusion that the rapes [petitioner]
suffered lacked a nexus to a protected
ground: [petitioner] did not allege
any facts to support a nexus finding.”
(Rapes?) It seems the petitioner was
expelled from his family’s home when
he was 17, but the court said that this
“did not rise to the level of persecution”
because “he found an alternate place to
live and a job.” As to his fear of future
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persecution, “In this case, [petitioner]
did not allege any individualized fear
of persecution (other than his claims
of past persecution discussed above);
accordingly, to prove his entitlement
to relief, he had to show a pattern or
practice of persecuting or torturing gay
men in Brazil. His country conditions
evidence consisted of two newspaper
articles and one report. This evidence
revealed numerous troubling incidents
of violence towards gay men in Brazil.
However, as the agency concluded, the
evidence of approximately 188 killings
of gay men based on their sexual
orientation in 2012 is not enough to
establish, by a clear probability, that
the harm inflicted on gay men in Brazil
is sufficiently ‘systematic or pervasive
as to amount to a pattern or practice of
persecution.’” Wait a minute: hundreds
of murders in one year does not “amount
to a pattern or practice of persecution”?
It is mere coincidence having nothing
to do with their sexual orientation that
hundreds of gay men were murdered in
one year?? One is struck by the irony
of reading this June 2 statement by
the 2nd Circuit panel, when the New
York Times subsequently reported in
depth about the alarming situation for
gay people in Brazil. See A. Jacobs,
Brazil is Confronting an Epidemic of
Anti-Gay Violence, New York Times,
July 5, 2016 (website), July 6, 2016
(print edition) (“Brazilians have been
confronting their own epidemic of antigay violence – one that, by some counts,
has earned Brazil the ignominious
ranking of the world’s deadliest
place for lesbians, gays, bisexual and
transgender people.”) Unfortunately,
under the standards governing judicial
review of BIA rulings, the court of
appeals is supposed to focus solely
on the evidence presenting to the
Immigration Judge at the time of the
hearing, limiting its review to the record
compiled at that time, and to ignore
later evidence about actual conditions
in the country at the time it is reviewing
the decision. This article suggests that

the petitioner would have good reason
to fear persecution were he deported
to Brazil now. He was raped more than
once as a teenager (the court does not
mention by whom) but that does not
constitute, in the eyes of the court,
“persecution,” because he failed to
allege that he was raped because he was
gay? He was thrown out by his family,
but that’s not persecution because he
found a place to stay and a job until he
fled to the U.S. Hundreds of gay men
are murdered every year in Brazil, a
situation that has become worse since
2012 and that the government seems to
be powerless or unwilling to counter,
but petitioner has no reasonable fear of
persecution? This sounds like a system
designed to evade the facts. The court
also rejected the petitioner’s argument
that the Immigration Judge was biased
because he failed to expressly deal
with all the evidence submitted by the
petitioner in his written decision. “His
argument that the IJ erred in failing
to request additional evidence fails
because it was [petitioner’s] burden to
establish his eligibility for relief.” The
petitioner is represented by Maria Isabel
A.N. Thomas of Princeton, New Jersey.
In the context of the current situation in
Brazil, this ruling strikes this writer as
fundamentally unjust.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 5TH
CIRCUIT – A gay HIV-positive man
from Mexico lost his appeal of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial
of his request for asylum, withholding of
removal, or relief under the Convention
against Torture (CAT), in Elizondo v.
Lynch, 2016 WL 3402589, 2016 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11086 (5th Cir., June 20,
2016). Although the court accepted the
proposition that HIV-positive gay men
qualify as a “particular social group”
for purposes of analyzing such claims,
it found that Elizondo’s evidence
about his experiences in Mexico did
not prove that he was persecuted
because of his membership in that
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class. “Though Elizondo testified that
he suffered insults from persons based
on his homosexuality,” wrote the court
per curiam, “those comments do not
qualify as persecution. Elizondo’s
testimony regarding the robberies he
suffered and the assault he experienced
also do not show that he was persecuted
on account of his membership in
a particular social group. Further,
Elizondo did not report any incidents
to the authorities, and there is no
evidence in the record that the Mexican
government is unable or unwilling
to control the violence.” Apparently,
the court proceeds oblivious to the
general media reports about anti-gay
violence in Mexico or the government’s
limited ability to control violent acts
by criminal groups, or the dismissive
or abusive responses of the police to
complaints by gay citizens. “The BIA’s
and the IJ’s decisions that Elizondo
was not entitled to asylum because he
failed to establish that he suffered past
persecution by actors that the Mexican
government was unwilling or unable to
control and based on membership in a
particular social group are supported
by substantial evidence,” wrote the
court. “Because Elizondo fails to
show that he is entitled to relief in the
form of asylum,” continued the court,
“he cannot establish entitlement to
withholding of removal, which requires
a higher burden of proof. The record
evidence does not show that it was
more likely than not Elizondo would be
tortured if returned to Mexico,” so he
was not entitled to relief under the CAT,
either. Elizondo was represented by
Jodilyn Marie Goodwin of Harlingen,
Texas on the appeal.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH
CIRCUIT – The 9th Circuit announced
that a majority of active judges in the
circuit voted to grant en banc rehearing
of an appeal by a gay, HIV-positive
Mexican man, whose petition to review
the Board of Immigration Appeals’

denial of his application for asylum,
withholding of removal or protection
under the Convention against Torture
was denied last November in a 2-1
panel decision. Bringas-Rodriguez
v. Lynch, 805 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir.
2015), petition for rehearing en banc
granted, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10766
(9th Cir., June 14, 2016). Evidently a
majority of the judges on the circuit
found some merit to dissenting Judge
William Fletcher’s detailed critique of
the majority opinion. The petitioner
recounted a lengthy history of sexual
abuse perpetrated by male members of
his family throughout his childhood.
The petitioner, brought to the U.S.
by his mother and step-father as a
teenager in 2004, lived in the U.S.
without incident until he incurred a
90-day jail sentence at age 20 (in 2010)
on a charge of “contributing to the
delinquency of a minor” in Colorado
when “he was drinking at his house and
a friend brought over a minor.” After
he served his sentence, the Department
of Homeland Security sought to deport
him, and he filed his application for
asylum, withholding or CAT protection
in February 2012. The Immigration
Judge and the BIA faulted him for not
going to the authorities when he was
sexually abused by family members,
even though at the time these events
occurred the Mexican police were
notorious for abusing gays and refusing
to follow up on these kinds of cases.
The 3-judge panel decision relied
on recent State Department country
reports about recent developments
concerning LGBT rights in Mexico to
reject the claim that he could reasonably
fear persecution in Mexico, but Judge
Fletcher pointed out that since the
petitioner last entered the U.S.A. from
Mexico in 2004, more recent country
reports were irrelevant. The question
whether he had a reasonable fear of
persecution as an openly gay, HIV+
man in Mexico is supposed to be
judged based on the conditions in the
country at the time he left. Fletcher

also noted ways in which the IJ and
panel decisions had misrepresented the
factual record in the case. Grants of en
banc rehearing are exceedingly rare in
cases where the government is seeking
to deport undocumented non-citizens,
so the grant of rehearing, which
effectively quashes the panel decision
as a precedent, is significant, in light
of the recent trend of federal appellate
decisions resisting asylum claims from
gay Mexicans. (By contrast, the 9th
Circuit has been very open to asylum
claims from transgender Mexicans
over the past few years.) In the huge
9th Circuit – there are currently 29
active judges, in addition to many
senior judges who still hear cases –
en banc rehearing is carried out in
11-member panels. In this case, the
three-judge panel included a district
judge sitting by designation (who was
the tie-breaker on the panel), so the
en banc panel will include the two
judges from the 3-judge panel and nine
randomly drawn members from among
the active judges of the circuit. If Judge
Fletcher’s views carry the day in the en
banc panel, the result could be a more
liberal view of asylum claims from gay
Mexicans in a circuit which is home to
a large proportion of the undocumented
immigrants from Mexico, and thus
receives a large proportion of their
petitions to review BIA denials. The
petitioner’s quest for en banc review in
this case was supported by five amicus
briefs that were joined by a wide array
of LGBT rights groups, disability rights
groups, organizations concerned with
refugee issues, and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees,
whose brief was prepared by pro bono
attorneys at Williams & Connolly LLP,
Washington, D.C.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH
CIRCUIT – In Ceron-Martinez v. Lynch,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10380, 2016 WL
3212256 (June 8, 2016), one sees how
critical the composition of three-judge
Summer 2016
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panels can be to the possible success of
a pro se refugee appeal. The petitioner is
an HIV-positive man from Mexico who
was denied withholding of removal by
an Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals. He sought review,
arguing that the IJ and the BIA “failed
to presume the truth of his testimony
that the hospital [in Mexico] turned
him away because he had AIDS” even
though they did not make a finding that
he lacked credibility. The memorandum
opinion for the majority of the panel –
George W. Bush appointees Consuelo
Callahan and Randy Smith – engaged
in an extremely technical argument
disclaiming jurisdiction to deal with
Ceron’s appeal on the merits, claiming
he had not sufficiently “exhausted” the
administrative process. In a stronglyworded dissent, Senior Judge Dorothy
Nelson, a Carter appointee, sharply
disagreed with the majority, finding
that Ceron had “sufficiently exhausted
his argument that the IJ and BIA failed
to presume the truth of his testimony,
and that he also sufficiently raised a
pattern or practice of persecution of a
group of persons claim.” She pointed
out that Ceron was pro se for “a
majority of the proceedings before the
IJ and the BIA,” and that he “adequately
raised to the BIA the issue of the IJ’s
consideration of his credibility such
that we have jurisdiction to consider
the merits of his argument.” She also
contended that “a fair reading of
Ceron’s December 2013 and April 2014
briefs demonstrates that he has raised a
pattern or practice claim,” including his
submission of documentary evidence
on “the persecution of individuals
suffering from HIV/AIDS in Mexico,
such as a news article about a gay,
HIV-positive man who was tortured,
beaten and suffocated, and found dead
with a sign stating in part, ‘This is
what happens to me for going around
infecting people with AIDS.” Ceron’s
brief also described the “widespread
. . . stigmatization and abuse of HIVpositive individuals or people with
306 LGBT Law Notes Summer 2016

AIDS in Mexico” and asserted that he
“will suffer persecution if forced to
return to Mexico.” Since they did not
question his credibility, she wrote, “we
have jurisdiction to consider Ceron’s
argument that the IJ and BIA failed to
presume the truth of his testimony, and
that Ceron adequately raised a pattern
or practice claim.” She would have
granted the petition to review the BIA’s
decision on the merits.

record does not compel the finding that
the IJ’s unwillingness to believe this
explanation, in light of the importance
of the omitted incidents in his asylum
claim, was erroneous.” Petitioner’s
counsel on appeal was Reynold E.
Finnegan, II, of Finnegan & Diba, Los
Angeles.

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH
CIRCUIT – A gay man from Moldova
struck out in his appeal of the Board
of Immigration Appeal (BIA) denial
of his petition for asylum, withholding
of removal or protection under the
Convention against Torture (CAT).
Zubcu v. Lynch, 2016 WL 3079311,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9944 (9th Cir.,
June 1, 2016). As is frequently the
case in these summary proceedings,
the memorandum opinion for the 9th
Circuit panel does not include a detailed
recitation of factual allegations. The
court found that the BIA’s ruling against
the petitioner on credibility grounds
was supported by substantial evidence.
The problem is that he submitted two
asylum applications, the first grounded
on a claim that he “was persecuted due
to his political opinion and religion,”
the second that he was persecuted
“based on his sexual orientation.” BIA
found that the failure to mention sexual
orientation in the first or to substantiate
the allegations about political
persecution fatally undermined the
petitioner’s credibility, both as to his
asylum petitions and his CAT claim.
Furthermore, there was nothing in the
record to document a contention that he
was likely to confront torture or serious
harm if deported back to Moldova.
The petitioner claimed that his first
asylum petition was filled out for him
by a friend to whom he didn’t want to
disclose his sexual orientation. That
argument cut no ice with the BIA or the
court, which quoted a prior case: “the

CALIFORNIA – On June 6, 2016, the
United States Supreme Court ruled
that the Prison Litigation Reform Act
[“PLRA”] requires inmates to exhaust
“only such administrative remedies
that are ‘available’” prior to initiating
federal civil rights litigation. Ross v.
Blake, 2016 WL 3128839 at *11, 2016
U.S. LEXIS 3614 at *27. In Johnson v.
Perry, 2016 WL 3543503 (E.D. Calif.,
June 24, 2016), United States Magistrate
Judge Allison Claire summarized the
exceptions to exhaustion, as identified
by the Supreme Court, as follows: (1)
when an administrative procedure
“operates as a simple dead end – when
officers [are] unable or consistently
unwilling to provide any relief to
aggrieved inmates”; (2) when the
administrative process is “so opaque
that if becomes, practically speaking,
incapable of use,” that is, “no ordinary
prisoner can discern or navigate it”;
and (3) “when prison administrators
thwart inmates from taking advantage
of a grievance process through
machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation.” Ross, Slip Op. at 9-10.
Here, prisoner Gilroy E. Johnson alleged
that officials thwarted his filing of
grievances, after he suffered retaliation
following complaining about officer
misconduct. Screening the case under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2), Judge Claire
dismissed the complaint for inadequate
specificity in pleading of exhaustion
under the PLRA, but the Supreme
Court’s recognition of exceptions to
exhaustion (particularly interference
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with remedies available in theory) is
validation of where numerous Circuit
Courts have been trending recently.
On the merits, Judge Claire also found
Johnson’s allegations too vague and
conclusory, but she allowed him to
replead Eighth Amendment causes of
action based on: (1) failure to protect;
(2) purposeful contamination of his
food; and (3) interference with his legal
mail. The first claims bears elaboration
for Law Notes readers. Johnson claimed
that officials called him gay, a “snitch”
and a child molester to incite others
to harm him, stating a potential claim
of deliberate indifference to his safety
under Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837 (1994). Judge Claire included
a nationwide string of cases finding
failure to protect claims based on verbal
harassment designed to incite inmateon-inmate violence. See Valandingham
v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th
Cir. 1989) (correctional officer calling
a prisoner “a ‘snitch’ in the presence of
other inmates is ‘material’ to a section
1983 claim for denial of the right not
to be subjected to physical harm”);
Thomas v. D.C., 887 F. Supp. 1, 4-5
(D.D.C. 1995) (telling other inmates
plaintiff was “a homosexual and a
‘snitch’”); see also Flores v. Wall, 2012
WL 4471101, at *12, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 136668, at *41-2 (D.R.I. Aug.
31, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 4470998, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139972 (D.R.I. Sept. 25,
2012) (correctional officers “spreading
rumors that plaintiff was homosexual
and a snitch,” citing cases from the
First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
and District Courts in Kentucky
and Missouri). Judge Claire denied
appointment of counsel at this juncture.
William J. Rold
CALIFORNIA – Law Notes reported
“California Adopts Guidelines for
Prisoner Requests for Sex Reassignment
Surgery,” as part of the settlement of
the Quine litigation (November 2015

at page 489). The settlement included
provision of “other” treatments and
services, some of which were yet to
be negotiated. The parties are still
fighting about them. By Order of June
9, 2016, which appears to be available
at this time only in PACER, in Quine
v. Beard, 3:14-CV-02726 (N.D. Calif.)
JST (NJV), and in news accounts, U.S.
Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas (who
has enforcement of the settlement)
ruled on some of the minutiae facing
transgender prisoners on a daily basis.
He found that transgender prisoners
should have “at least some access” to the
following: Pajama/Nightgown, Robe,
Sandals, Scarf, T-Shirts, and Walking
Shoes. Chains/necklaces should be
allowed “in the same manner as
inmates housed in female institutions”;
and “supervised access” should be
permitted for pumice stone, emery
boards, and curling irons. By contrast,
the following items allowed in female
institutions “may justify a policy that
does not allow . . . bracelet, earrings,
hair brush, and hair clips” in male
institutions. The parties were directed
to continue to meet and attempt to agree
about “binders.” Attorneys for Quine
heralded the decision as challenging
“gender norms” used to discriminate
against
transgender
prisoners,
according to a report by Associated
Press, 6/10/16. Shiloh Quine, who is
serving a life sentence, is set for sex
reassignment surgery in December.
She is represented by Morgan Lewis
& Bockus, LLP, San Francisco, and
the Transgender Law Center, Oakland.
William J. Rold

3), primarily because she did not then
have a diagnosis of “gender dysphoria”
and he regarded her claim to be a
medical “dispute” about treatment
that is not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment (and without citing the
Ninth Circuit’s reversal of a summary
dismissal of a transgender prisoner’s
pro se complaint protesting lack of
treatment in Rosati v. Igbinoso, 2015
WL 3916977 (9th Cir. June 26, 2015),
reported in Law Notes (Summer 2015
at page 299). Now Denegal is back,
apparently pleading her entire history
since childhood and her odyssey in
prison (per the lengthy recitation in
the opinion), and Judge Seng will
allow her to proceed past screening,
in Denegal v. Farrell, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88937, 2016 WL 3648956 (E.D.
Calif., July 8, 2016), so she will be able
to litigate her claim that she is being
unconstitutionally denied appropriate
treatment for the serious medical
condition of her gender dysphoria.
Denegal is receiving hormone therapy,
and this lawsuit is about her demand
for sex reassignment surgery. In light
of litigation over this issue in several
cases last year in the federal courts
in California, she may have a strong
case. Surprisingly, the court’s opinion
does not mention a concession by the
California Corrections system last
summer that it may not maintain a
blanket ban on sex reassignment surgery
for transgender inmates, regardless
of credible medical opinion that such
surgery is “medically necessary” in
a particular case. William J. Rold &
Arthur S. Leonard

CALIFORNIA – Last fall, U.S.
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng
dismissed the pro se complaint of
transgender inmate Dwayne Denegal,
a/k/a Fatima Shabazz, for failure to
state a claim in Denegal v. Farrell,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122326 (E.D.
Calif., September 14, 2015), reported in
Law Notes (October 2015 at pages 462-

ILLINOIS – Dannel Maurice Mitchell
is an HIV+ inmate and a determined
litigator, with various cases before
two federal judges in the Southern
District of Illinois. In Mitchell v.
Pace, 2016 WL 3087454 (S.D. Ill.,
June 2, 2016), United States District
Judge J. Phil Gilbert reviewed under
28 U.S.C. § 1915A the sufficiency
Summer 2016
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of a claim that Mitchell was denied a
shower after accidentally defecating on
himself and was forced to clean himself
in humiliating fashion before other
inmates and staff. Judge Gilbert found
that Mitchell stated a claim against the
corrections officer who said he was
taking an “unauthorized” shower and
forced him to leave the shower before
washing, leaving him with “no other
option than to clean himself in front of
his peers in the common area.” Judge
Gilbert reviewed the claim as one of
“forced public nudity . . . evaluated
under the same standard as claims of
humiliating strip searches.” He found
that Mitchell “plausibly alleges that the
[incident] in question was motivated by
a desire to harass or humiliate rather
than by a legitimate justification,”
citing King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889,
897 (7th Cir. 2015) and other 7th Circuit
cases. He found that the officer could
have issued a ticket for the unauthorized
shower while still allowing Mitchell to
clean himself. He ordered service and
directed that the defendant not waive
reply under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). In
Mitchell v. Fulk, 2016 WL 3071993
(S.D. Ill., June 1, 2016), United States
District Judge Staci M. Yandle
addressed preliminary review of claims
of denial of medical care for HIV
and other conditions. Without much
discussion about the actual denials
of care (which recited mostly a list
of complaints, including “untreated”
pain), she found on “liberal” reading
of the complaint “colorable” claims of
deliberate indifference under Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976),
against the individual defendants, who
included physicians and nurses, as well
as a consultant – if he could be shown
to be a “state actor” under the standards
of Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822-30 (7th Cir.
2009). She found inadequate allegation
of pattern and practice to proceed against
the corporate defendants (Wexford
Health Services and the University
of Illinois), and she dismissed these
308 LGBT Law Notes Summer 2016

claims without prejudice. The opinion
includes a review of standards for
liability generally, including individual
responsibility of nurses under Holloway
v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d
1063, 1075 (7th Cir. 2012). She also
directed service (with addresses to be
provided in camera, if needed) and
required responsive pleadings. William
J. Rold
LOUISIANA – U.S. Magistrate Judge
Karen Roby Wells dismissed pro
se HIV+ inmate Pernell C. Kellup’s
complaint on screening under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A in
Kellup v. Gusman, 2016 WL 3627321
(E.D. La., June 9, 2016). Judge Wells
conducted a Spears hearing – Fifth
Circuit informational interview with
pro se inmates to screen cases under
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th
Cir. 1985) – and determined that his
claims of mold and sewage problems
in the Orleans Parrish jail system did
not amount to Eighth Amendment
violations under Wilson v. Lynaugh,
878 F.2d 846, 849 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1989).
Moreover, a one-week delay in receipt
of HIV medication (while diagnosis
was confirmed) did not state a claim
under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102-103 (1976), even though he claimed
nausea and weight loss during the
interval. The delay was too short and
the consequences too small to constitute
“deliberate indifference” (Fifth Circuit
string cites omitted). William J. Rold
OKLAHOMA – In Wherry v. Gunter,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87950, 2016
WL 3676796 (W.D. Okla., July 6,
2016), Chief U.S. District Judge Joe
L. Heaton adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Charles B. Goodwin, dismissing the
civil rights complaint of pro se inmate
Ronnie Wherry, Jr., on initial screening
(and assessing “one strike” under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, for

frivolous pleadings) under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(g). Wherry
alleged that a guard threatened to
“spray your black ass” and called him
“Itsy Bitsy Teeny Weeny,” which he said
was a homophobic slur in prison. The
statements were isolated (two remarks
in one day), and not accompanied by
physical conduct. Calling the remarks
“limited commentary” in a prison
context, Judge Goodwin found violations
of neither the Eighth Amendment nor
the Equal Protection Clause. Wherry
was a California prisoner confined
at North Fork Correctional Facility
[“North Fork”], a private prison in
Oklahoma run by the Tennessee-based
Corrections Corporation of America
[“CCA”]. Although a claim was not
stated against her, the guard engaged
in state action under West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); but Wherry also
sued North Fork, which Judge Goodwin
found not to be amenable to suit. There
are no appearances listed in the decision
(or on PACER), so Judge Goodwin’s
web page and internet recitations about
North Fork and its amenability to suit
apparently are derived from the court’s
judicial notice and other District Court
decisions regarding CCA’s operations
in Oklahoma. Judge Goodwin does not
discuss whether or not CCA could be
sued, but it seems academic on these
facts. William J. Rold
TEXAS – This case raises the issue
of when a prisoner who has had three
prior cases dismissed for failure to state
a claim can nevertheless overcome
the “three strikes” bar of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act and proceed in
forma pauperis, because of “imminent
danger.” Plaintiff Robert Miller alleged
that a sergeant persuaded medical staff
to deny him HIV medication for over
a month and also arranged for another
inmate to assault him. United States
District Judge Michael H. Schneider
ruled that the “imminent danger”
exception did not apply to allegations
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about “past acts” in Miller v. University
of Texas Medical Branch, 2016 WL
3267346 (June 15, 2016), adopting the
report of the reviewing United States
Magistrate, who also noted that, in
addition to the three prior “strikes,” the
instant complaint was duplicative of
yet another lawsuit Miller had pending
in the Eastern District of Texas. Judge
Schneider found that the allegations
of denial of medical care for a fixed
period in the past and the placement
of an “enemy” in Miller’s cell to
facilitate an assault did not meet the
“imminent danger of serious physical
injury” exception to the three-strikes
rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), because
the danger did not exist at the time
the federal lawsuit was filed, citing
Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330
(7th Cir. 2003), and Baños v. O’Guin,
144 F.3d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1998).
The dismissal was without prejudice
to Miller’s proceeding after paying
the full filing fee, and also without
prejudice to the Court’s “frivolousness
analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A”
should Miller pay the fee and refile.
William J. Rold
WISCONSIN – Law Notes has twice
previously written about Wisconsin
transgender prisoner Dominique Dewayne
Gulley-Fernandez’s multiple lawsuits
about conditions of confinement,
most recently in Gulley-Fernandez v.
Johnson, 2016 WL 1169470 (E.D. Wisc.,
March 21, 2016), reported in April 2016
at page 167, wherein U.S. District Judge
Rudolph T. Randa denied preliminary
relief but ordered consolidation of
claims. Now, after defendants have
answered the most recent pleadings
(including two new lawsuits), Judge
Randa again denies preliminary relief
in Gulley-Fernandez v. Johnson,
2016 WL 3149714 (E.D. Wisc., June
3, 2016). Gulley-Fernandez asked
for a transfer, claiming transphobic
harassment and unlawful seizure of
written materials. State officials filed

an affidavit describing their efforts
to keep Gulley-Fernandez in general
population, thwarted, they say, by her
own conduct (“he continues to yell or
talk at the cell front and through the
air vents about his sexual preferences
which has led many of the other
inmates getting aggravated”). The state
also says that the “seized” materials
were magazines belonging to another
inmate,
where
Gulley-Fernandez
had used the law library typewriter
to alter addresses in order to receive
the publications herself. Judge Randa
found that the submissions indicated
that Gulley-Fernandez was a “troubled
individual with behavioral problems
. . . regularly receiving support at the
prison . . . [whose] ongoing actions and
behavior results in the staff moving
him to restrictive housing. None of the
staff’s actions resulted from retaliatory
animus and instead were used to
protect Gulley.” Gulley-Fernandez
demonstrated neither irreparable harm
nor likelihood of success on the merits
sufficient for preliminary relief. Judge
Randa has previously denied counsel,
but he again allows the plaintiff to
proceed on medical care and protection
from harm claims. It seems clear that
Gulley-Fernandez is foundering, and
legal assistance (and an expert) would
be useful – and save the court’s time in
the long run. William J. Rold

LEGISLATIVE & ADMINISTRATIVE
U.S. CONGRESS – Rep. Jason Chaffetz
(R-Utah), chair of the House Oversight
& Government Reform Committee,
held a July 12 hearing on H.R. 2802,
a bill ironically named the “First
Amendment Defense Act” that would
violate the Establishment Clause by
sheltering those with religiously-based
objections to same-sex marriage from
any adverse consequences to their
employment, tax status or government
contracts under federal law. The 1st

Amendment requires the government
to be neutral in matters of religion, so
privileging particular religious beliefs
would seem to be a clear violation of
such neutrality, as a federal district
court ruled in preliminarily enjoining
enforcement of Mississippi’s HB 1523.
Proponents of the measure asserted
that it was intended to accommodate
the religious free exercise rights of
individuals and institutions and should
be allowed the same as other provisions
of federal law that accommodate
religious observers. The measure
cannot be enacted during the current
session of Congress, since Senate
Democrats would filibuster it and even
if it were to get through both houses,
President Obama would veto it.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE –
On June 30, the Defense Department
issued Release No. NOR-246-16, titled
“Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
Announces Policy for Transgender
Service Members. The policy establishes
“a construct by which service members
may transition gender while serving,
sets standards for medical care, and
outlines responsibilities for military
services and commanders to develop
and implement guidance, training and
specific policies in the near and longterm.” Which is DOD bureaucratic
speak for saying that a process is being
launched that will roll out over time –
about a one-year period – but: “Effective
immediately, service members may
no longer be involuntarily separated,
discharged or denied reenlistment
solely on the basis of gender identity.
Service members currently on duty
will be able to serve openly.” This was
a historic announcement, denied rather
longer than had been expected when
Secretary Carter announced shortly
after his appointment that he would
launch an effort to figure out how to
allow transgender people to serve in
the U.S. military. Carter designated
Acting Under Secretary of Defense
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for Personnel and Readiness Peter
Levine as the point person to work
with the various military services
to “monitor and oversee” the effort
to make appropriate policy changes
and physical adjustment of facilities.
“The full policy must be completely
implemented no later than July 1,
2017,” says the release. A “Transgender
Service Member Policy Implementation
Fact Sheet” can be found on the DoD
website. While the announced policy
will allow transgender people already
in the military to remain, the “initial
accession policy” governing new
recruits “will require an individual to
have completed any medical treatment
that their doctor has determined is
necessary in connection with their
gender transition, and to have been
stable in their preferred gender for 18
months, as certified by their doctor,
before they can enter the military.” In
other words, young people who have
been diagnosed with gender dysphoria
but have not initiated a transition
process will not be welcome to enlisted
and initiate their transition process at
the expense of the Defense Department,
but those who are already in the service
and receive the appropriate diagnosis
from military medical personal will be
covered for their transition procedures
to the extent they are deemed
medically necessary. After a transition
is completed, marked by a change in
the Service members “gender marker”
in the DoD’s personnel system, they
“will use berthing, bathroom, and
shower facilities associated with their
gender.” Any complaints of antitrans discrimination will be handled
through DoD’s established equality
opportunity channels.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS – On
June 15 the Labor Department
published final regulations instructing
federal contractors how to comply
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with E.O. 112146, as amended by
President Obama to extend the ban on
discrimination by federal contractors
to sexual orientation and gender
identity. This was the first time since
the 1970s that the Department updated
its sex discrimination guidelines.
According to a fact sheet issued to
announce the new guidelines, the new
rules bring the sex discrimination
guidelines “from the ‘Mad Men’ era to
the modern era.” The final regulations,
which were first published as proposed
rules on January 30, 2015, go into
effect on August 15, 2016.
ARKANSAS – A Texarkana nondiscrimination ordinance that had
been adopted unanimously by the City
Council was repealed in a referendum
vote on June 28 by 3,409 to 881. Only
20% of the voters favored keeping the
ordinance! The ordinance dealt with
city employment and city contractors,
and included sexual orientation and
gender identity as forbidden grounds
for discrimination. Opponents whipped
up a storm against the measure by
calling it a “bathroom bill” and raising
fears that the measure would endanger
women and children by allowing
transgender predators into bathrooms.
In reporting on the vote, the Arkansas
Times speculated that it was prelude
to a state “bathroom bill” in 2017,
confirming that Arkansas voters
overall are clueless about transgender
people and their lives. Arkansas
Times, June 29. * * * The Arkansas
Legislative Council’s Administrative
Rules and Regulations Subcommittee
gave final approval on July 12 of a
regulation to allow counselors to refuse
to work with clients if the counselor
has a “conflict of conscience.” Critics
of the new measure claim it permits
discrimination by counselors against
LGBT clients. The rule protects
counselors from sanctions for referring
away clients because of an “ethical,
moral or religious principle” held by the

counselor. The head of the state Board
of Examiners in Counseling, defending
the rule, said it was necessary to
protect the rights of both counselors an
clients, and that counselors would be
required to perform “due diligence” by
consulting with a peer before exercise
their right to refuse services. The
American Counseling Association’s
CEO, Rich Yep, told the press that
this new rule “directly violates” the
organization’s standards and “creates
an environment” for discrimination.
“As a profession dedicated to diversity
and inclusivity, we urged them not
to pass this,” he wrote, stating that
the ACA “remains steadfast in its
opposition to this unethical law
that enables prejudice.” Little Rock
Democrat Gazette, July 13.
CALIFORNIA – Palm Springs City
Council voted unanimously on July
6 to approve an ordinance to convert
all single-stall restrooms in public
buildings to being gender-neutral. The
ordinance also applies to businesses
accessible to the public, such as bars,
restaurants, and retail stores. The
intent is to protect transgender people
who fear harassment when using
public facilities consistent with their
gender identity. A similar ordinance
passed last year by Cathedral City
took effect on January 1, 2016. The
Council is also considering possible
legislation to encourage businesses
to increase privacy in restrooms by
installing floor-to-ceiling toilet stalls.
The council is also considering a bill
that would require anybody doing
business with the city to adopt an equal
benefits plan, under which employers
would be barred from discrimination
because of sexual orientation in the
administration of their benefit plans.
Desert Sun, July 8. * * * The City of
Long Beach Council voted 8-0 to halt
“nonessential” travel to North Carolina
or Mississippi until their governments
repeal recently enacted anti-LGBT
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laws. The vote also called for City
Hall to draft letters to the governors
of those states demanding repeal of
the laws. The council acted on the
recommendation of the city’s Human
Relations Commission. Long Beach
Press-Telegram, June 23. We wonder
whether Governor McCrory (N.C.) or
Governor Bryant (MI) will deign to
answer the letters.
DELAWARE – The Delaware Senate
gave unanimous approval on June 9
to a bill amending the definition of
misconduct as ground for divorce
to remove “homosexuality” and
“lesbianism,” reported the Associated
Press on June 10. “The divorce
law defines marital misconduct as
behavior by a spouse so destructive
that a person filing for divorce
could not reasonably be expected to
continue in the relationship,” said
the report, given other examples of
conduct listing in the statute: adultery,
bigamy, criminal conviction with a
penalty of imprisonment for a year or
more, habitual drinking or drug use,
contracting a sexually-transmitted
disease. The measure had already
been approved by the House and was
sent to Governor Jack Markell for his
approval.
FLORIDA – The Florida Department
of Children and Families has reinstated
a proposal explicitly banning bullying
and harassment of LGBT foster
children in group homes, after the
withdrawal of the proposal at the
instance of the Scott Administration,
had generated a “public outcry” by
civil rights groups, child-welfare
advocates and former foster youth,
according to a July 7 report in the
Orlando Sentinel. The Department
announced that it is creating a position
for a full-time ombudsman to deal with
discrimination complaints that might
be reported to an anonymous hotline

that it will operate. The proposed
rule will also ban facility staff from
any “attempt to change or discourage
a child’s sexual orientation, gender
identity, or gender expression.” The
DCF Secretary, Mike Carroll, denied
that the June 12 shootings at the Pulse
nightclub in Orlando had anything to
do with the Department’s decision to
reverse its withdrawal of the proposal.
Of course, the Florida Conference of
Catholic Bishops, which presumably
supports bullying and harassment
of gay youth in order to scare them
straight, announced its opposition to
the proposal, purportedly basing it
on concern for “other children” who
might be required to share a bedroom
with “someone who ‘identifies’ as the
same gender but remains biologically
different” and thus be subjected to
assaults. Bizarre! * * * The Miami
Beach Commission voted unanimously
to adopt a ban on “conversion therapy”
offered by licensed health care
providers to minors on June 8. The
vote came in the wake of the Florida
legislature’s failure to pass H.B. 137,
a bill that was introduced by Miami
Beach’s openly gay state representative,
David Richardson.
Safeguarding
America’s Values for Everyone, Press
Release, June 8.
GUAM – Guam is subject to Title IX
and receives funding for its public
schools from the U.S. government, so
efforts are under way to comply with
the requirements to accommodate
transgender students. Pacific Daily
News (July 4) reported that the
University of Guam and the Guam
Community College have both
signified that transgender students
may access restrooms consistent
with their gender identity, and that
any newly constructed facilities will
include
gender-neutral
restrooms
in order to provide an appropriate
choice of facilities to all students. Jon
Fernandez, superintendent of the Guam

Department of Education, indicated
that every year Guam’s educational
systems receive more than $45 million
in federal funds that are essential to
operation of the system.
HAWAII – On June 29, Governor
David Ige signed H.B. 2084 into law,
prohibiting insurers in the states from
discrimination against individual
because of their gender identity.
Honolulu Civil Beat, July 2.
ILLINOIS – The Chicago City
Council voted on June 22 to delete a
provision of the city’s Human Rights
Ordinance that allowed operators of
public accommodations to require
patrons to present government-issued
identification if their use of sexdesignated facilities such as restrooms
or locker rooms was questioned. The
provision was attacked as a means of
“outing” and embarrassing transgender
patrons.
INDIANA – The Howard County
Commissioners approved on June 20 an
amendment to the county’s fair housing
ordinance to add sexual orientation,
gender identity and marital status as
prohibited grounds of discrimination,
in order to be sure that the county would
be able to receive pending grants from
the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development. The measure was
passed “under protest” – not because
the commissioners did not want to ban
discrimination against LGBT people,
but because they felt that the phrase
“actual or perceived” that was included
to track HUD language was ambiguous
and could create enforcement problems.
Kokomo Tribune, June 22.
IOWA – Seizing upon a poorly-worded
brochure published by the Iowa
Civil Rights Commission, the Fort
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Des Moines Church of Christ filed
a lawsuit seeking to claim a religious
exemption from any obligation to allow
transgender persons to use restrooms in
the church consistent with their gender
identity. The offending brochure,
published in 2008, appeared to require
churches to allow persons attending
religious services that were “open to
the public” to comply with the antidiscrimination law’s gender identity
provision. However, in response to this
lawsuit and the threat of another by the
Cornerstone World Outreach Church
of Sioux City, the Commission quickly
issued a revised brochure clarifying that
places of worship are generally exempt
from the public accommodations
provisions except when they are used
as polling places, are operating as day
care centers, or engaged in other nonreligious activities. The Commission
said that it has never been asked to
consider a complaint against a church
in a gender identity case since the
statute was amended in 2007 to add
gender identity protection. Indeed, the
Commission’s director said that the
Commission “has not done anything
to suggest it would be enforcing these
laws against ministers in the pulpit,
and there has been no new publication
or statement from the ICRC raising the
issue.” One suspects that the lawsuit
was brought to make a political point
rather than in anticipation of having
to defend discrimination claims. Such
suspicions are fed by the identification
of the church’s legal counsel: Alliance
Defending Freedom, an organization
that is busy stirring up anti-gay and
anti-transgender litigation at every
opportunity. Des Moines Register, July 9.
KANSAS – The State Board of
Education voted unanimously to
“ignore” the federal Education
Department’s directive to school
systems that receive federal money
concerning their obligation under Title
IX of the Education Amendments Act
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to afford appropriate restroom access
for transgender students. The vote
left it up to individual school districts
to decide whether to comply. The
Associated Press reported that Kansas
receives over $479 million in federal
assistance for its public schools,
about 10% of the state’s education
budget. The Obama Administration
has instigated lawsuits against some
school districts, but has avowed that it
will not take action to suspend federal
funding pursuant to Title IX until the
federal courts definitely uphold this
interpretation of the law.
KENTUCKY – The Bowling Green
City Commission voted on July 5 to
approve a syringe exchange program
as a public health measure to combat
the spread of disease. The program
is being developed by the Warren
County Health Department. The action
responds to S.B. 192, passed by the
Kentucky General Assembly in March,
which allows local governments to set
up such programs. Bowling Green Daily
News, July 6. * * * Attorney General
Matt Beshear’s office has issued a
formal opinion that Rowan County
Clerk Kim Davis violated the state’s
Open Records Act by denying a request
by the Campaign for Accountability for
copies of any documents reflecting a
retainer or attorney-client engagement
agreement between Davis or her staff
and Liberty Counsel, the anti-gay
religious organization that represented
her in her marriage license battle
before the federal district court. Davis
had incompletely replied to the request,
and then refused a request by the
Attorney General’s office to see the
documents that she had withheld under
her claim of privilege. The opinion
does not state that she violated the
Act by withholding documents from
Campaign for Accountability, but
rather that she violated it by refusing to
allow the Attorney General’s Office to
examine the documents she claimed to

be exempt from disclosure to a member
of the public. Davis’s attorney at
Liberty Counsel, Mat Staver, said that
the documents covered by the Opinion
would be provided to the AG’s office.
Liberty Counsel has represented Davis
pro bono, of course. Louisville CourierJournal, July 6. * * * The Kentucky
Department of Corrections has ended a
policy that allowed prison wardens to
ban incoming sexually-oriented mail
for inmates if they concluded that it
would “promote homosexuality.” The
ACLU of Kentucky had challenged the
policy on First Amendment grounds.
Corrections Commissioner Rodney
Ballard issued a revised inmate male
policy to prison staff during the first
week of June, stating that all “sexually
explicit materials” (defined as “pictorial
depictions of nudity” or “actual or
simulated sexual acts”) would be
prohibited, regardless of whether it has
anything to do with homosexuality.
Henderson Gleaner, June 9.
MAINE – A group calling itself
Equal Rights Not Special Rights
(very unoriginal name, derived from
the people who sponsored Colorado
Amendment 2 in 1992) has launched
a referendum effort to repeal the
provision of the Maine Human Rights
Act prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination. The addition of sexual
orientation to the Human Rights Act
was approved by Maine voters in 2005
by a 55-45 percent margin, after a
previous referendum had repealed a
legislative enactment. The proponents
of the new effort asserted that it was
necessary to protect the religious free
exercise rights of those who do not
wish to associated with homosexuals
or have an involvement with same-sex
marriages. The Maine legislature’s
attempt to enact same-sex marriage
was repealed in a 2009 referendum,
but then in 2012 a referendum vote
approved same-sex marriage by 5347 percent. A 2014 NY Times poll
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showed 63% support for same-sex
marriage among Maine residents. The
proponents have one year from the
time they start collecting signatures to
obtain at least 61,123 valid signatures
of registered voters in order to get the
measure on the November 2017 general
election ballot. Portland Press, July 9.
MASSACHUSETTS – Negotiators
from the state House and Senate
reached a compromise on a bill to
add protection against discrimination
because of gender identity in places
of public accommodation to the state’s
Law Against Discrimination, and the
measure passed both houses easily
in a vote on July 7. Governor Charlie
Baker, a Republican who had opposed
the original bill, had later signaled that
he would be inclined to sign the House
version, which included a provision
requiring the Attorney General to issue
guidance and when and how action
could be taken against people who
assert gender identity for “an improper
purpose.” This measure was intended
to get at the phony objection cited by
opponents that forbidding this kind
of discrimination will expose women
and children to danger from attack
in public restrooms. A version of this
provision survived in the compromise
bill. Boston Globe, July 8. Governor
Baker signed the measure into law on
July 8. It becomes effective on Oct. 1,
a compromise date between the Senate
and House versions.
MICHIGAN – The City Council of
Howell voted unanimously on June 27
to approve a new antidiscrimination
ordinance that prohibits employment
and housing discrimination on various
grounds, including sexual orientation
and gender identity. A local press
report said that 38 other Michigan
communities have adopted similar
ordinance, and that Howell’s was
patterned on one enacted three years ago

in Battle Creek. The ordinance provides
exemptions for religious organizations,
and does not cover places of public
accommodation. Livingston County
Daily Press, June 29. * * * The Portage
City Council voted 6-1 on June 28 to
approve an ordinance that would ban
discrimination in housing, employment
and public accommodations because of
sexual orientation or gender identity.
Newschannel3.com.
MISSISSIPPI – The Jackson City
Council voted 7-0 on June 14 to include
sexual orientation and gender identity
in the city’s anti-discrimination
ordinance covering housing, public
accommodations and employment, and
also to expand the hate crimes ordinance
to encompass these categories. The
vote was a sign of defiance to the state
government, which legislated earlier
this year to allow individuals and
organizations with religious or moral
objections to marriage equality and sex
outside of heterosexual marriage to act
in accord with their beliefs. As noted
above, the state statute, which was to
go into effect on July 1, did not do so
because of a last-minute preliminary
injunction issued by the U.S. District
Court, finding that plaintiffs were
likely to prevail on their claim that the
statute violates the federal constitution.
As Jackson is the only jurisdiction
within Mississippi that prohibits such
discrimination, the state law was
largely symbolic with respect to the
rest of the state but threatened to render
the Jackson ordinance unenforceable.
NEW HAMPSHIRE – On June 30,
Governor Margaret Hassan signed
Executive Order 2016-04, expanding
the state’s existing anti-discrimination
executive order to include gender
identity or gender expression. The
order applies to state agencies in their
employment practices and provision of
services, and requires that executive

branch contracts and grants include
anti-discrimination provisions that
cover gender identity or expression.
State agencies are directed to review
all their policies to bring them into
compliance, with the Division of
Personnel charged to provide guidance
to state agencies by September 15 and
propose any necessary rule changes.
NEW JERSEY – After a city resident
and Garden State Equality asked the
town of Clifton to fly a rainbow flag
to celebrate gay pride, Town Council
divided evenly on the question, but
Mayor Jim Anzali broke the tie at a
June 6 meeting in favor of flying the
flag. The mayor said he did not think
that flying a pride flag “is going to hurt
anybody.” A flag raising ceremony was
held on June 25. AP State News, June 9.
NEW YORK – The State Division of
Human Rights, which enforces the New
York State Human Rights Law, has
published a new regulation prohibiting
discrimination based on an individual’s
relationship or association with a
member of a “protected class.” Gay
people are explicitly protected under
the statute, and a recent regulation
promulgated by the agency provides
that transgender people are also
covered, both within the ambit of sex
discrimination, and for those dealing
with gender dysphoria, the ambit of
the disability discrimination provision.
In a press release announcing the new
regulations, the Division gave the
following example of what might be
prohibited: “job seekers may not be
denied employment because of the
gender identity, transgender status, or
other protected characteristics of their
spouses.” JD Supra, June 29.
NEW YORK – The New York City
Council approved an ordinance on
June 21 that requires single-stall public
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bathrooms to be gender-neutral. The
measure, which takes effect January 1,
2017, was approved by a vote of 47-2.
The measure would apply to any singlestall restroom that is open to public use.
Restaurants and other retail businesses
in New York have already begun putting
up new identifying signs on restrooms
to indicate that people are welcome
to use restrooms consistent with their
gender identity.
NEW YORK – The New York City
Civilian Complaint Review Board
issued its first comprehensive report
on relationships between the LGBT
community and the New York City
Police Department in a document
titled “Pride, Prejudice and Policing:
An Evaluation of LGBTQ-Related
Complaints from January 2010 through
December 2015.” The document is
available on the Board’s website: http://
www.nyc.gov/ccrb. It contains detailed
breakdowns with graphs and charts
of complaints filed with the Board
concerning conduct by NYPD staff
towards LGBTQ community members.
Overall, the data show that the volume
of complaints in this category were at a
peak in 2012 and have declined in each
subsequent year.
NEW YORK – Long Beach City Council
voted unanimously on June 21 to
add gender identity to the city’s
anti-discrimination policy for its
employees. The policy covers both
discrimination and harassment. The
city’s anti-discrimination ordinance
does not cover use of bathrooms or
other facilities, however. Newsday,
June 23.
NORTH CAROLINA – The Charlotte
Mecklenburg Schools updated their
policies to comply with the U.S.
Education Department’s requirements
under Title IX, in open defiance of the
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state’s H.B.2. Transgender students can
either use the bathroom they prefer or
can request access to a private facility
(such as a restroom in a school nurse’s
office). Staff members are instructed
to address students by the name and
pronoun corresponding to their gender
identity. The governor’s office issued a
statement criticizing the school district
as having made a “radical change” to
its policies. H.B. 2 is under attack in
several court proceedings, and motions
for preliminary injunctions against its
enforcement are pending. abc11.com,
June 21.
OHIO – The City Council of Newark,
Ohio, voted unanimously to amend
its equal employment opportunity,
fair housing and ethnic intimidation
laws to add “sexual orientation,”
“gender identity,” and “gender
expression” as protected categories.
Newark Advocate, July 6. * * * A
little “zing” to the GOP? On July 13,
the City Council in Cleveland, Ohio,
unanimously repealed a provision in
its anti-discrimination ordinance that
had allowed limitations on restroom
access by transgender individuals.
The city’s 2009 anti-discrimination
ordinance included gender identity,
but expressly allowed employers and
businesses to limit restroom access
based on biological sex. The proposal
to change that was introduced in 2013,
but remained dormant until somebody
woke up and decided it would be a good
idea to move the repeal measure prior
to the Republican Convention. Under
the revised law, transgender people can
use facilities that are consistent with
their gender identity in workplaces and
places of public accommodation. * * *
The Cincinnati Public Library Board
voted unanimously to reject a request
by a transgender employee to cover
her gender confirmation surgery under
the health insurance plan. Although
costs were not discussed publicly, a
member of the board asserted that it

would not be “fair” to ask “the public”
to pay for the procedure. The vote
affirmed a recommendation from the
board’s human resources committee.
Cincinnati Enquirer, June 15.
OREGON – The Oregon Division
of Motor Vehicles stated that it may
need a substantial period of time in
order to modify the software used to
generate drivers’ licenses in order to
accommodate a court order granting
an individual’s petition to get a license
that does not designate them as either
male or female. On June 10, Judge
Amy Holmes Hehn of the Multnomah
County Circuit Court granted a petition
by Jamie Shupe of Portland, born with
male anatomy but seeking a license that
does not assign Shupe a specific legal
gender. Shupe had undergone hormone
therapy after retiring from the military,
stating that “transitioning to female
was the only option available then” but
refusing to embrace the gender binary.
“It feels amazing to be free from a
binary sex classification system that
inadequately addressed who I really
am, a system in which I felt confined,”
said Shupe in response to Judge Hehn’s
ruling. A spokesperson for the DMV
said that they had been in touch with
Shupe. “At this point, we can’t fulfill
the request,” said David House, “but
we are studying it to figure out what
computer system changes and statutory
changes might need to be made.”
He said that the existing database
program did not support a “third kind
of sex designation.” cnn.com, June 12;
Statesmanjournal.com, June 22.
PENNSYLVANIA – The Philadelphia
School Reform Commission voted
on June 16 to approve a new policy
allowing transgender students to use
restrooms and joint groups – including
athletic teams – that correspond with
their gender identity, reported the
Associated Press. Students will be
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allowed to determine which pronouns
should be used to address them, and
can wear clothing consistent with
their gender identity at school. * * *
The Pittsburgh School Board voted
unanimously on June 22 to approve a
districtwide policy outlining the rights,
protections, and support systems that
school must provide for transgender
students, reported the Associated
Press. The policy allows students to use
bathrooms and participate in physical
education classes and intramural
sports that “align with their gender
identity,” according to the AP report.
Students may also determine the
preferred name and gender pronouns
to be used for them. * * * Proposals to
amend the state’s anti-discrimination
law to cover sexual orientation and
gender identity have been blocked for
many years in legislative committees
with Republicans controlling both
houses, but a bill to protect LGBT
people from discrimination received
Senate committee approval in June
after the Orlando massacre. However,
in order to win enough votes from
Republicans to approve the measure,
sponsors agreed to remove coverage of
public accommodations. Sharon Herald,
June 28. Republicans generally believe
that allowing transgender people to use
restrooms consistent with their gender
identity will lead to the destruction of
Western Civilization as we know it.
(They don’t seem to have realized that
transgender people have been using
restrooms consistent with their gender
identity since the beginning of recorded
time, during which Western Civilization
seems to have advanced . . . ) Actually,
we’re just kidding. What Republican
legislators probably believe, with
some justification, is that if they vote
to approve such a measure, they will
attract primary opponents when they
seek re-election who will based their
campaigns on the fear-engendering
argument that letting transgender
women use women’s restrooms puts
cisgender women and children at risk of

violation of their privacy and possible
sexual assault by cisgender men posing
as transgender women in order to get
fraudulent access to the facilities. In
order to lend credence to such fears,
some anti-transgender men have
started to invade women’s restrooms in
a few isolated cases in order to make
this seem like a real possibility. Of
course, a law that protects the right
of transgender people to use facilities
consistent with their gender identity
would not authorize a cisgender man to
use a restroom designated for women!!
RHODE ISLAND – The United
Healthcare plan covering Rhode
Island
state
employees
began
covering hormone therapy and sex
reassignment surgery for transgender
state employees as of July 1, according
to an announcement by Governor Gina
Raimondo on June 23. According to
a report by the Providence Journal
(June 24), Rhode Island is the twelfth
state to extend such coverage to its
employees. Rhode Island was among
the early states to forbid gender identity
discrimination, dating back 15 years.
The coverage for “irreversible surgical
interventions” is limited to employees
18 years or older, and surgical coverage
is only available for persons who
have completed twelve months of
“successful continuous full time real
life experience in the desired gender.”
TENNESSEE – The Nashville Metro
Council voted to eliminate the
requirement that businesses with singletoilet restrooms have separate facilities
for labeled as being exclusively for men
or women. The Council unanimously
voted to “broaden exceptions for
unisex restrooms, which are only
allowed in Nashville businesses that
fall below a square-footage threshold,”
reported the Memphis Commercial
Appeal on June 25. The measure
was introduced by a councilmember

after constituents who wanted to open
a vegetarian restaurant with a unisex
bathroom were told by Metro codes
inspectors that they could not have
unisex restrooms because of the size
of their establishment. Councilman
Brett Withers said that he learned
that several restaurants and other
businesses were in violation of code
provisions because they wanted to
make single-user restroom facilities
available to all patrons regardless of
sex or gender identity. The new law
authorizes “unisex restrooms at most
businesses that have two or more
bathroom facilities that each consist of
single toilets and have locks.”
TEXAS – Responding to an inquiry
from Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, Texas
Attorney General Ken Paxton issue A.G.
Opinion KP-0100 on June 28, advising
that the Fort Worth Independent
School District’s superintendent had
violated chapters 11 and 26 of the
Texas Education Code by unilaterally
adopting a policy providing that school
officials will not advise parents about
the gender identity of their children
without the children’s permission. The
superintendent adopted “Guidelines”
on transgender students in April, which
were stated to be mandatory for the
current school year. The guidelines were
developed by district staff and were
adopted without any chance for public
comment or school board vote. Paxton
asserted that state law protects the right
of parents to information about their
children. The Guidelines, on the other
hand, assert that students have a right to
privacy, including “keeping a student’s
actual or perceived gender identity and
expression private,” and directed that
school personnel “may only share this
information on a need-to-know basis
or as the student directs. This includes
sharing information with the student’s
parent or guardian.” The Guidelines also
direct that students have a right to control
the degree to which parents or guardians
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will be involved with the “transitioning”
process of the student. Paxton opined that
to the extent the Guidelines subordinate
the rights of parents provided by
Chapter 26, and were adopted without
the input of the public and the school
district’s board, they violate Chapter 11.
Austin American-Statesman, June 29.
Some of this may be sour grapes, since
Patrick and Paxton were looking for an
appropriately-situated school district to
be a plaintiff in the law suit attacking the
Obama Administration’s construction
of Title IX to cover gender identity
discrimination in schools, and they
had hoped to enlist Fort Worth, until it
developed that the school superintendent
refused to play along. As a result, they
ended up using a tiny rural district that
does not appear to have any transgender
students.
UTAH – The Utah County Board of
Commissioners voted unanimously on
July 5 to add gender identity, sexual
orientation, and pregnancy/pregnancyrelated conditions to the county’s nondiscrimination policy, which makes
the County’s personnel rules and
regulations match up with those of the
state government. In 2015, the famous
“Utah compromise” resulted in the
addition of gender identity and sexual
orientation to the state’s civil rights
law. Thus, the Commissioners’ action
was mainly symbolic, since the county
was already required to comply with
state law. However, County Personnel
Director Lana Jensen said, “We are
just making sure everyone is aware
those are officially part of the protected
categories.” Provo Daily Herald, July 5.
WASHINGTON – Proponents of an
initiative that would repeal a state rule
allowing transgender people to use
restroom facilities consistent with their
gender identity failed to file petition
signatures by the statutory deadline to
get on this November’s ballot. In light
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of current voting statistics, proponents
would need at least 246,372 valid
signatures from registered voters to
qualify their initiative. At the rate
that signatures tend to be disqualified,
this means that they would actually
have to get at least 325,000 signatures
to survive any challenge and get to
the ballot. They had scheduled an
appointment to turn in the signatures by
the July 8 deadline, but they contacted
the secretary of state’s office on July 7
to cancel the appointment. AP Alerts,
July 8.
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MASSACRE AT ORLANDO GAY
BAR – On June 12, Omar Mateen
brought an arsenal of weapons into
Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida,
and opened fire, ultimately killing 49
people in the crowded gay-oriented
club and wounding scores more. Most
of the dead were Hispanic LGBT
people who were there celebrating a
theme night at the bar. During the hours
of his rampage and hostage taking,
Mateen communicated allegiance to
various Islamic terrorist groups. He
died when law enforcement officers
forced their way into the bar to rescue
the remaining patrons and exchanged
gunfire with him. Afterwards some
survivors claimed that Mateen had
frequented the bar in the past, and some
gay individuals claimed to have had
contact with him through gay-oriented
cruising apps, at least one person
claiming to have had sex with him. His
first wife speculated that he may have
been a closeted gay man. However,
a month later federal investigators
asserted that these claims were not
substantiated. Immediate reaction from
Obama Administration officials was to
describe it both as a terrorist act and
a hate crime, although again federal
law enforcement officials a month
later were insisting that there was no

evidence Mateen was anti-gay, which
would seem an odd thing to say about
a man who invaded a gay bar, shooting
and killing people and, according to
some survivors, voicing anti-gay slurs.
Much remains to be learned about
this occurrence, which was generally
accounted the worst multiple-shooting
incident in the United States for a
century or more. It stimulated rallies
and memorial services internationally,
but did not appear to have any
discernible effect on Republicans in
the U.S. Congress, who subsequently
sought to repeal President Obama’s
executive order barring anti-LGBT
discrimination by defense contractors
leading to an impasse in Congress over
a defense spending bill and callously
scheduled exactly a month later a
committee hearing on a proposed
“First Amendment Defense Act”
intended to “protect” individuals and
institutions who sought to discriminate
against LGBT people based on their
religious views. (It seemed clear that
a main goal of the bill was to protect
non-profit educational institutions
from losing their privileged federal
tax status if they violated Title IX by
discriminating against married samesex couples.)
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – The
Republican and Democrat National
Conventions were scheduled to begin
on July 18 and July 25, respectively. At
our deadline, presumptive Republican
Presidential Candidate Donald Trump
had announced that he would nominate
Indiana Governor Michael Pence to
be his running mate. Trump has never
held elective office or any government
position. Pence, who served six terms
in the House of Representatives before
winning election as governor of
Indiana, had a solidly anti-gay voting
record in the House, according to
Human Rights Campaign. As governor,
he is most famous for having advocated
and signed into law an extreme
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act
that critics claims would sanction
anti-gay discrimination by Indiana
businesses; blowback from the business
community was so severe that Pence
reluctantly signed an amendment
providing that the RFRA could not be
raised as defense to a discrimination
claim. Pence describes himself as an
Evangelical Christian. Trump’s views
on LGBT issues are a moving target. At
times in the past he voiced support for
same-sex marriage, criticized attempts
to police transgender access to public
restrooms, and supported measures
to ban anti-gay discrimination, but
in the course of his current run
for the Republican nomination he
backed away from all those positions,
announced that he would appoint
Justices to the Supreme Court who
would overrule the marriage equality
decision, and affirmed that he would
rescind President Obama’s executive
orders requiring federal contractors
not to discriminate because of sexual
orientation or gender identity. Neither
Trump nor Pence raised any objection
to the product of the Republican
Platform Committee, which opposes
the Equality Act, criticizes the Supreme
Court’s marriage equality decision, and
endorses conversion therapy to “cure”
homosexuality. As we went to press,
presumptive Democratic President
Candidate Hillary Clinton had not
announced her choice for running
mate. Clinton, who was First Lady of
Arkansas and the United States during
her husband’s administrations, served
as U.S. Senator from New York and as
President Obama’s first Secretary of
State. She supported the repeal of the
“don’t ask, don’t tell” military policy,
the invalidation of the Defense of
Marriage Act, and the Supreme Court’s
Obergefell decision, although some
critics noted that DADT and DOMA
were both signed into law by her
husband, President Bill Clinton, and
she did not endorse marriage equality
until after President Obama had done so

during his 2012 re-election campaign.
The proposed party platform work
out by a committee dominated by her
supporters calls for enactment of the
Equality Act and generally endorses
equality rights for LGBT people under
federal law.
INTERNATIONAL
SPREAD
OF
MARRIAGE
EQUALITY
–
A
Melbourne-Australia based LGBT
rights activist, Tony Pitman, announced
that after Colombia and several
Mexican states embraced marriage
equality during June, the number of
people in the world living in marriage
equality jurisdictions had exceeded
one billion. He cumulated current
population estimates. The largest
country by population with marriage
equality is the United States, followed
by Brazil, France, the U.K., and South
Africa, all with populations exceeding
50 million people. The population
estimates were current as of July 1, 2016.
Since the first same-sex marriages
took place in the Netherlands in 2001,
“we’ve gone from zero to a billion in
just 15 years,” Pitman exulted. But,
he said, “It’s terribly disappointing
that Australians will never be able
to say that we were among the first
billion people in the world to achieve
marriage equality.” samesame.com.
au/news/13926/A-billion-people-nowlive-with-marriage-equality.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY – In 1975, a “rogue” local
clerk in Boulder, Colorado, issued
marriage licenses to some same-sex
couples, including Richard Frank
Adams and Anthony C. Sullivan.
Adams, a U.S. citizen, then sought to
sponsor Sullivan, an Australian, as
his spouse for immigration purposes.
The Attorney General of Colorado had
disavowed the legality of the resulting
marriages. Adams’ petition was denied
by the Immigration Service in an

outrageously insulting letter, and he lost
his appeal in the 9th Circuit, which held
that the federal government could define
marriage as solely the union of a man
and woman for federal immigration
purposes, regardless what a state did.
The Supreme Court’s decision in
U.S. v. Windsor (2013), holding that
federal refusal to recognize a statesanctioned same-sex marriage violates
the 5th Amendment, came many years
after Adams’ death, but Sullivan, who
survived him and was residing in the
U.S. “under the radar,” sought to revive
that old petition with the assistance of
immigration lawyer Lavi Soloway, who
specializes in representing same-sex
couples. Soloway pressed for an apology
from the government for the way the
petition was treated in the 1970s, and for
a new decision. A written apology was
soon forthcoming from the Homeland
Security Department, and on January
5, 2016, the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service (USCIS) approved
Adams’ old visa petition. On April 21,
the USCIS issued Sullivan a “green
card” and a notice that his application
for permanent residence in the U.S. had
been approved. “It is with great pleasure
that we welcome you to permanent
resident status in the United States,”
reads the notice on a Form I-797C. The
resident status is good for ten years
and can be renewed at that time. The
full story of how this all unfolded can
be found at a website maintained by
Soloway, domaproject.org.
NATIONAL PTA – The National Parent
Teacher Association adopted a resolution
during its 2016 Annual Convention on
Recognition of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender and Queer/Questioning
Individuals as a Protected Class. They
are for it, calling for federal policies
that specifically protect LGBTQ youth
and “local practices that create and
maintain safe, affirming and inclusive
learning environments for all students,”
according to their July 5 news release.
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The specific concerns mentioned in
the press release are bullying and
discrimination, but the release did
not explicitly state a position on the
bathroom access issue that is roiling
the country.
HIV / AIDS – Media sources in
Australia reported that Associate
Professor David Harrich of QIMR
Berghofer
Medical
Research
Institute in Brisbane had achieved an
experimental breakthrough with HIV,
finding a protein that can be used to
“switch off” infected cells, thus ending
their replication. So far his discoveries
have only been in vitro, and he is
proceeding now to testing in animal
subjects to determine the mechanism
by which this discovery works. If it
pans out, it could be possible to treat
people with HIV infection once, rather
than having to administer medication
daily throughout their life. CourierMail, July 15. * * * News of Prof.
Harrich’s discovery came hard on
the heels of an announcement by the
nation’s health officials that antiretroviral treatment for HIV was now
so widespread in Australia that new
cases of AIDS are not being diagnosed.
While 1,000 or more new cases of
HIV infection are being reported
annually, actual cases of full-blown
AIDS, in which an untreated infection
results in immune system collapse
and the blossoming of opportunistic
infections, are just not occurring,
thus leading to celebratory headlines
announcing that the AIDS epidemic
is “over” in Australia. Well, yes and
no. As long more than a thousand
new HIV infections are detected each
year, and as thousands of people are
taking daily meds in order to suppress
HIV infection, and some people are
dying each year from complications
resulting from the medication or the
underlying infection, the epidemic is
hardly “over”. It has just evolved to a
different stage.
318 LGBT Law Notes Summer 2016

GALLUP POLL ON SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE – According to a Gallup
Poll published on June 22, almost
half of the same-sex couples living
together in the U.S. are married. A
Reuters report summarizing the results
said, “The percentage of marriage
cohabiting same-sex couples, as
opposed to couples living together but
not married, rose to 49 percent from 38
percent before the ruling [in Obergefell
v. Hodges on June 26, 2015].” Gallup
estimated that 123,000 same-sex U.S.
couples married in the year after
Obergefell, with a high number of
those unions actually taking place
in states that had already legalized
marriage equality as a result of prior
litigation and legislative action. Gallup
estimates that 9.6% of gay and lesbian
Americans are now married, and that
the percentage of same-sex couples
living in a “domestic partnership” has
declined to 10.1% from 12.8% during
the same time period. Data had to be
accumulated from interviews, since
states do not general keep records
showing which marriages involve
different-sex couples and which
marriages involve same-sex couples.
The 2020 U.S. census should provide
interesting nationwide data on the
prevalence of same-sex marriage!
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
– A study published in the journal
Archives of Sexual Behavior claims
that the percentage of American adults
who say they have had at least one
homosexual experience has doubled
since the 1990s. The study is based on
a survey of 30,000 adults. According
to the survey data, the percentage of
men who had sex at least once with
another man had increased from 4.5%
to 8.2% between 1990 and 2014, and
the percent of women who had sex
at least once with another woman
increased from 3.6% to 8.7%. Also,
the percentage of adults who said they
had sex at least once with a man and

once with a woman increased from
3.1% to 7.7%. Among “millennials” –
adults between ages 18 and 29 during
the 2010s – 7.5% of men and 12.2% of
women reported having had at least one
same-sex experience. Prior to 1990, the
percentage of the adult population who
believed that same-sex relations were
“not wrong” was 13%; in 2014, that
figure had risen to 49% for all adults
and 63% for millennials.
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (UCLA) – The
Williams Institute released a study,
titled “How Many Adults Identify as
Transgender in the United States,”
which substantially increases prior
estimates, conclude that 0.6% of the
adult population, or approximately 1.4
million individuals, today identify as
transgender. The study extrapolated
from data collected in the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System. In
2014, 19 states participating in that
survey included a question about
transgender identity. The authors of the
student also used data from the U.S.
Census Bureau’s American Community
Survey to supplement the date from
the 19 states covered in the BRFSS
surveys. Thus, Williams Institute
announced, “The study provides the
first ever state-level estimates of the
percentage of adults who identify as
transgender for all 50 states. Hawaii
(0.8%), California (0.8%), Georgia
(0.8%), New Mexico (0.8%), Florida
(0.7%), and Texas (0.7%) are the states
that have the highest percentages of
adults who identify as transgender.”
The study found that “young adults
are more likely than older adults
to identify as transgender. Among
adults ages 18 to 24, 0.7% identify as
transgender; among adults ages 25 to
64, 0.6% identify as transgender; and
among adults ages 65 and older, 0.5%
identify as transgender.” The survey
authors are Andrew R. Flores, Jody L.
Herman, Gary J. Gates, and Taylor N.T.
Brown.

LAW & SOCIETY / INTERNATIONAL
UNITED METHODIST CHURCH –
The Western District of the United
Methodist Church elected an openlygay bishop, Rev. Karen Oliveto, on
July 15, despite the denomination’s
continuing condemnation of same-sex
relationships. She is pastor of Glide
Memorial United Methodist Church
in San Francisco, and is the first
openly-gay bishop to be elected in the
12.7 million member church. Several
regional district have appointed gay
clergy, some Methodist churches have
allowed same-sex marriages to take
place, and there is turmoil within the
denomination over these issues. AP
Online, July 16.
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH –
Responding to press questioning during
a flight from Argentina to Rome on
June 26, Pope Francis was asked by a
reporter whether he agreed with a recent
comment by a Roman Catholic cardinal
from Germany, reacting to the Orlando
massacre, that the church should
apologize to gays. According to the New
York Times version of a Reuters report,
“Francis, looking sad, recalled church
teachings that homosexuals ‘should not
be discriminated against.’ ‘They should
be respected, accompanied pastorally,’
he said. Then he added that he thought
the church should apologize not only
to gay people it had offended, but also
to the poor, to women who have been
exploited, and to children who have
been exploited by being forced to work.
‘It must apologize for having blessed
so many weapons,’ he said.” Critics
quickly pointed out the evasive nature
of these remarks, as Francis did not
state any change in church doctrine
regarding gay people, was willing to
refer to exploitation of women but
not to allowing women to participate
fully in the church as priests or other
high clerical officials, and referred to
exploitation of children “being forced
to work” but not “being forced into
having sex with priests.” Indeed!

STONEWALL INN: ENSHRINING
GAY HISTORY – The Stonewall Inn on
Christopher Street, site of a historic “riot”
in June 1969 that is now widely identified
as a signal event in the modern LGBT
rights movement in the United States,
became the focus of federal and state
attention as President Barack Obama
announced on June 24 the designation of
a national monument zone centered on it
– the first officially designated national
monument commemorating gay history
– to be known as Stonewall National
Monument. The White House released
a statement by the President, saying that
the monument would “tell the story of
our struggle for LGBT rights.” (Obama
had prominently mentioned Stonewall
in a litany of important civil rights
events during his second inaugural
address.) Governor Andrew Cuomo then
designated it formally in a “Citation”
on June 26 as a “State Historic Site.”
Cuomo also announced the appointment
of an LGBT Memorial Commission in
his Executive Order No. 158, charging
the Commission with recommending
a site and design of a memorial “in
the vicinity of the western portion of
Greenwich Village” to honor the victims
of the June 12 Orlando massacre. The
Commission was directed to complete
its work and provide its recommendation
to the governor by December 31, 2016.
* * * In a separate action, on June 17
New York City dedicated the corner of
6th Avenue and Washington Place as
Sgt. Charles H. Cochrane Way, in honor
of a gay NYC police officer who came
out publicly to testify for the NYC Gay
Rights Bill in 1986 and co-founded the
Gay Officers Action League to advocate
for LGBT people within the New York
City Police Department. Cochrane, who
would lead GOAL’s active participation
in the annual Gay Pride March for
many years, passed away in 2008. * * *
In another LGBT history development,
U.S. Representative Joseph Crowley
(D-Queens & the Bronx) announced
that the House of Representatives had
passed by unanimous consent his bill,

H.R. 2607), to rename the Jackson
Heights Post Office in honor of the late
Jeanne and Jules Manford, co-founders
of Parents, Families and Friends of
Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) and
parents of LGBT rights activist Morty
Manford. A companion bill has been
introduced in the Senate by New York’s
two senators, Charles E. Schumer and
Kirsten Gillibrand.

INTERNATIONAL NOTES
UNITED NATIONS – The United
Nations Security Council issued a
statement on June 14 condemning the
June 12 Orlando gay bar massacre,
specifically denouncing targeting people
“as a result of their sexual orientation.”
This is the first such statement to be
issued by the Security Council in
response to a highly-publicized antigay incident. eTurbonews.com, June 14.
Later in June, the United Nations Human
Rights Council voted to create the UN’s
first LGBT rights watchdog, by a vote
of 23-18 with 6 abstentions. The official
title will be “independent expert” and
the position is charged with monitoring
“violence and discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity.”
In the past, resolutions of the Council
had directed the human rights office to
prepare reports on LGBT rights, but had
not authorized establishing a position
specifically to deal with LGBT rights
issues. Opponents of the resolution
were led by Pakistan on behalf of
members of the Organization for
Islamic Cooperation, which succeeded
in amending the resolution to require
respect for local values, “religious
sensitivities,” or domestic politics.”
Another amendment condemned any
“coercive measures” to change national
policies, which responds specifically to
threats by western nations to suspend
financial aid from governments that
persecute people because of their
sexual orientation or gender identity.
Summer 2016

LGBT Law Notes 319

INTERNATIONAL
Surprisingly, South Africa was
among the abstaining voters, despite
its constitutional provisions (the
first in the world) forbidding sexual
orientation discrimination. The South
African representative said that the
abstention was due to the “arrogant and
confrontational” of proponents of the
resolution. BuzzFeed.com, June 30.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES – The creation of a core group
on the promotion of the rights of LGBTI
person was announced on June 15
during the 46th regular session of the
General Assembly of the Organization
of American States. Brazil initiated the
move with the support of Argentina,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, the United
States, Mexico and Uruguay. The group
is committed to support OAS efforts
aimed at ensuring LGBT human rights
in member countries. The statement
announcing formation of the group
specifically referenced the Orlando
massacre. Mena Report, June 18.
Ironically, although the government of
Brazil has staked out an affirmative gay
rights position, news reports reflect an
“epidemic” of anti-gay violence in the
country by gangs that the government
seems unable to control, according to a
July 6 report in the New York Times.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS – The Court ruled in Taddeucci
and McCall v. Italy, No. 51362/09, that
Italy violated the European Convention
on Human Rights by refusing to allow a
gay man from New Zealand who is the
same-sex partner of an Italian national to
settle in Italy with his partner. The men
have been living as a couple since 1999,
and decided to move to Italy in 2003
because of Mr. Taddeucci’s poor health.
McCall received a temporary residence
permit as a student, but the police
rejected his subsequent application for a
permit as a family member. The district
court upheld their appeal, but the Court
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of Appeal found for the police authority.
The Court of Cassation dismissed
their appeal. They then moved to the
Netherlands and pursued their appeal
to the European Court, which found a
violation of Article 14 (prohibition of
discrimination) and Article 8 (right to
respect for private and family life). The
court said that Taddeucci and McCall
should not be treated the same as an
unmarried heterosexual couple, because
Italy provided no legal recognition
for same-sex couples at the time they
applied for the residence permit. In
deciding to treat gay couples the same as
unmarried straight couples without any
form of spousal status available for gay
couples, said the court, the State violated
its non-discrimination obligations under
the Convention. This is, of course, a
transitional problem, because recently
Italy has legislated to create domestic
partnerships for same-sex couples that
will afford residence rights.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS – The Court ruled in Case of
O.M. v. Hungary, No. 9912/15, that it
was improper for Hungarian authorities
to hold a gay asylum applicant from Iran
in detention pending the outcome of his
case, since his detention was not justified
by any of the reasons in the “exhaustive
lists” of Article 5, Section 1 of the
Convention. The authorities had stated
that he was being detained to prevent him
from fleeing the jurisdiction while his
case was pending. The Court considered
this illogical; why would the man flee
the jurisdiction if he had specifically
sought asylum in the country? “The
Court reiterates that Article 5 enshrines
a fundamental human right, namely
the protection of the individual against
arbitrary interference by the State with
his or her right to liberty.” The relevant
provisions “contain an exhaustive
list of permissible grounds on which
individuals may be deprived of their
liberty and no deprivation of liberty
will be lawful unless it falls within

one of those grounds,” said the court,
which found that “the applicant’s
detention verged on arbitrariness” which
enabled the Court to conclude that the
Convention had been violated from
June 25 through August 22 of 2014
while the applicant was detained until
the authorities had concluded that he
was entitled to asylum in Hungary.
ASCENSION ISLAND – The Ascension
Island Council voted in favor of
marriage equality on May 31, according
to a report by internet journalist Rex
Wockner, who also reports that the
population in this British dependency
island is about 880 people. Wockner
noted that same-sex marriage became
legal in Pitcairn Islands (population 48)
in May 2015, in Jersey (Channel Islands)
there was a 37-4 preliminary vote in
favor of in September 2015, and the
Isle of Man (population almost 86,000)
voted 6-3 to legalize marriage equality
in April 2016.
AUSTRALIA – The High Court of
Australia reversed a jury conviction
under Crim. Code section 317(b)
(intentional transmission of a serious
disease) in Zaburoni v. R, (2016) 330
ALR 49, finding that the evidence
presented at the trial would not support
the jury in concluding that the defendant,
an HIV-positive man, had intended to
transmit the virus to his female sexual
partner. It was not enough for the
prosecution to show that the defendant
knew he was HIV-positive and was
aware that the virus could be transmitted
sexually. The man had pled guilty to
an alternative count under Crim. Code
section 320, which makes it an offence
to do “grievous bodily harm to another”
and would subject him to a maximum
penalty of 14 years. The prosecution
insisted on continuing the case under
section 317(b), which would subject
the defendant to a maximum prison
term of life, and the jury convicted on
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this. The High Court agreed with Mr.
Zaburoni that “knowledge or foresight
of result, whether possible, probable
or certain, is not a substitute in law for
proof of a specific intent under the Code
. . . Where the accused is aware that,
save for some supervening event, his
or her conduct will certainly produce
a particular result, the inference that
the accused intended, by engaging in
that conduct, to produce that particular
result is compelling. Nonetheless,
foresight that conduct will produce a
particular result as a ‘virtual certainty’
is of evidential significance and under
the Code it remains that the trier of
fact must be satisfied that the accused
meant to produce the particular result.”
* * * The Parliamentary election held
in Australia has returned the Liberal
government to office. Prime Minister
Turnbull reiterated his commitment to
hold a national plebiscite on the subject
of same-sex marriage prior to any vote in
Parliament, but the leader of the Labour
Party, which came very close to denying
the Liberals a majority, announced
consideration of pushing a private
members vote in hopes of persuading
the P.M. that the overwhelming support
for marriage equality in public opinion
polls would justify saving the expense
and divisiveness of a plebiscite and
allowing a free vote in the Parliament,
which many observers suggest would
be successful, as several opponents of
marriage equality were defeated for
reelection and several new supporters
were successful in winning seats. * * *
Family Court Chief Justice Diana
Bryant told the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation that she hopes to change
the way transgender children access
hormone treatment because the current
process, requiring approval of a Family
Court judge, is “difficult and stressful”
for the children. She said that Australia
is the only country in the world that
requires a court order in addition to
expert medical approval, for children to
access hormone therapy. She has asked
the Attorney General’s Department to

organize a “roundtable” with the major
hospitals to see if they can come up
with a “simpler and consistent method
of dealing with these matters. I would
ultimately envisage an application that
could be made relatively simple by
consent.” ABC Premium News, July 5.
BERMUDA – Bermuda held a
referendum on June 23 on same-sex
marriage, in which opponents heavily
outvoted proponents, but because fewer
than 50% of the island’s registered voters
showed up, the result is not binding
on the government. Former AttorneyGeneral Mark Pettingill, a proponent
for marriage equality, announced that
he will represent two same-sex couples
who will apply for a marriage license
and then file suit when they are turned
down, asserting that denial of the right
to marry violates the Human Rights
Act, which they will argue must take
priority over the Marriage Act. Royal
Gazette, June 29.
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA – The
Parliamentary Assembly voted on July
14 to amend the Anti-Discrimination
Law to make explicit protection against
discrimination because of sexual
orientation or gender identity. Indeed,
going beyond what other countries have
done, the amended law also expressly
protects intersex people, and improves
the procedures available for individuals
who confront discrimination to invoke
the assistance of the government.
Local activists claimed that the express
protection for intersex people was a first
for South-East Europe. The steps were
taken in accord with requirements of the
European Union for countries seeking
to obtain or maintain membership.
BRAZIL – The New York Times reported
on July 5 that Brazil is experience an
“epidemic of anti-gay violence.” The
article recites accounts of assaults and

murders in various parts of the country
which appear to have targeted victims
because of their sexuality. It reported
that a local gay rights group has counted
nearly 1600 murders in hate-motivated
attacks since January 2011, averaging
one anti-gay murder a day in a country
of 200 million people. This despite
the fact that the legal climate for gay
people in Brazil has become very
liberal, including marriage equality, gay
people adopting children, and formal
protection against discrimination. On
the other hand, LGBT rights advocates
report that the police have not been
particularly cooperative, often omitting
anti-gay animus from official reports
on murders. The country is generally
experiencing a sharp rise in street crime
and homicides. There is one openly gay
member of the Congress, but he said that
a large coalition of Christian Evangelical
legislators has blocked proposed hate
crimes legislation. Local groups also
report that transgender Brazilians are
at heightened risk for violence, and that
some assailants have videotaped their
assaults against transgender people and
posted them online.
CAMEROON – The Minister of Public
Health, Andre Mam Fouda, announced
on June 23 that HIV/AIDS screening
will now be compulsory for anyone
seeking medical service, as part of the
new direction for combatting the HIV
epidemic in the country and improving
management and care for those living
with HIV infection. Agence de Presse
Africaine, June 25.
CANADA – The Court of Appeal for
Ontario ruled on June 29 in Trinity
Western University v. Law Society of
Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 518, that the
Law Society was within its rights to deny
accreditation to TWU’s new law school.
The school requires staff and students
to adhere to a university requirement
that they sign a “community covenant”
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that forbids sex outside of heterosexual
marriage. While the school claims that
it does not discriminate because of
sexual orientation, the covenant raised
concerns by the Law Society, which
maintains its own non-discrimination
policy as an ethical standard for the
profession. Refusal of accreditation
means that the law school’s graduates
cannot gain admission to practice law
in Ontario which, given the structure of
the profession in Canada, is tantamount
to saying that they are excluded from
practice where most of the nation’s
major litigation takes place. TWU is
an evangelical Christian private school,
which has been seeking accreditation
from law societies throughout Canada
for its new law degree program. The
Law Society’s governing body voted 2821 to deny accreditation, on the ground
that the school’s policies discriminate
based on sexual orientation, gender,
marital status and religion, conflicting
with the ethical standards of the legal
profession in Ontario. The Canadian
Bar Association intervened in the case
in support of the Law Society. The
Court found that a “reasonableness”
standard applies to the LSUC’s
decision, as applied to the balancing
of freedom of religion and equality
requirements under the nation’s Charter
of Rights, and that LSUC met that
standard. The Court of Appeal decision
conflicts with Superior Court rulings
in British Columbia and Nova Scotia,
where courts overturned denials of
accreditation by local law societies, so
there are some places in Canada where
TWU graduates could practice unless
those rulings were to be overturned.
Globeandmail.com, June 29.
CANADA – The government of Ontario
announced that it is introduced genderneutral driver’s licenses and health
identification cards. Beginning early
in 2017, drivers will be able to select
one of three designations: M for Male,
F for Female, and X for neither of the
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above. The province has also started
issuing health cards that do not display
information about the person’s sex on
the front of the card, and ServiceOntario
will issue new cards without the sex
identifier at no charge. The government
is also launching public consultations to
develop policies on how the government
collects, uses and displays sex and
gender information on government forms
and products, according to a June 30
news release from the government of
Ontario. Canadian Government News.
CANADA – A meeting the synod of the
Anglican Church of Canada narrowly
approved a resolution to allow samesex marriages to be performed in the
denomination’s churches on July 11 –
but at first the news reports said that the
measure had been defeated by one vote.
There are three voting orders within
the church – lay, clergy and bishops –
and the resolution needed at least 2/3
support within each of these groups to
pass. It achieved that with the lay voters
and the bishops, but at first appeared
to fall one vote short with the clergy.
After the vote was announced, however,
several members said that their votes
had not been properly registered, and
a reexamination on July 12 revealed
that all three groups had achieved the
requisite margin. The resolution must
be affirmed at the next synod meeting
in 2019 in order to become “church
law,” but some Bishops and clergy
indicated that they were prepared to act
on it in the interim, going ahead with
same-sex marriages in their churches.
Canadian Press, July 12. * * * Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau, an outspoken
supporter of LGBT rights, made history
by raising a rainbow flag on Parliament
Hill in Ottawa and then marching in a
Pride Parade, the first Canadian head of
government to do so. * * * Vancouver
became the first Canadian city to
adopt an inclusive transgender policy
by vote of the City Council on July
13. The vote approves implementing

a series of recommendations made
by a consulting group specializing in
transgender issues, including genderneutral public restrooms and sensitivity
training for city government staff. A
team will be appointed by the Council
to oversee implementation and report
annually on progress, with changes
being implemented over the next 6-18
months. (Construction and remodeling
of facilities may take some time.)
bc.ctvnews.ca, July 14.
CANADA – Health Canada announced
that the deferral period for gay men to
donate blood has been reduced from
five years to one year, consistent with
the trend in other countries. The new
rule will take effect on August 15, 2016.
Health Minister Jane Philpott told
the CBC that the Liberal government
hopes to reduce the waiting period even
further, acknowledged that the new
policy would still disqualify many gay
men from donating blood, and stated:
“I would rather see Canada take a step
in the right direction than stand still.”
Digital Journal, June 21.
CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
– The CCJ dismissed a suit brought
by Jamaican gay activist Maurice
Tomlinson challenging the validity of
statutes in Belize and Trinidad & Tobago
that on their face prohibit the entry of
homosexuals into those countries. The
court accepted an argument on behalf
of the respondent countries that they did
not deny entry to homosexual citizens
of other countries that are signatory to
the governing rules of the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM). The court
accepted an argument from Belize
that its immigration law is intended
only to bar individuals who engage
in prostitution, and from Trinidad &
Tobago that it does not in practice bar
homosexuals from entering the country.
Although his case was dismissed,
Tomlinson declared it a victory because
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the two countries had gone on record
stating that their statutory bans were
not literally enforced. “It is now up to
the international community to press
for the repeal of this law so that it will
be clear in relation to non-nationals
of the CARICOM region,” declared
Tomlinson. The court called upon the
respondent states to voluntarily amend
their laws to harmonize with CARICOM
treating obligations, reported dailyxtra.
com, June 10.
CHINA – Yu Hu (a pseudonym) has sued
a hospital in central Henan Province for
subjecting him to treatment intended to
“cure his sexual orientation disorder,”
reported China News Service on
June 14. He alleges that members
of his family forcibly admitted him
to the hospital after he divorced his
wife, tied to a bed, medicated, and
threatened with violence. He was
released from the hospital after his
same-sex partner contacted LGBT
rights organizations, which notified
the police that he was being detained
unlawfully in the hospital. His lawyer
sued in the local court, alleging
violation of personal freedom and
being subjected to violence. He said,
“They did it simply because I am gay.
I don’t know how many other people
have been treated like this. They must
be held accountable.” There is some
precedent for the case. The report says
that in 2014 a court in Beijing ordered a
group of psychologists in Chongqinq to
apologize to a man for subjecting him
to sexual orientation change efforts.
* * * A local labor dispute arbitration
committee in Guangzhou rejected a
petition by an HIV-positive man to be
reinstated to his job, taking the position
that “infectious disease prevention and
treatment regulations stipulating that
HIV-positive individuals should be
quarantined until they are proven to no
longer been infectious are still in effect.”
The individual, using the pseudonym
Ah Ming, said that he would ask the

National Health and Family Planning
Commission to explain its reasons for
requiring a quarantine, contending that
this violates national policy. Global
Times, June 24.
COSTA RICA – The Social Security
Agency announced on June 10 that it
will extend pension payments to the
surviving partner of same-sex couples
when one member has died. The
country’s LGBT community has been
lobbying for this change for many years.
A member of the agency’s board, Jose
Luis Loria, said that he was “satisfied”
that gay people would be treated equally
to heterosexual widows or widowers,
according to a June 10 report by Agence
France Presse English Wire.
CZECH REPUBLIC – The Constitutional
Court has overturned a law that banned
individual gays and lesbians living in
a registered partnership from adopting
children. The Court said that the ban
was discriminatory because individual
gays and lesbians who did not live in a
registered partnership were allowed to
adopt. However, the opinion does not
approve joint adoptions by same-sex
couples. Associated Press, June 28.
FRANCE – Following the example
of the U.K. and the U.S., the French
government announced on July 11
that it was modifying its regulations
on blood donation to end the lifetime
disqualification of anybody who had
engaged in gay sex. Gay men will be
allowed to donate blood provided they
certify that they have not engaged in
sexual activity with another man for at
least a year prior to the donation date.
The one-year rule has been criticized as
unrealistically long, given the current
level of accuracy of HIV-antibody
testing and the likelihood that most gay
men will continue to be excluded under
its application. New Europe, July 12.

GREECE – Agence France Presse
English Wire reported on June 3 that
a gay Syrian man whose asylum claim
was rejected by Greece would be sent to
Turkey under a controversial agreement
brokered by the European Union, under
which failed asylum seekers would be
sent to Turkey in light of the migrant
crisis affecting Europe. The man’s
application for asylum was rejected
and a Board of Appeal ruled that it was
safe for him to return to Turkey, but a
representative of the Greek Council
for Refugees said that they would try
to appeal the ruling further. The man
claimed to have fled Istanbul after living
there several years because he had been
threatened due to his sexual orientation.
Previously the board had granted
asylum to people in similar situations,
but the system has been overwhelmed
by the flood of migrants from Syria.
INDIA – The state of Kerala has
become the first to announce a pension
scheme for transgender individuals over
60 years of age, in a proposed new state
budget. Kerala was also a leader in
establishing a state Transgender Policy
last year marking an affirmative effort
by the government to hire transgender
people to fill civil service vacancies,
and to end stigma and discrimination
against transgender residents. Merinews,
July 9. * * * The Supreme Court on
June 29 refused to take up a new petition
challenging the validity of the colonialera sodomy law, stating that it would refer
the petition to the Chief Justice to decide
whether it should be heard together
with several curative petitions that are
pending before a panel of the court.
Indianexpress.com, June 29. * * * The
sodomy law, Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code, is still being enforced, as
exemplified by a ruling on June 29 by
the Bombay High Court, which rejected
a plea filed by a 33-year-old man who
is subject to criminal proceedings for
a consensual sexual relationship with a
27-year-old man. “A division bench of
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Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Amjad
Sayed said it cannot be said it is not an
offence against society, especially after
the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of the penal section,” reported the
Hindustan Times on June 30. The police
became involved because the man’s wife
discovered evidence of the relationship
and reported it. * * * The Supreme Court
issued a statement on June 30, clarifying
that its 2014 ruling concerning rights
of transgender people was not meant
to affect the rights of lesbians, gay men
or bisexuals. The Ministry of Social
Justice and Empowerment had sought
clarification as to whether LGB people
were included in the Court’s mandate
to treat transgenders in the Other
Backward Classes category for purposes
of affirmative efforts in education and
employment. The Pioneer, July 1.
ISRAEL – A planned Pride March in
Beersheba was cancelled by organizers
in response to an order from Israel’s
Supreme Court, granted in response to
an application by security officials, to
abandon the planned parade route for
a less prominent route. The court said
that police intelligence assessments
suggested that a march along the
planned route would incite a violent
response, and Israeli security officials
are now gun-shy as a result of anti-gay
violence resulting in a murder at last
year’s Jerusalem Pride. The organizers
said they would hold a protest rally
instead of a march. This was to have
been Beersheba’s first Pride March.
Thai News Service, July 15.
JAPAN – Naha City, the capital of
Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, has become
the fifth local government in Japan to
adopt a measure recognizing same-sex
partnerships as equivalent to marriage.
Same-sex couples can obtain certificates
recognizing their partnerships provided
both members of the couple are age
20 or older. The certification system
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is intended to aid same-sex couples
in making housing applications and
being recognized as next-of-kin in
relevant situations. Application form
are available on the city’s website, and
submissions were accepted beginning
July 11. Kyodo News, July 8.
KENYA – In a ruling that drew outraged
comments from the international
human
rights
community
and
suggestions that international treaties
be amended expressly to address the
issue, Judge M.J. Anyara Emukule of
the High Court of Kenya ruled that anal
examinations of individuals charged
with homosexual acts are not a violation
of human rights under the nation’s
constitution or international treaty
obligations. He rejected the contention
of the petitioners that they had not
freely consented to the examinations,
and asserted that “the right to fair trial”
guaranteed in the constitution “does
not, with respect, extend to excluding
an accused from medical examination.”
He asserted: “on matters of sodomy or
acts against the order of nature as is
envisaged in Section 162 of the Penal
Code, rectal or anal examination is
according to current medical science,
and constitution of the human anatomy,
the only way of examination to show
whether the anus is dry or has been
subjected to application of medical
lubricants for ease of anal penetration.
The anus, unlike the vagina, has no
natural lubrication. There is no other
part of the human body which to carry
out the medical examination. Whether
the examination was reasonable or not
is a question of fact which only the trial
court or as the case may be the appellate
Court after ascertaining all the facts
may determine and, whether or not
the person who took the samples was
ignorant or negligent. Was there, was
there no anal sex? Those are questions
before the trial, not the Constitutional,
court.” COL & GMN v. Kwale, Petition
No. 21 of 2015 (June 16, 2016).

MALTA – The government announced
on July 8 that all ministries are
supposed to introduce gender-neutral
restroom facilities in their buildings by
September, in order to “ensure a nonjudgmental or exclusive environment for
all,” according to an official statement.
While there would still be male and
female only facilities, at least a third
of all restroom facilities would have
to be designated as gender neutral.
Under the country’s recently enacted
Gender Identity Law, individuals are not
required to obtain medical intervention
in order to effect a legal change of gender
based on their self-determined gender
identity. Malta is the smallest European
Union nation, but now occupies the “top
spot” on the Rainbow Map of Europe
charting LGBT-friendly government
policies. dpa International, July 8.
MEXICO – Another state heard from.
The Morelos state congress approved a
reform of the state constitution to allow
for same-sex marriage. This was subject
to approval by the municipalities within
the state, a majority being required.
Under the rules for this procedure, a
municipality that failed to act on the
proposal would be counted as a yes
vote. Somewhat controversially, the
congress declared that the measure
had been adopted, based on its claim
that of the State’s 33 municipalities,
12 municipalities voted in favor, 15
were opposed, 5 failed to act, and one
obtained an extension because of a delay
in notification. The five that failed to act
were automatically being counted as
“yes” votes and establishing a majority
to amend the constitution. Groups
opposed to the measure protested,
claiming that some of the “fictional”
yes votes came from municipalities that
had actually voted no but had failed to
submit the certification of their vote by
the deadline, and threatening to sue.
Morelos became the 10th state to be
added to the marriage equality list, in
addition to Mexico City, and was said

INTERNATIONAL
to be the first to do so by amending its
state constitution. This account is based
on reporting by internet journalist Rex
Wockner, who maintains a running
commentary on his blog about the
unfolding story of marriage equality in
Mexico. * * * Coalescing around the
ongoing struggle to spread marriage
equality nationwide, activists have
formed a new national LGBT rights
movement organization, MOViiMX,
which can be contacted through the
website www.moviimx.org.
NORTHERN IRELAND – Health
Minister Michelle O’Neill announced
on June 2 that Northern Ireland was
following the lead of the U.K. in lifting
the lifetime ban on men donating blood.
Henceforth there would be a one-year
deferral period, so only men who affirm
that they have not had sex with another
man during the previous 12-month
period will be allowed to donate blood.
WashingtonPost.com, June 2.
NORWAY – On June 7 the Norwegian
Parliament approved a new healthcare
law under which transgender people
can self-declare their appropriate legal
gender. The measure ended requirements
of compulsory psychiatric evaluations,
diagnoses of gender dysphoria and
sterilization surgery as a prerequisite
to recognizing legal gender. A report
by Human Rights Watch asserted that
this made Norway the fourth country
in Europe to separate medical and
legal processes for recognizing gender
identity, the others being Denmark
and Ireland (through internal political
action) and Malta (in response to a
ruling by the European Court of Human
Rights). According to the report, 41
states in Europe have legal gender
recognition provisions in place, 35 of
which require a psychiatric diagnosis
and 24 requiring surgical sterilization
before a legal change of status will be
recognized. The Norwegian Ministry

of Health proposed the new law. Plus
Media Premium Official News, June 8.
PAKISTAN – Local media reported
on June 27 that 50 clerics had issued a
fatwa (religious decree) providing that
marriage with a transgender person
is lawful. According to the fatwa, a
transgender person having “visible signs
of being a male” can marry a woman,
and a transgender person having “visible
signs of being a female” can marry a
man. But somebody who carries “visible
signs of both genders” must remain
single. The fatwa also condemned any
act intended to “humiliate, insult or
tease” transgender people, and declared
that funeral rituals for transgender
people should be consistent with those
exhibiting the same gender traits. Daily
Regional Times, June 28.
PORTUGAL – President Marcelo Rebelo
de Sousa vetoed a law authorizing noncompensated surrogacy where a woman
cannot conceive a child, but approved
a measure allowing lesbian couples
and single women access to in-vitro
fertilization services with donated sperm
in order to have children. The surrogacy
legislation had passed by a slim margin
over strong opposition by the Catholic
Church, which remains politically
influential in Portugal. An attempt
might be made for a legislative override
of the veto. Surrogacy is controversial
in Europe, with France, Germany and
Italy prohibiting the practice. Britain,
Ireland, Denmark and Belgium allow
“altruistic surrogacy,” typically where a
woman does a favor for a woman who
cannot conceive children and is not
compensated for her services apart for
reimbursement of expenses. Agence
France Presse English Wire, June 8.
SWITZERLAND – The Parliament
voted June 17 in favor of stepchild
adoption by a vote of 125-86 with 3

abstentions. This is expected to open
up the possibility for second parent
adoptions by same-sex couples raising
children. NELFA, June 17. * * * Swiss
health authorities announced their
intention to end the lifetime ban on
blood donation by gay men, moving to
a one year deferral period as several
other countries have recently done. The
theory is that if a gay man has abstained
from sex for at least a year, it is highly
unlikely that his blood will carry HIV
if it tests negative using currently
available screening tests. thelocal.ch,
June 21.
TAIWAN (REPUBLIC OF CHINA)
– Changhua County is offering samesex couples the right to record their
partnerships at household registration
offices. Although the record does
not create legal rights, it is symbolic
of the local government’s support in
the ongoing struggle to achieve legal
recognition for same-sex couples. The
county’s action follows similar measure
adopted in Hsinchu County and in the
cities of Chiayi, Kaohsiun, New Tapei,
Taichung, Tainan, Taipei and Taoyuan.
The nine municipalities cover over 75
percent of the nation’s population, and
to date more than 500 same-sex couples
have taken advantage of the right to
register their partnerships. Thai News
Service, June 30.
TURKEY – Authorities in Istanbul
banned an annual gay pride march on
purported security grounds. Although
modern Turkey no longer outlaws
private
consensual
homosexual
conduct, gay people in Turkey complain
of harassment and abuse, especially
as the Erdogan administration has
been leading the country towards
Islamisation. Erdogan has avoided
addressing gay issues directly. Agence
France Presse English Wire, June 17.
Early in July there was a failed attempt
by dissidents in the military to stage
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a coup. How this might affect future
relations between the government and
the LGBT community was uncertain.
UNITED KINGDOM – The Women
and Equalities Minister, Nicky Morgan,
announced on July 9 that the government
would undertake a review of the
Gender Recognition Act with an eye to
improving the process for determining
legal gender without reference to
surgical procedures. The review is
intended to reduce “unnecessary red
tape” and adopt a streamlined process
that will be easier for transgender
residents to navigate. The goal will be
to achieve legal and social equality for
transgender people. European Union
News, July 9. The article reporting
on this, although dated July 9, did
not say anything about whether the
change in leadership flowing from the
Brexit vote would affect these plans,
possibly because as of that date it was
expected that the Cameron government
would function until October as the
Conservative Party determined who
would succeed David Cameron as
Prime Minister. By July 12, however, all
competition to Theresa May, the Home
Secretary, had fallen by the wayside,
and she took office on July 13. * * *
The Bristol Evening Post reported
July 6 that a gay man from Nigeria
who had been denied asylum in the
U.K. was immediately imprisoned upon
being delivered back to Nigeria, and
authorities there took the resettlement
money that the U.K. Home Office had
given to him upon his departure. He
was held for seven days before being
released, presumably with a warning
to refrain from violating the country’s
sodomy law, which carries potential
penalties of imprisonment up to 14 years
or stoning (quite Biblical). That the
British Home Office sees no ground for
asylum for gay refugees from Nigeria
is incredible but unfortunately true,
even in a case such as this, where the
petitioner had fled Nigeria after “being
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viciously assaulted with his partner, who
died as a result of the injuries inflicted
upon them.” It apparently made not
different to U.K. authorities that Nigeria
is officially one of the world’s most
outspokenly anti-gay countries. * * *
The new Prime Minister, Theresa May,
announced the appointment of Justine
Greening to be Education Minister.
Greening, who had recently come out as
a lesbian, is the first Education Minister
who is a product of a comprehensive
state secondary school.

PROFESSIONAL NOTES
THE NATIONAL LGBT LAW
ASSOCIATION’S LAVENDER LAW
CONFERENCE will be held in
Washington, D.C., on August 4-6.
The keynote speaker will be STUART
DELERY, whose recent service as
Acting Associate Attorney General,
the number three position in the Justice
Department, made him the highest
ranking openly gay attorney in that
Department’s history. The event will
be held at the Renaissance Washington
D.C. Downtown Hotel.
TLDEF –THE TRANSGENDER LEGAL
DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND
announced that its new Executive
Director is JILLIAN WEISS, a
transgender New York attorney. Weiss is
a tenured professor at Ramapo College.
She earned her law degree at Seton
Hall University. She maintained a law
practice in addition to her teaching job,
and has litigated precedent-setting cases
on behalf of transgender plaintiffs. She is
only the second ED in the organization’s
history, following the retirement of its
founding director, Michael Silverman.
For their work advancing the legal
rights of transgender people, both Weiss
and Silverman have received the Arthur
S. Leonard Award from the New York
City Bar Association. Weiss’s law firm

associate, Ezra Young, will join her at
TLDEF as a staff attorney.
Having wound up affairs at Freedom
to Marry, Executive Director EVAN
WOLFSON is joining the international
law firm Dentons as senior counsel.
He hopes to advise the firm on its
internal human rights policies as well as
providing counsel to clients on similar
matters. In recent months Wolfson has
traveled to several different countries, in
some cases at the invitation of local U.S.
embassies, to speak with local activists
about strategies for achieving marriage
equality. He will be based in the firm’s
New York City office. Wall Street
Journal Law Blog, June 23.
On June 7, openly transgender Judge
VICTORIA KOLAKOWSKI was reelected for a seat on the Alameda
County Superior Court. She is the
only openly transgender person to hold
elective office in California. When
she was first sworn in, she became the
second openly transgender trial judge in
the nation, as Houston, Texas, Associate
Municipal Court Judge PHYLLIS FRYE
was appointed and sworn in between
Judge Kolakowski’s first election and
her inauguration, thus becoming the
first openly transgender sitting judge!
Former U.S. Solicitor General DONALD
B. VERRILLI, JR., who argued for
the Obama Administration before the
Supreme Court to invalidate DOMA
and strike down state bans on samesex marriage, was the featured keynote
speaker at Lambda Legal’s annual
reception in Washington, D.C., on June 15.
(Previous speakers at this event included
Attorneys General ERIC HOLDER and
LORETTA LYNCH.) Lambda’s National
Director of Constitutional Litigation,
SUSAN SOMMER, was the other
featured speaker at the event, held at the
Newseum.

The LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF
GREATER NEW YORK 2016 Pride
Reception on June 16 included a
Roundtable Discussion on the Equality
Act now pending in Congress. Panelists
were former LeGaL President and
Law Notes Editor ART LEONARD,
former NYC Council Speaker Christine
Quinn, and transgender rights activist
and Democratic National Committee
Executive Committee Member Babs
Siperstein. U.S. Rep. David Cicilline
(D-R.I.), lead sponsor of the bill in
the House, intended to participate, but
weather conditions grounded his flight
from D.C.
“Greene” cont. from pg. 273
Interestingly, it appears that the
court rejected Greene’s assertion
because she did not allege any of the
three supporting factors discussed in
Butler, even though the Butler court
had weighted the nine factors equally
and had not set a bright-line threshold
necessary to establish an employment
relationship. These observations were
not lost on Chief Judge William Byrd
Traxler Jr., who dissented and clarified
that the first three factors listed in the
Butler test were intended to have the
most weight. Furthermore, he believed
that Greene alleged enough facts to
satisfy these three most important
factors: that Harris (1) reserved the
authority to hire and fire; (2) required
day-to-day supervision of Greene, and
even designated an employee to do so;
and (3) furnished the equipment she
used and her place of work.
As demonstrated by the 4th Circuit
and its creation of a nine-factor test,
both state and federal definitions
of employment currently fail to
encompass all the various types of
contracts and arrangements existing
between workers and their clients.
Until these definitions are broadened to
encompass the employment landscape
as it is, protections enacted against
employment-related discrimination—
whether it is based on sexual orientation
or any other type—fall short of the
legislation’s intended goal: to provide
workplace victims a way of obtaining
relief. – Timothy Ramos, NYLS ‘19
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decision; wildly overblown, and full of
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